Document: Macalintal vs. Commission On Elections, G.R. Nos. 263590 & 263673 (DSR-G.R. Nos. 263590 & 263673) | Section: ART. 7. Laws are repealed only by subsequent ones, and their violation or non-observance shall not be excused by disuse or custom or practice to the contrary.

The doctrine of operative fact is an exception to the general rule, such that a judicial declaration of invalidity may not necessarily obliterate all the effects and consequences of a void act prior to such declaration. In Serrano de Agbayani v. Philippine National Bank, the application of the doctrine of operative fact was discussed as follows:

The decision now on appeal reflects the orthodox view that an unconstitutional act, for that matter an executive order or a municipal ordinance likewise suffering from that infirmity, cannot be the source of any legal rights or duties. Nor can it justify any official act taken under it. Its repugnancy to the fundamental law once judicially declared results in its being to all intents and purposes a mere scrap of paper. As the new Civil Code puts it: 'When the courts declare a law to be inconsistent with the Constitution, the former shall be void and the latter shall govern. Administrative or executive acts, orders and regulations shall be valid only when they are not contrary to the laws of the Constitution.' It is understandable why it should be so, the Constitution being supreme and paramount. Any legislative or executive act contrary to its terms cannot survive.

Such a view has support in logic and possesses the merit of simplicity. It may not however be sufficiently realistic. It does not admit of doubt that prior to the declaration of nullity such challenged legislative or executive act must have been in force and had to be complied with. This is so as until after the judiciary, in an appropriate case, declares its invalidity, it is entitled to obedience and respect. Parties may have acted under it and may have changed their positions. What could be more fitting than that in a subsequent litigation regard be had to what has been done while such legislative or executive act was in operation and presumed to be valid in all respects. It is now accepted as a doctrine that prior to its being nullified, its existence as a fact must be reckoned with. This is merely to reflect awareness that precisely because the judiciary is the governmental organ which has the final say on whether or not a legislative or executive measure is valid, a period of time may have elapsed before it can exercise the power of judicial review that may lead to a declaration of nullity. It would be to deprive the law of its quality of fairness and justice then, if there be no recognition of what had transpired prior to such adjudication. aCIHcD

Document: The Doctrine of Operative Fact (CASE-AUQ148-rw) | Section: Document Body

The decision now on appeal reflects the orthodox view that an unconstitutional act, for that matter an executive order or a municipal ordinance likewise suffering from that infirmity, cannot be the source of any legal rights or duties. Nor can it justify any official act taken under it. Its repugnancy to the fundamental law once judicially declared results in its being to all intents and purposes a mere scrap of paper. As the New Civil Code puts it: “When courts declare a law to be inconsistent with the Constitution, the former shall be void and the latter shall govern.” Administrative or executive acts, orders and regulations shall be valid only when they are not contrary to the laws of the Constitution. It is understandable why it should be so, the Constitution being supreme and paramount. Any legislative or executive act contrary to its terms cannot survive.

Such a view has support in logic and possesses the merit of simplicity. It may not however be sufficiently realistic. It does not admit of doubt that prior to the declaration of nullity such challenged legislative or executive act must have been in force and had to be complied with. This is so as until after the

699

judiciary, in an appropriate case, declares its invalidity, it is entitled to obedience and respect. Parties may have acted under it and may have changed their positions. What could be more fitting than that in a subsequent litigation regard be had to what has been done while such legislative or executive act was in operation and presumed to be valid in all respects. It is now accepted as a doctrine that prior to its being nullified, its existence as a fact must be reckoned with. This is merely to reflect awareness that precisely because the judiciary is the governmental organ which has the final say on whether or not a legislative or executive measure is valid, a period of time may have elapsed before it can exercise the power of judicial review that may lead to a declaration of nullity. It would be to deprive the law of its quality of fairness and justice then, if there be no recognition of what had transpired prior to such adjudication.

In the language of an American Supreme Court decision: “The actual existence of a statute prior to such a determination [of constitutionally], is an operative fact and may have consequences which cannot justly be ignored. The past cannot always be erased by a new judicial declaration. The effect of the subsequent ruling as to invalidity may have to be considered in various aspects — with respect to particular relations, individual and corporate, and particular conduct, private and official.” (De Agbayani v. Philippine National Bank, 38 SCRA 429 [1971]; Manila Motor Co., Inc. v. Flores, 99 Phil. 738 [1956])

§ 3. The doctrine of operative fact is incorporated in Sec. 246 of the Tax Code

Document: The Doctrine of Operative Fact (CASE-AUQ148-rw) | Section: Document Body

“The doctrine of operative fact, as an exception to the general rule, only applies as a matter of equity and fair play. It nullifies the effects of an unconstitutional law by recognizing that the existence of a statue prior to a determination of unconstitutionality is an operative fact and may have consequences which cannot always be ignored. The past cannot always be erased by a new judicial declaration. The doctrine is applicable when a declaration of unconstitutionality will impose an undue burden on those who have relied on the invalid law.” (Chavez v. Judicial and Bar Council, 676 SCRA 579 [2012])

§ 5. The doctrine of operative fact is an exception to the general rule, such that a judicial declaration of invalidity may not necessarily obliterate all the effects and consequences of a void act prior to such declaration

“The doctrine of operative fact is an exception to the general rule, such that a judicial declaration of invalidity may not necessarily obliterate all the effects and consequences of a void act prior to such declaration.

Clearly, for the operative fact doctrine to apply, there must be a ‘legislative or executive measure,’ meaning a law or executive issuance that is invalidated by the court. From the passage of such law or promulgation of such executive issuance until its invalidation by the court, the effects of the law or executive issuance, when relied upon by the public in good faith, may have to be recognized as valid.” (Commissioner of Internal Revenue v. San Roque Power Corporation, 707 SCRA 66 [2013])

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§ 6. The judiciary has the final say on whether a legislative or executive measure is valid or void

“The doctrine merely reflects awareness that precisely because the judiciary is the governmental organ which has the final say on whether or not a legislative or executive measure is valid, a period of time may have elapsed before it can exercise the power of judicial review that may lead to a declaration of nullity. It would be to deprive the law of its quality of fairness and justice then, if there be no recognition of what had transpired prior to such adjudication.” (Belgica v. Ochoa, Jr., 710 SCRA 1 [2013])

§ 7. Actions previous to the declaration of unconstitutionality are legally recognized

Document: The Doctrine of Operative Fact (CASE-AUQ148-rw) | Section: Document Body

x x x    x x x    x x x

The doctrine of operative fact, as an exception to the general rule, only applies as a matter of equity and fair play. It nullifies the effects of an unconstitutional law by recognizing that the existence of a statute prior to a determination of unconstitutionality is an operative fact and may have consequences which cannot always be ignored. The past cannot always be erased by a new judicial declaration. The doctrine is applicable when a declaration of unconstitutionality will impose an undue burden on those who have relied on the invalid law. Thus it was applied to a criminal case when a declaration of unconstitutionality would put the accused in double jeopardy or would put in limbo the acts done by a mu704

nicipality in reliance upon a law creating it. (Planters Products, Inc. v. Fertiphil Corporation, 548 SCRA 485 [2008]. See also Navarro v. Ermita, 648 SCRA 400 [2011]; Navarro v. Ermita, was first discussed in 612 SCRA 131 [2010], where the Supreme Court declared R.A. 9355 otherwise known as An Act Creating the Province of Dinagat Islands as unconstitutional. A Motion for Reconsideration was denied in 620 SCRA 529 [2010] but it was reconsidered in 648 SCRA 400 [2011] using the operative fact doctrine as one of the reasons for its reconsideration)

x x x    x x x    x x x

§ 8. When will the doctrine not apply

It is highly inappropriate to apply the operative fact doctrine when it would be iniquitous and serve injustice to the Government and to the people who contributed to public funds. (Philippine Coconut Producers Federation, Inc. [COCOFED] v. Republic, 663 SCRA 514 [2012])

§ 9. The operative fact doctrine can never be invoked to validate as constitutional an unconstitutional act

Document: The Doctrine of Operative Fact (CASE-AUQ148-rw) | Section: Document Body

“The existence of such law and issuances is an ‘operative fact’ to which legal consequences have attached. This court is constrained to give legal effect to the acts done in consonance with such executive and legislative acts; to do otherwise would work patent injustice on respondents.” (Chavez v. National Housing Authority, 530 SCRA 235, 335-336 [2007]; Hacienda Luisita, Incorporated v. Presidential Agrarian Reform Council, 653 SCRA 154, 291 [2011])

x x x    x x x    x x x

“For as we have held, a void act though in law a mere scrap of paper nonetheless confers legitimacy upon past acts or omissions done in reliance thereof. Consequently, the existence of a statute or executive order prior to its being adjudged void is an operative fact to which legal consequences are attached.” (City Government of Makati City v. Civil Service Commission, 376 SCRA 248 [2002])

x x x    x x x    x x x

“The courts below have proceeded on the theory that the Act of Congress, having been found to be unconstitutional,

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was not a law; that it was inoperative, conferring no rights and imposing no duties, and hence affording no basis for the challenged decree. It is quite clear however, that such broad statements as to the effect of a determination of unconstitutionality must be taken with qualifications. The actual existence of a statute prior to the determination of its invalidity is an operative fact and may have consequences which cannot just be ignored. The past cannot always be erased by a new judicial declaration. The effect of the subsequent ruling as to invalidity may have to be considered in various aspects — with respect to particular relations, individual and corporate, and particular conduct, private or official. Questions of rights claimed to have become vested, of status, of prior determinations deemed to have finality and acted upon accordingly, of public policy in the light of the nature both of the statute and of its previous application, demand examination. These questions are among the most difficult of those which have engaged the attention of courts, state and federal, and it is manifest from numerous decisions that an all-inclusive statement of a principle of absolute retroactive invalidity cannot be justified.” (Municipality of Malabang, Lanao del Sur v. Benito, 27 SCRA 533, 540 [1969]; Rieta v. People, 436 SCRA 273 [2004])

Document: Versoza vs. Versoza, G.R. No. L-25609 (DSR-G.R. No. L-25609) | Section: Article 1814 of the Spanish Civil Code was reproduced in Article

Article 1814 of the Spanish Civil Code was reproduced in Article

2035 of the new Civil Code - in an expanded form - as follows:

"ART. 2035.  No compromise upon the following questions shall be valid:

(1) The civil status of persons;

(2) The validity of a marriage or a legal separation;

(3) Any ground for legal separation;

(4) Future support;

(5) The Jurisdiction of courts;

(6) Future Legitime."

It thus appears that Article 2035 has roots deeper than Article 222.  For, whereas Article 222 is inserted as a new concept in the present Code in a laudable effort to obviate a sad and tragic spectacle occasioned by a litigation between members of the same family, Article 2035 firmly maintains the ancient Injunction against compromise on matters involving future support.  And this is as it should be.  For, even as Article 222 requires earnest efforts at a compromise and inability to reach one as a condition precedent to the filing and maintenance of a suit "between the members of the same family", that same article took good care to add: "subject to the limitations in article 2035."

Plaintiffs ask for support past, present and future.  There is also the prayer for alimony pendente lite.  Since the present action also revolves on the right to future support and because compromise on future support is proscribed,[14] then the conclusion is irresistible that an attempt at compromise of future support and failure thereof is not a condition precedent to the filing of the present suit.  It need not be alleged in the Complaint.  The very opening statement in Article 2035 unmistakably confirms our view.  It says that "(n)o compromise upon the following questions shall be valid: x x x (4) Future support."[15] We cannot afford to give a loose view to this controlling statute.  We may not disregard it.  To do so is to misread the law, to write off an explicit congressional will, to cross the line which circumscribes courts of justice and step into legislative area.

Document: Survey of Existing Laws that Provide for Alternative Modes of Dispute (CASE-534 SCRA 743) | Section: § 1. Civil Code Provisions

§ 1. Civil Code Provisions

The Philippine Civil Code provides for the submission of a dispute to arbitration.

The pertinent provisions are as follows:

ART. 2042. The same persons who may enter into a compromise may submit their controversies to one or more arbitrators for decision.

ART. 2043. The provisions of the preceding Chapter upon compromise shall also be applicable to arbitrations.

ART. 2044. Any stipulation that the arbitrator’s award or decision shall be final, is valid, without prejudice to Articles 2038, 2039, and 2040.

ART. 2045. Any clause giving one of the parties power to choose more arbitrators than the other is void and of no effect.

ART. 2046. The appointment of arbitrators and the procedure for arbitration shall be governed by the provisions of such rules of courts as the Supreme Court shall promulgate.

It must be noted that although the Civil Code allows the same persons who may enter into a compromise to submit their controversies to arbitration, compromise is different from arbitration. Arbitration is the conventional substitution of the ordinary jurisdiction of courts with the special jurisdiction of arbitrators while in compromise, the decision settling the controversy is made by the parties themselves. It is in effect, an act of alienation, transijir es enajenar.

According to the Code Commission which drafted the Civil Code, “reciprocal concession” sits at the very heart and life of every compromise. Hence, a lean compromise is better than a fat lawsuit.

Moreover, in various decisions of the Supreme Court, once a compromise has been accepted, it is binding upon the parties provided consent was not vitiated even if such agreement may turn out to be unfavourable to either or both parties. This is because both parties to a compromise agreement signed the same willingly and voluntarily and any judgment based thereon has the effect of res judicata.

Effect of ADR Law

As with the Arbitration Law, the ADR Law did not repeal the provisions of the Civil Code on Arbitration or on Compromise.

Document: Morales vs. Biagtas, G.R. No. L-17193 (DSR-G.R. No. L-17193) | Section: article 1606 of the new Civil Code could be invoked, still such redemption or

article 1606 of the new Civil Code could be invoked, still such redemption or

repurchase could be made within thirty days from the date of final judgment rendered in a civil action where the issue or controversy between the parties concerns with or involves the juridical nature or character of the contract. There being no issue or controversy as to the juridical nature or character of the contract in question, the provisions of the new Code invoked by the appellees cannot be applied.

The order appealed from is set aside, without pronouncement as to costs.

Bengzon, C. J., Bautista Angelo, Labrador, Concepcion, Reyes, J. B. L., Barrera, Paredes, Regala, and Makalintal, JJ., concur.

[1] Perez vs. Zulueta, 106 Phil., 264.

[2] Magayano vs. Gapuan, 33 Phil., 453.

Document: People vs. Marino, G.R. Nos. 89404-05 (DSR-G.R. Nos. 89404-05) | Section: Article 2202, New Civil Code.

Article 2202, New Civil Code.

Document: Barretto vs. Tuason, G.R. Nos. 36811 and 36827 and 36840 and 36872 (DSR-G.R. Nos. 36811 and 36827 and 36840 and 36872) | Section: Article 1939 of the present Civil Code provides

Article 1939 of the present Civil Code provides:

"ART. 1939. Prescription which began to run before the publication of this Code shall be governed by the prior law; but if, after this Code took effect, all the time required by the same for prescription has elapsed, it shall be sufficient even if according to such prior law a longer period of time would have been required."

And article 1301 of the same Code provides:

"ART . 1301. The action of annulment shall last four years.

"The term shall commence to run—

"In cases of intimidation or violence from the day on which it has ceased;

"In those of error or deceit or falsity of consideration, from the date of the consummation of the contract;

"When the purpose of the action is to invalidate the unauthorized contracts of a married woman, from the date of the dissolution of the marriage;

"With respect to contracts made by minors or incapacitated persons, from the date they were released from guardianship."

According to these provisions, the action of annulment, admitting that it had not yet prescribed when the Civil Code took effect in these Islands on December 7, 1889 (Mijares vs. Nery, 3 Phil., 195), should have been commenced by the impugners of the sales within the four (4) years following the taking effect of the Civil Code, which was not done.

The rules of prescription found in the Code of Civil Procedure, Act No. 190, are not applicable to the action of annulment under consideration, because according to section 38 thereof, the prescriptive period provided in former statutes should be applied to rights of action which have already accrued before it went into effect.

Document: Heirs Of Sotto vs. Palicte, G.R. No. 159691 (DSR-G.R. No. 159691) | Section: Section 47 (b) Rule 39 of the Rules of Court institutionalizes the doctrine of Res Judicata in the concept of bar by prior judgment, *viz

The doctrine of Res Judicata is an old axiom of law, dictated by wisdom and sanctified by age, and founded on the broad principle that it is to the interest of the public that there should be an end to litigation by the same parties over a subject once fully and fairly adjudicated. It has been appropriately said that the doctrine is a rule pervading every well-regulated system of jurisprudence, and is put upon two grounds embodied in various maxims of the common law: one, public policy and necessity, which makes it to the interest of the State that there should be an end to litigation ÔÇôinterest reipublicae ut sit finis litium; the other, the hardship on the individual that he should be vexed twice for one and the same cause ÔÇô nemo debet bis vexari pro una et eadem causa. A contrary doctrine would subject the public peace and quiet to the will and neglect of individuals and prefer the gratification of the litigious disposition on the part of suitors to the preservation of the public tranquillity and happiness.[19] The doctrine is to be applied with rigidity because:

x x x the maintenance of public order, the repose of society, and the quiet of families require that what has been definitely determined by competent tribunals shall be accepted as irrefragable legal truth. So deeply is this principle implanted in xxx jurisprudence that commentators upon it have said, theRes Judicatarenders white that which is black and straight that which is crooked.Facit excurvo rectum, ex albo nigrum.No other Evidence can afford strength to the presumption of truth it creates, and no argument can detract from its legal efficacy.[20]

Document: De Ramos vs. Court of Appeals (G.R) (CASE-213 SCRA 207) | Section: Syllabi

Syllabi

• Civil Procedure; Res Judicata.—The doctrine of res judicata is an old axiom of the law, dictated by wisdom and sanctified by age, and is founded on the broad principle that it is to the interest of the public that there should be an end to litigation by the same parties over a subject once fully and fairly adjudicated. It is “a rule pervading every well-regulated system of jurisprudence, and is put upon two grounds embodied in various maxims of the common law; the one, public policy and necessity, which makes it to the interest of the state that there should be an end to litigation—republicae ut sit litium; the other, the hardship on the individual that he should be vexed twice for the same cause—nemo debet bis vexari et eadem causa.” A contrary doctrine would subject the public peace and quiet to the will and neglect of individuals and prefer the gratification of the litigious disposition on the part of suitors to the preservation of the public tranquility and happiness. The essential requisites of res judicata are (1) there must be a final judgment or order; (2) the court rendering it must have jurisdiction over the subject matter and over the parties; (3) it must be a judgment or order on the merits; and (4) there must be between the two cases identity of parties, identity of subject matter, and identity of action.

Document: Dioquino vs. Laureano, G.R. No. L-25906 (DSR-G.R. No. L-25906) | Section: Art. 1174 of the present Civil Code which is a restatement of Art. 1105 of the

Art. 1174 of the present Civil Code which is a restatement of Art. 1105 of the

Old Civil Code, except for the addition of the nature of an obligation requiring the assumption of risk, compels such a conclusion.  It reads thus: "Except in cases expressly specified by the law, or when is otherwise declared by stipulation, or when the nature of the obligation requires the assumption of risk, no person shall be responsible for those events which could not be foreseen, or which, though foreseen, were inevitable." Even under the old Civil Code then, as stressed by us in the first decision dating back to 1908, in an opinion by Justice Mapa, the rule was well-settled that in the absence of a legal provision or an express covenant, "no one should be held to account for fortuitous cases."[3] Its basis, as Justice Moreland stressed, is the Roman law principle major casus est, cui humana infirmitas resistere non potest.[4] Authorities of repute are in agreement, more specifically concerning an obligation arising from contract "that some extraordinary circumstance independent of the will of the obligor, or of his employees, is an essential element of a caso fortuito.[5] If it could be shown that such indeed was the case, liability is ruled out.  There is no requirement of "diligence beyond what human care and foresight can provide."[6]

The error committed by the lower court in holding defendant Federico Laureano liable appears to be thus obvious.  Its own findings of fact repel the notion that he should be made to respond in damages to the plaintiff for the broken windshield.  What happened was clearly unforeseen.  It was a fortuitous event resulting in a loss which must be borne by the owner of the car.  An element of reasonableness in the law would be manifestly lacking if, on the circumstances as thus disclosed, legal responsibility, could be imputed to an individual in the situation of defendant Laureano.  Art. 1174 of the Civil Code guards against the possibility of its being visited with such a reproach.  Unfortunately, the lower court was of a different mind and thus failed to heed its command.

Document: Colmenares vs Duterte (G.R. No. 245981) (CASE-AVR569-rw) | Section: Syllabi

by the lex contractus or “proper law of the contract.” This is the law voluntarily agreed upon by the parties (the lex loci voluntatis) or the law intended by them either expressly or implicitly (the lex loci intentionis). The law selected may be implied from such factors as substantial connection with the transaction, or the nationality or domicile of the parties. Philippine courts would do well to adopt the first and most basic rule in most legal systems, namely, to allow the parties to select the law applicable to their contract, subject to the limitation that it is not against the law, morals, or public policy of the forum and that the chosen law must bear a substantive relationship to the transaction. Indeed, in several contract disputes involving foreign elements, the Court has given primacy to the principle of lex loci intentionis, or the law intended by the parties. In much the same way, even while the Loan Agreements stipulate the application of Chinese law and appoint the CIETAC and HKIAC as arbitral tribunals, absent any showing that the assailed stipulations offend the law, morals, or public policy, the same must be sustained.

LEONEN, J., Dissenting Opinion:

Judicial Review; Grave Abuse of Discretion; View that under the present constitution, judicial review is no longer limited to the authority to settle actual controversies. It now includes the power “to determine whether or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality of the Government.” The incorporation of this new power was meant to narrow the reach of the political question doctrine and “to broaden the scope of judicial inquiry.”—Under the present constitution, judicial review is no longer limited to the authority to settle actual controversies. It now includes the power “to determine whether or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality of the Government.” The incorporation of this new power was meant to narrow the reach of the political question doctrine and “[to] broaden the scope of judicial inquiry[.]” Saguisag v. Ochoa, Jr., 779 SCRA 241 (2016), teaches: The power of judicial review has since been strengthened in the 1987 Constitution. The scope of that power has been extended to the determination of whether in matters traditionally considered to be within the sphere of appreciation of another branch of government, an exercise of discretion has been attended with grave abuse. The expansion of this

302

Document: Heirs of Romana Ingjug-Tiro vs. Casals (G.R. No. 56232,) (CASE-363 SCRA 435) | Section: Syllabi

In actions for reconveyance of property predicated on the fact that the conveyance complained of was null and void ab initio, a claim of prescription of action would be unavailing. “The action or defense for the declaration of the inexistence of a contract does not prescribe.” Neither could laches be invoked in the case at bar. Laches is a doctrine in equity and our courts are basically courts of law and not courts of equity. Equity, which has been aptly described as “justice outside legality,” should be applied only in the absence of, and never against, statutory law. Aequetas nunguam contravenit legis. The positive mandate of Art. 1410 of the New Civil Code conferring imprescriptibility to actions for declaration of the inexistence of a contract should pre-empt and prevail over all abstract arguments based only on equity. Certainly, laches cannot be set up to resist the enforcement of an imprescriptible legal right, and petitioners can validly vindicate their inheritance despite the lapse of time.

Document: Colmenares vs Duterte (G.R. No. 245981) (CASE-AVR569-rw) | Section: Syllabi

by the lex contractus or “proper law of the contract.” This is the law voluntarily agreed upon by the parties (the lex loci voluntatis) or the law intended by them either expressly or implicitly (the lex loci intentionis). The law selected may be implied from such factors as substantial connection with the transaction, or the nationality or domicile of the parties. Philippine courts would do well to adopt the first and most basic rule in most legal systems, namely, to allow the parties to select the law applicable to their contract, subject to the limitation that it is not against the law, morals, or public policy of the forum and that the chosen law must bear a substantive relationship to the transaction. Indeed, in several contract disputes involving foreign elements, the Court has given primacy to the principle of lex loci intentionis, or the law intended by the parties. In much the same way, even while the Loan Agreements stipulate the application of Chinese law and appoint the CIETAC and HKIAC as arbitral tribunals, absent any showing that the assailed stipulations offend the law, morals, or public policy, the same must be sustained.

LEONEN, J., Dissenting Opinion:

Judicial Review; Grave Abuse of Discretion; View that under the present constitution, judicial review is no longer limited to the authority to settle actual controversies. It now includes the power “to determine whether or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality of the Government.” The incorporation of this new power was meant to narrow the reach of the political question doctrine and “to broaden the scope of judicial inquiry.”—Under the present constitution, judicial review is no longer limited to the authority to settle actual controversies. It now includes the power “to determine whether or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality of the Government.” The incorporation of this new power was meant to narrow the reach of the political question doctrine and “[to] broaden the scope of judicial inquiry[.]” Saguisag v. Ochoa, Jr., 779 SCRA 241 (2016), teaches: The power of judicial review has since been strengthened in the 1987 Constitution. The scope of that power has been extended to the determination of whether in matters traditionally considered to be within the sphere of appreciation of another branch of government, an exercise of discretion has been attended with grave abuse. The expansion of this

302

Document: Bustamante vs. Rosel (G.R) (CASE-319 SCRA 413) | Section: Syllabi

Syllabi

• Civil Law; Contracts; Pactum Commissorium; Article 1306 of the Civil Code is one of the exceptions to the rule that contracts have the force of law between the contracting parties and must be complied with in good faith.—Respondents argue that contracts have the force of law between the contracting parties and must be complied with in good faith. There are, however, certain exceptions to the rule, specifically Article 1306 of the Civil Code, which provides: “Article 1306. The contracting parties may establish such stipulations, clauses, terms and conditions as they may deem convenient, provided they are not contrary to law, morals, good customs, public order, or public policy.” A scrutiny of the stipulation of the parties reveals a subtle intention of the creditor to acquire the property given as security for the loan. This is embraced in the concept of pactum commissorium, which is proscribed by law.

• Same; Same; Same; Elements of Pactum Commissorium.—“The elements of pactum commissorium are as follows: (1) there should be a property mortgaged by way of security for the payment of the principal obligation, and (2) there should be a stipulation for automatic appropriation by the creditor of the thing mortgaged in case of non-payment of the principal obligation within the stipulated period.”

PETITION for review on certiorari of a decision of the Court of Appeals.

The facts are stated in the resolutions of the Court.

Emerico B. Lomibao for petitioner.

Julio C. Contreras for private respondents.

Document: Batchelder vs. Central Bank (CASE-44 SCRA 45) | Section: Syllabi

1. We start with fundamentals. The Civil Code expressly provides that a contract is a meeting of minds between two persons whereby one binds himself with respect to the other to give something or render some service. The above provision is practically a restatement, with slight modification, of Article 1254 of the Civil Code of Spain of 1889, formerly enforced in our jurisdiction. Such an article, in the opinion of Justice J.B.L. Reyes, speaking for the Court, in A. Magsaysay, Inc. v. Cebu Portland Cement Co., requires that “the area of agreement must extend to all points that the parties deem material or there is no contract.” It is noteworthy that in his Outlines on Civil Law, with Judge Ricardo Puno as co-author, he speaks highly of Article 1321 of the Civil Code of Italy. It reads thus: “A contract is the accord of two (or more) persons (with previously diverging interests) for the purpose of creating, modifying or extinguishing a juridical relation between them.” Likewise all commentators on the Civil Code have agreed that the birth or perfection of a consensual contract, Article 1315, commences from the moment the parties come to an agreement on a definite subject matter and valid consideration. Justice Capistrano, who was with the Code Commission, and Senators Ambrosio Padilla and Arturo Tolentino, all three distinguished in the field of civil law, are substantially in agreement. Planiol states the following: “The consent of the parties, that is to say, the accord of wills, is the essential element of every contract * * *. The consent, in the matter of contracts, is composed of a double operation. (1) The parties must commence by agreeing as to the contents of the ‘convention’ that is to say, by making sufficiently precise the object and the essential conditions, and discussing the particular clauses which they desire to introduce to modify or to complete the ordinary effects * * *. (2) This first operation having been terminated, the parties are in accord on the projected contract: there is between them what Littre calls the uniformity of opinions, which is one sense of the word ‘consent’, but the contract is not concluded, it still exists in a projected state. There remains to give its obligatory force by an act of will, expressing the individual adherence of each one of the parties to the act thus prepared. * * *. When all the necessary consents (sic) are obtained, and manifested in legal form, the contract is formed, the lien of law is tied. It is therefore the union of these adherences (sic) which constitute the contract and which gives birth to the obligations which are derived from it. It is an act of volition, while the preliminary operation of discussion of the project is a work of the mind and reasoning.”

Document: Blas vs. Angeles-Hutalla (G.R) (CASE-439 SCRA 273) | Section: Syllabi

Syllabi

• Civil Law; Contracts; It is settled that the real nature of a contract may be determined from the express terms of the written agreement and from the contemporaneous and subsequent acts of the parties thereto.—It is settled that the real nature of a contract may be determined from the express terms of the written agreement and from the contemporaneous and subsequent acts of the parties thereto. In the construction or interpretation of an instrument, the intention of the parties is primordial and is to be pursued. If the terms of a contract are clear and leave no doubt upon the intention of the contracting parties, the literal meaning of its stipulations shall control. If the contract appears to be contrary to the evident intentions of the parties, the latter shall prevail over the former. The denomination given by the parties in their contract is not conclusive of the nature of the contents.

• Same; Same; The writings of the parties should be read and interpreted together in such a way as to render their intention effective.—The agreement of the parties may be embodied in only one contract or in two or more separate writings. In such event, the writings of the parties should be read and interpreted together in such a way as to render their intention effective.

• Same; Same; Contract of Sale; It must be stressed that a sale is at once perfected when a person (the seller) obligates himself, for a price certain, to deliver and to transfer ownership of a specified thing; or right to another (the buyer) over which the latter agrees.—It must be stressed that a sale is at once perfected when a person (the seller) obligates himself, for a price certain, to deliver and to transfer ownership of a specified thing or right to another (the buyer) over which the latter agrees. From the time the contract is perfected, the parties are bound not only to the fulfillment of what has been expressly stipulated but also to all the consequences which, according to their nature, may be in keeping with good faith, usage and law.

Document: Heirs of Dr Mario S Intac and Angelina MendozaIntac vs Court of Appeals (G.R. No. 173211) (CASE-ATE583-rw) | Section: Syllabi

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Civil Law; Contracts; Words and Phrases; A contract, as defined in the Civil Code, is a meeting of minds, with respect to the other, to give something or to render some service.―A contract, as defined in the Civil Code, is a meeting of minds, with respect to the other, to give something or to render some service. Article 1318 provides: Art. 1318. There is no contract unless the following requisites concur: (1) Consent of the contracting parties; (2) Object certain which is the subject matter of the contract; (3) Cause of the obligation which is established. Accordingly, for a contract to be valid, it must have three essential elements: (1) consent of the contracting parties; (2) object certain which is the subject matter of the contract; and (3) cause of the obligation which is established.

Same; Same; Simulated Contracts; If the parties state a false cause in the contract to conceal their real agreement, the contract is only relatively simulated and the parties are still bound by their real agreement.―If the parties state a false cause in the contract to conceal their real agreement, the contract is only relatively simulated and the parties are still bound by their real agreement. Hence, where the essential requisites of a contract are present and the simulation refers only to the content or terms of the contract, the agreement is absolutely binding and enforceable between the parties and their successors in interest.

Same; Same; Same; In absolute simulation, there is a colorable contract but it has no substance as the parties have no intention to be bound by it.―In absolute simulation, there is a colorable contract but it has no substance as the parties have no intention to be bound by it. “The main characteristic of an absolute simulation is that the apparent contract is not really desired or intended to produce legal effect or in any way alter the juridical situation of the parties.” “As aresult, an absolutely simulated or fictitious contract is void, and the parties may recover from each other what they may have given under the contract.”

Document: Ambrose vs SuqueAmbrose (G.R. No. 206761) (CASE-AVF387-rw) | Section: Syllabi

Lex loci celebrationis is a Latin term, literally translated as the law of the place of the ceremony. It means that the valid490

ity of a contract is governed by the place where it is made, executed, or to be performed. [Footnote *: ] It is adhered to by Philippine law, as enunciated under the first paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code, viz.:

Otherwise stated, a marriage formally valid in the place it is celebrated is valid in the Philippines.

Lex loci celebrationis is a conflict of law principle that comes into play when there are substantive issues relating to a contract that is celebrated elsewhere than the place of citizenship of its parties. [Footnote *: ] Philippine courts apply the same, not only with respect to marriage but to other contracts, in order to determine the law that is to be applied in resolving disputes that arise as a result thereof.

Applied to this controversy, the marriage between the parties having been celebrated in the Philippines, is governed by Philippine laws. The same laws holds true with its incidents and consequences. Thus, all matters relating to the validity of the contract of marriage, such as the presence or absence of requisites, forms, or solemnities are to be judged in relation to the law in which it has been celebrated or performed.

Along this line, it is useful to state that when the marriage is celebrated elsewhere, its validity does not depend fully on foreign law. While accepted in the jurisdiction in which it is celebrated, it may be held invalid in the Philippines when it falls under the instances mentioned in par. 1, Article 26 of the Family Code such as incestuous or bigamous marriages. As

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well, irrespective of the place of solemnization of marriage, Philippine laws bind the contracting Filipino citizen with respect to “family rights and duties, status, condition, and legal capacity”; any controversy arising therefrom would then have to be determined in accordance with the same law. [Footnote *: ]

Herein, it is indubitable that the action relates to the validity of the marriage celebrated in the Philippines. The petitioner’s action assails the psychological incapacity of the respondent to perform the essential marital obligations. Ultimately, therefore, the result of the action would have an effect on the personal status of the respondent. With this, there is no reason to foreclose the petitioner’s right to institute the instant petition for nullity of marriage.

Document: Lim vs Court of Appeals (CASE-65 SCRA 161) | Section: Syllabi

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• Paternity and filiation; Recognition of natural children; Law in force at the time of recognition governs the act of recognition.—Since the recognition allegedly took place during the effectivity of the Civil Code of 1889, such recognition should be reckoned in accordance with the requisites established by the said Civil Code. For, the law in force at the time of the recognition governs the act of recognition.

• Same; Same; Civil Code of 1889; Recognition must be precise, express and solemn.—Recognition, under the Civil Code of 1889, “must be precise, express and solemn.”

• Same; Same; Same; Recognition must be made in the record of birth, in a will or in some other public document.—Section 131 of the Civil Code of 1889 requires that the recognition of a natural child “be made in the record of birth, in a will, or on some other public document.”

• Same; Same; Same; Public documents; Classes of.—According to article 1216 of the Civil Code of 1889, public documents “are those authenticated by a notary or by a competent public official, with the formalities required by law.” Thus, “there are two classes of public documents, those executed by private individuals which must be authenticated by notaries, and those issued by competent public officials by reason of their office.” “The public document pointed out in Article 131 as one of the means by which recognition may be made belongs to the first class.”

• Same; Same; Same; Same; Marriage contract not a public document of recognition.—The marriage contract is not a written act with the intervention of a notary; it is not an instrument executed in due form before a notary and certified by him. The marriage contract is a mere declaration by the contracting parties, in the presence of the person solemnizing the marriage and of two witnesses of legal age, that they take each other as husband and wife, signed by signature or mark by the said contracting parties and the said witnesses, and attested by the person solemnizing the marriage. The marriage contract does not possess the requisites of a public document of recognition.

Document: Ambrose vs SuqueAmbrose (G.R. No. 206761) (CASE-AVF387-rw) | Section: Syllabi

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Procedural Rules and Technicalities; Liberal Application of the Rules; The Supreme Court (SC) recognized on certain occasions that procedural rules may be relaxed, particularly when their strict application frustrate rather than promote substantial justice.—Procedural rules are essential in the administration of justice. Rules are established to provide order and enhance the efficiency of our judicial system. However, the Court recognized on certain occasions that procedural rules may be relaxed, particularly when their strict application frustrate rather than promote substantial justice. The relaxation of the rules is also warranted considering the nature and the issues involved in the case. In this case, the RTC denied the petitioner’s notice of appeal for failure to file a motion for reconsideration. The Court notes nonetheless that the notice of appeal was filed well within the same 15-day period required for the filing of the motion for reconsideration. Due regard must also be given to the fact that the decision appealed from is a dismissal of the petition that is based not on the sufficiency of the ground raised but solely for lack of legal capacity on the part of the petitioner. Thus, in the exercise of its equity jurisdiction, the Court resolves in view of the attendant circumstances of this case, to disregard the procedural lapse committed in order to give the parties the amplest opportunity to fully ventilate their claims and to fully ascertain the merits of the case.

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Civil Law; Family Law; Conflict of Laws; Lex Loci Celebrationis; Contracts; Words and Phrases; Lex loci celebrationisis a latin term, literally translated as the law of the place of the ceremony. It means that the validity of a contract is governed by the place where it is made, executed, or to be performed.—Lex loci celebrationis is a Latin term, literally translated as the law of the place of the ceremony. It means that the validity of a contract is governed by the place where it is made, executed, or to be performed. It is adhered to by Philippine law, as enunciated under the first paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code, viz.: Art. 26. All marriages solemnized outside the Philippines, in accordance with the laws in force in the country where they were solemnized, and valid there as such, shall also be valid in this country, except those prohibited under Articles 35(1), (4), (5) and (6), 36, 37 and 38. Otherwise stated, a marriage formally valid in the place it is celebrated is valid in the Philippines.

Document: Ambrose vs SuqueAmbrose (G.R. No. 206761) (CASE-AVF387-rw) | Section: Syllabi

Same; Same; Same; Same; Persons and Family Relations; Marriages; It is useful to state that when the marriage is celebrated elsewhere, its validity does not depend fully on foreign law. While accepted in the jurisdiction in which it is celebrated, it may be held invalid in the Philippines when it falls under the instances mentioned in par. 1, Article 26 of the Family Code such as incestuous or bigamous marriages.—Lex loci celebrationis is a conflict of law principle that comes into play when there are substantive issues relating to a contract that is celebrated elsewhere than the place of citizenship of its parties. Philippine courts apply the same, not only with respect to marriage but to other contracts, in order to determine the law that is to be applied in resolving disputes that arise as a result thereof. Applied to this controversy, the marriage between the parties having been celebrated in the Philippines, is governed by Philippine laws. The same laws holds true with its incidents and consequences. Thus, all matters relating to the validity of the contract of marriage, such as the presence or absence of requisites, forms, or solemnities are to be judged in relation to the law in which it has been celebrated or performed. Along this line, it is useful to state that when the marriage is celebrated elsewhere, its validity does not depend fully on foreign law. While accepted in the jurisdiction in which it is celebrated, it may be held invalid in the Philippines when it falls under the instances mentioned in par. 1, Article 26 of the Family Code such as incestuous or bigamous marriages. As well, irrespective of the place of solemnization of marriage, Philippine laws bind the contracting Filipino citizen with respect to “family

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rights and duties, status, condition, and legal capacity”; any controversy arising therefrom would then have to be determined in accordance with the same law.

Document: Cardoza vs. Singson (G.R. No. 3545,) (CASE-181 SCRA 45) | Section: Syllabi

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• Remedial Law; Execution; Under the Code of Civil Procedure, the prevailing party in a civil action is entitled to a writ of execution of the final judgment obtained by him within five years from the date of its entry.—Under Section 443, Chapter IX of Act No. 190, otherwise known as the Code of Civil Procedure which took effect on September 1, 1901, the prevailing party in a civil action is entitled to a writ of execution of the final judgment obtained by him within five years from the date of its entry. The counting of the five-year period starts from the entry of judgment and not from its promulgation.

• Same; Same; Same; Trial court correctly made the entry of a judgment nunc pro tunc pursuant to the decision of the Court of Appeals in Civil Case No. CA. GR No. 3545.—Acting not only as a court of law but also as a court of equity, the trial court correctly made the entry of a judgment nunc pro tunc pursuant to the decision of the Court of Appeals in Civil Case No. C.A. G.R. No. 3545. In so doing, the lower court merely ordered the judgment of the Court of Appeals to be executed.

• Same; Same; Same; Same; Issuance of a nunc pro tunc order recognized by the Court in Lichauco v. Tan Pho.—The issuance of a nunc pro tunc order was recognized by this Court in Lichauco v. Tan Pho, 51 Phil. 862 where an order or judgment actually rendered by a court at a former time had not been entered of record as rendered. There is no doubt that such an entry operates to save proceedings had before it was made.

• Same; Same; Judgment; Rule is settled that a judgment which has become final and executory can no longer be amended or corrected by the Court except for clerical errors or mistakes.—Finally, well settled is the rule that a judgment which has become final and executory can no longer be amended or corrected by the court except for clerical errors or mistakes. In such a situation, the trial court loses jurisdiction over the case except to execute the final judgment, as in this case.

PETITION for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus with preliminary injunction to review the decision of the then Court of First Instance of Southern Leyte, Br. I. Singson, J.

The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court.

Jose Batiquin for petitioner.

Adelino B. Sitoy for private respondents.

PARAS, J.:

Document: Domagas vs Jensen (G.R. No. 158407) (CASE-AVK880-rw) | Section: Syllabi

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Remedial Law; Actions; Whether a proceeding is in rem or in personam or quasi in rem for that matter, is determined by its nature and purpose and by these only; Actions for recovery of real property are in personam.—The settled rule is that the aim and object of an action determine its character. Whether a proceeding is in rem, or in personam, or quasi in rem for that matter, is determined by its nature and purpose, and by these only. A proceeding in personam is a proceeding to enforce personal rights and obligations brought against the person and is based on the jurisdiction of the person, although it may involve his right to, or the exercise of ownership of, specific property, or seek to compel him to control or dispose of it in accordance with the mandate of the court. The purpose of a proceeding in personam is to impose, through the judgment of a court, some responsibility or liability directly upon the person of the defendant.Of this character are suits to compel a defendant to specifically perform some act or actions to fasten a pecuniary liability on him. An action in personam is said to be one which has for its object a judgment against the person, as distinguished from a judgment against the propriety to determine its state. It has been held that an action in personam is a proceeding to enforce personal rights or obligations; such action is brought against the person. As far as suits for injunctive relief are concerned, it is well-settled that it is an injunctive act in personam. In Combs v. Combs, the appellate court held that proceedings to enforce personal rights and obligations and in which personal judgments are rendered adjusting the rights and obligations between the affected parties is in personam. Actions for recovery of real property are in personam. On the other hand, a proceeding quasi in rem is one brought against persons seeking to subject the property of such persons to the discharge of the claims assailed. In an action quasi in rem, an individual is named as defendant and the purpose of the proceeding is to subject his interests therein to the obligation or loan burdening the property. Actions quasi in rem deal with the status, ownership or liability of a particular property but which are intended to operate on these questions only as between the particular parties to the proceedings and not to ascertain or cut off the rights or interests of all possible claimants. The judgments therein are binding only upon the parties who joined in the action.

Document: De Guzman vs Tabangao Realty Incorporated (G.R. No. 154262) (CASE-AUB936-rw) | Section: Syllabi

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Civil Law; Property; Quieting of Titles; Quieting of title is a common law remedy for the removal of any cloud upon or doubt or uncertainty with respect to title to real property.—In Baricuatro, Jr. v. Court of Appeals, 325 SCRA 137 (2000), the Court described the nature of an action for quieting of title, thus: Regarding the nature of the action filed before the trial court, quieting of title is a common law remedy for the removal of any cloud upon or doubt or uncertainty with respect to title to real property. Originating in equity

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jurisprudence, its purpose is to secure “x x x an adjudication that a claim of title to or an interest in property, adverse to that of the complainant, is invalid, so that the complainant and those claiming under him may be forever afterward free from any danger of hostile claim.” In an action for quieting of title, the competent court is tasked to determine the respective rights of the complainant and other claimants, “x x x not only to place things in their proper place, to make the one who has no rights to said immovable respect and not disturb the other, but also for the benefit of both, so that he who has the right would see every cloud of doubt over the property dissipated, and he could afterwards without fear introduce the improvements he may desire, to use, and even to abuse the property as he deems best x x x.”

Same; Same; Article 477 of the Civil Code further provides that the plaintiff in an action to quiet title must have legal or equitable title to or interest in the real property, which is the subject matter of the action, but need not be in possession of said property.—Article 477 of the Civil Code further provides that the plaintiff in an action to quiet title must have legal or equitable title to or interest in the real property, which is the subject matter of the action, but need not be in possession of said property. For an action to quiet title to prosper, two indispensable requisites must concur: (1) the plaintiff or complainant has a legal or equitable title or interest in the real property subject of the action; and (2) the deed, claim, encumbrance, or proceeding claimed to be casting a cloud on his title must be shown to be in fact invalid or inoperative despite its prima facie appearance of validity or legal efficacy.

Document: Valisno vs. Adriano (CASE-161 SCRA 398) | Section: Syllabi

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• Civil Law; Easements and Servitudes; Land Titles; Existence of an apparent sign of easement between two estates, maintained by the owner of both, shall be considered as a title.—The existence of the irrigation canal on defendant’s land for the passage of water from the Pampanga River to Honorata’s land prior to and at the time of the sale of Honorata’s land to the plaintiff was equivalent to a title for the vendee of the land to continue using it, as provided in Article 624 of the Civil Code: “Article 624. The existence of an apparent sign of easement between two estates, established or maintained by the owner of both shall be considered, should either of them be alienated, as a title in order that the easement may continue actively and passively, unless at the time the ownership of the two estates is divided, the contrary should be provided in the title of conveyance of either of them, or the sign aforesaid should be removed before the execution of the deed. This provision shall also apply in case of the division of a thing owned in common by two or more persons.” (Civil Code)

• Same; Same; Same; Same; Water rights appurtenant to a parcel of land pass with the conveyance of the land, although not specifically mentioned in the conveyance.—Water rights, such as the right to use a drainage ditch for irrigation purposes, which are appurtenant to a parcel of land, pass with the conveyance of the land, although not specifically mentioned in the conveyance. The purchaser’s easement of necessity in a water ditch running across the grantor’s land cannot be defeated even if the water is supplied by a third person (Watson vs. French, 112 Me 371, 19 C J. 868–897). The fact that an easement by grant may also have qualified as an easement of necessity does not detract from its permanency as property right, which survives the determination of the necessity (Benedicto vs. CA, 25 SCRA 145). As an easement of waters in favor of the appellant has been established, he is entitled to enjoy it free from obstruction, disturbance or wrongful interference (19 CJ 984), such as the appellee’s act of levelling the irrigation canal to deprive him of the use of water from the Pampanga River.

APPEAL from the decision of the Court of First Instance of Nueva Ecija, Br. I.

The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court.

Honorio Valisno Garcia I for plaintiff-appellant.

Felipe K. Medina for defendant-appellee.

GRIÑO-AQUINO, J.:

Document: Domilos vs Pastor (G.R. No. 207887) (CASE-AVQ415-rw) | Section: Syllabi

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Constitutional Law; Civil Procedure; Judgments; Rendition of Judgments; A decision that does not clearly and distinctly state the facts and the law on which it is based leaves the parties in the dark as to how it was reached. It is especially prejudicial to the losing party who is unable to pinpoint the possible errors of the court for review by a higher tribunal.—The purpose of Article VIII, Section 14 of the Constitution in relation to Rule 36, Section 1 of the Rules of Court, is to inform the person reading the decision, and especially the parties involved in the case, of how the decision was reached by the court after consideration of the pertinent facts and examination of the applicable laws. A decision that does not clearly and distinctly state the facts and the law on which it is based leaves the parties in the dark as to how it was reached. It is especially prejudicial to the losing party who is unable to pinpoint the possible errors of the court for review by a higher tribunal. A review of both the September 21, 2006 RTC’s Decision and March 26, 2013 CA’s Decision reveals that the judgments were consistent with the purpose of the Article VIII, Section 14 of the 1987 Constitution as both contained a thorough summary of the antecedent facts and proceedings; a discussion of relevant statutory provisions and jurisprudence; and a presentation of significant documentary evidence presented by both parties. Clearly, the two judgments were reached in the regular performance of the courts’ duty and no error can be attributed to either of the decisions.

Civil Law; Contracts; Compromise Agreements; The compromise agreement was a contract that created real rights as it was a contract for division of property.—The compromise agreement was a contract that created real rights as it was a contract for division of property. The third persons, the Pastors, who came into possession of the object of the contract are thus, bound by the contract or compromise agreement. Furthermore, rescission, or in this case, revocation or cancella387

tion of the compromise agreement, cannot take place because the objects of the contract are already in the legal possession of the Pastors who did not act in bad faith. At the time the compromise agreement was revoked by Lino and Palichang, the Pastors were already legal co-owners of the property by virtue of a valid sale. As such, their respective shares in the disputed property may not be validly included in the revocation of the compromise agreement without their knowledge and consent. Although it is clear that the Pastors are not parties to the compromise agreement, their objection to its revocation can be treated as an adverse claim over the disputed property.

Document: Bustamante vs. Rosel (G.R) (CASE-319 SCRA 413) | Section: Syllabi

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• Civil Law; Contracts; Pactum Commissorium; Article 1306 of the Civil Code is one of the exceptions to the rule that contracts have the force of law between the contracting parties and must be complied with in good faith.—Respondents argue that contracts have the force of law between the contracting parties and must be complied with in good faith. There are, however, certain exceptions to the rule, specifically Article 1306 of the Civil Code, which provides: “Article 1306. The contracting parties may establish such stipulations, clauses, terms and conditions as they may deem convenient, provided they are not contrary to law, morals, good customs, public order, or public policy.” A scrutiny of the stipulation of the parties reveals a subtle intention of the creditor to acquire the property given as security for the loan. This is embraced in the concept of pactum commissorium, which is proscribed by law.

• Same; Same; Same; Elements of Pactum Commissorium.—“The elements of pactum commissorium are as follows: (1) there should be a property mortgaged by way of security for the payment of the principal obligation, and (2) there should be a stipulation for automatic appropriation by the creditor of the thing mortgaged in case of non-payment of the principal obligation within the stipulated period.”

PETITION for review on certiorari of a decision of the Court of Appeals.

The facts are stated in the resolutions of the Court.

Emerico B. Lomibao for petitioner.

Julio C. Contreras for private respondents.

Document: Valisno vs. Adriano (CASE-161 SCRA 398) | Section: Syllabi

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• Civil Law; Easements and Servitudes; Land Titles; Existence of an apparent sign of easement between two estates, maintained by the owner of both, shall be considered as a title.—The existence of the irrigation canal on defendant’s land for the passage of water from the Pampanga River to Honorata’s land prior to and at the time of the sale of Honorata’s land to the plaintiff was equivalent to a title for the vendee of the land to continue using it, as provided in Article 624 of the Civil Code: “Article 624. The existence of an apparent sign of easement between two estates, established or maintained by the owner of both shall be considered, should either of them be alienated, as a title in order that the easement may continue actively and passively, unless at the time the ownership of the two estates is divided, the contrary should be provided in the title of conveyance of either of them, or the sign aforesaid should be removed before the execution of the deed. This provision shall also apply in case of the division of a thing owned in common by two or more persons.” (Civil Code)

• Same; Same; Same; Same; Water rights appurtenant to a parcel of land pass with the conveyance of the land, although not specifically mentioned in the conveyance.—Water rights, such as the right to use a drainage ditch for irrigation purposes, which are appurtenant to a parcel of land, pass with the conveyance of the land, although not specifically mentioned in the conveyance. The purchaser’s easement of necessity in a water ditch running across the grantor’s land cannot be defeated even if the water is supplied by a third person (Watson vs. French, 112 Me 371, 19 C J. 868–897). The fact that an easement by grant may also have qualified as an easement of necessity does not detract from its permanency as property right, which survives the determination of the necessity (Benedicto vs. CA, 25 SCRA 145). As an easement of waters in favor of the appellant has been established, he is entitled to enjoy it free from obstruction, disturbance or wrongful interference (19 CJ 984), such as the appellee’s act of levelling the irrigation canal to deprive him of the use of water from the Pampanga River.

APPEAL from the decision of the Court of First Instance of Nueva Ecija, Br. I.

The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court.

Honorio Valisno Garcia I for plaintiff-appellant.

Felipe K. Medina for defendant-appellee.

GRIÑO-AQUINO, J.:

Document: Constantino vs. Espiritu (G.R. No. L-16853, L-18292, L-28646, L-11156, L-14321, L-17951, L-18884, L-21166, L-22731, L-25147, L-18491, L-19519) (CASE-45 SCRA 557) | Section: Syllabi

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• Land titles and deeds; Purpose of system of land registration.—The real purpose of the system is to quiet title of land; to put a stop forever to any question of the legality of the title, except claims which were noted at the time of registration, in the certificate, or which may arise subsequent thereto. That being the purpose of the law, it would seem that once a title is registered the owner may rest secure, without the necessity of waiting in the portals of a court, or sitting in the ‘mirador de su casa’ to avoid the possibility of losing His land. For such title accumulates in one document a precise and correct statement of the exact status of the fee held by its owner. The certificate, in the absence of fraud, is the evidence of title and shows exactly the real interest of its owner. The title once registered, with very few exceptions, should not thereafter be impugned, altered, changed, modified, enlarged, or diminished, except in some direct proceeding permitted by law. Otherwise all security in registered titles would be lost. Such a principle applies not only to the holder of the title but to one who buys it from him for value.

• Same; Purpose of lis pendens.—The notice of lis pendens is an announcement to the whole world that a particular real property is in litigation, and serves as a warning that one who acquires an interest over said property does so at his own risk, or that he gambles on the result of the litigation over said property. Where, however, the notice of lis pendens was already cancelled by virtue of a court order at the time of the purchase of the land, a subsequent decision of the court ordering the restoration of such notice on the ground that there was bad faith in its cancellation will not affect the rights of said purchaser whose purchase was made in good faith and for value.

APPEAL from an order of the Court of First Instance of Rizal. Andres Reyes, J.

The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court.

David Guevara for plaintiffs-movants-appellees.

Silva & Gonzales for purchaser-oppositor-appellant.

FERNANDO, J.:

Document: Espiritu vs. Cipriano (G.R. No. 43861) (CASE-55 SCRA 533) | Section: Syllabi

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• Rental Law; Statutory Construction; Prospective operation of statutes which affect substantive rights.—The statute affects substantive rights and hence a strict and prospective construction thereof is in order. Article 4 of the New Civil Code ordains that laws shall have no retroactive effect unless the contrary is provided and that where the law is clear, the duty of this Court is equally plain. We must apply it to the facts as found. The law being a “temporary measure designed to meet a temporary situation,” it had a limited period of operation as in fact it was so worded in clear and unequivocal language that “No lessor of a dwelling unit or land X X X shall, during the period of one year from May 31, 1970, increase the monthly rental agreed upon between the lessor and lessee prior to the approval of this Act.” Hence the prohibition against the increase in rentals was effective only from March, 1970, up to March, 1971. Outside and beyond that period, the law did not, by its express terms, purport to give a retroactive operation.

• Same; Same; Statutes have no retroactive effect unless otherwise provided therein.—Well-settled is the principle that while the Legislature has the power to pass retroactive laws which do not impair the obligation of contracts, or affect injuriously vested rights, it is equally true that statutes are not to be construed as intended to have a retroactive effect so as to affect pending proceedings unless such intent is expressly declared or clearly and necessarily implied from the language of the enactment.

Document: Bustamante vs. Rosel (G.R) (CASE-319 SCRA 413) | Section: Syllabi

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• Civil Law; Contracts; Pactum Commissorium; Article 1306 of the Civil Code is one of the exceptions to the rule that contracts have the force of law between the contracting parties and must be complied with in good faith.—Respondents argue that contracts have the force of law between the contracting parties and must be complied with in good faith. There are, however, certain exceptions to the rule, specifically Article 1306 of the Civil Code, which provides: “Article 1306. The contracting parties may establish such stipulations, clauses, terms and conditions as they may deem convenient, provided they are not contrary to law, morals, good customs, public order, or public policy.” A scrutiny of the stipulation of the parties reveals a subtle intention of the creditor to acquire the property given as security for the loan. This is embraced in the concept of pactum commissorium, which is proscribed by law.

• Same; Same; Same; Elements of Pactum Commissorium.—“The elements of pactum commissorium are as follows: (1) there should be a property mortgaged by way of security for the payment of the principal obligation, and (2) there should be a stipulation for automatic appropriation by the creditor of the thing mortgaged in case of non-payment of the principal obligation within the stipulated period.”

PETITION for review on certiorari of a decision of the Court of Appeals.

The facts are stated in the resolutions of the Court.

Emerico B. Lomibao for petitioner.

Julio C. Contreras for private respondents.

Document: CladoReyes vs Limpe (G.R. No. 163876) (CASE-AVQ898-rw) | Section: Syllabi

Syllabi

Civil Law; Land Titles; Property; Two Indispensable Requisites in order that an Action to Quiet Title Could Prosper.—Under Articles 476 and 477 of the New Civil Code, there are two indispensable requisites in order that an action to quiet title could prosper: (1) that the plaintiff or complainant has a legal or an equitable title to or interest in the real property subject of the action; and (2) that the deed, claim, encumbrance or proceeding claimed to be casting cloud on his title must be shown to be in fact invalid or inoperative despite its prima facie appearance of validity or legal efficacy.

Same; Same; Same; Evidence; Time and again Supreme Court has held that a mere allegation is not evidence, and he who alleges has the burden of proving the allegation with the requisite quantum of evidence.—To prove their case, petitioners merely cited Section 4 of Article XIII of the 1987 Constitution and Section 2 of the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law and stated that their title was founded upon those provisions. They hardly argued on the matter. Neither was there positive evidence (1) that their predecessor had legal title, i.e., a certificate of land transfer; (2) that the lot was an agricultural lot and not a commercial one as contended by respondents; and (3) that they are qualified beneficiaries under the Agrarian Reform Law. Time and again we have held that a mere allegation is not evidence, and he who alleges has the burden of proving the allegation with the requisite quantum of evidence.

Same; Same; Same; Realty tax payments constitute proof that the holder has a claim of title over the property.—Although tax declarations or realty tax receipts are not conclusive evidence of ownership, nevertheless, they are good indicia of possession in the concept of an owner, for no one in his right mind would be paying taxes for a property that is not in his actual or at least constructive possession. As we previously held, such realty tax payments constitute proof that the holder has a claim of title over the property.

PETITION for review on certiorari of the decision and resolution of the Court of Appeals.

The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court.

Ernesto M. Tomaneng for petitioners.

Mario P. Ontal for respondents.

QUISUMBING, J.:

Document: Torres vs. Ventura, G.R. No. 86044 (DSR-G.R. No. 86044) | Section: Article 1412 of the Civil Code, which embodies the pari delicto doctrine

Article 1412 of the Civil Code, which embodies the pari delicto doctrine

states: "If the act in which the unlawful or forbidden cause consists does not constitute a criminal offense, the following rules shall be observed:

(1) When the fault is on the part of both contracting parties, neither may recover what he has given by virtue of the contract, or demand the performance of the other's undertaking; xxx"

94 Phil. 405 (1954).

95 Phil. 887 (1954).

Id., at 889.

54 Off. Gaz. 4945, August, 1958.

Document: Laurel vs. Delute, A.C. No. 12298 (DSR-A.C. No. 12298) | Section: Rule 15.03 — A lawyer shall not represent conflicting interests except by written consent of all concerned given after a full disclosure of facts.

CANON 15 — A LAWYER SHALL OBSERVE CANDOR, FAIRNESS AND LOYALTY IN ALL HIS DEALINGS AND TRANSACTIONS WITH HIS CLIENTS.

Rule 15.01 — A lawyer, in conferring with a prospective client, shall ascertain as soon as practicable whether the matter would involve a conflict with another client or his own interest, and if so, shall forthwith inform the prospective client.

xxx xxx xxx

Document: Heirs Of Alido vs. Campano, G.R. No. 226065 (DSR-G.R. No. 226065) | Section: Heirs Of Alido vs. Campano, G.R. No. 226065

Under Article 1412 (1) of the Civil Code, 27 parties in a void contract who are of equal fault cannot demand recovery, enforcement or performance from the other. The said provision embodies the doctrine of In Pari Delicto which "is a universal doctrine that holds that no action arises, in equity or at law, from an illegal contract; no suit can be maintained for its specific performance, or to recover the property agreed to be sold or delivered, or the money agreed to be paid, or damages for its violation; and where the parties are In Pari Delicto, no affirmative relief of any kind will be given to one against the other." 28

Nevertheless, Article 1416 of the Civil Code provides that when the agreement is not illegal per se, but is merely prohibited, and the prohibition by the law is designed for the protection of the plaintiff, he may, if public policy is thereby enhanced, recover what he has paid or delivered. In other words, the doctrine of In Pari Delicto cannot apply when it contravenes well-established public policy as whenever public policy is advanced by either party, they may be allowed to sue for relief against the transaction. 29

The doctrine of In Pari Delicto does not apply in the sale of a homestead which has been illegally sold, in violation of the homestead law. 30 In Spouses Maltos v. Heirs of Eusebio Borromeo, 31 the Court explained that the doctrine of In Pari Delicto cannot preclude a grantee from recovering a parcel of land sold in violation of the five-year prohibition on alienation of land acquired through free patent, to wit:

Santos involved the sale of a parcel of land within the five-year prohibitory period. The Roman Catholic Church raised the defense of In Pari Delicto. It was also argued by the Roman Catholic Church that the effect of the sale would be the reversion of the property to the state. This court held that: DHITCc

Document: The Fundamentals of Lis Pendens in the Dismissal of Civil Cases (CASE-91 SCRA 283) | Section: C. *Judgment Would As a Result Amount to Res Judicata

C. Judgment Would As a Result Amount to Res Judicata

From the cases decided by the Supreme Court it would appear that it is not enough that there be an identity of a parties as well as the identity of rights asserted and relief prayed for in order that a second action may be barred by a pending first action. It is required that the identity in the preceding particulars be such that any judgment which may be rendered on the other would, regardless of which party is successful amount to res judicata in the case on hand. Thus, in the case of Alarcon vs. Torres, et. al., wherein a case was subsequently filed by Alarcon against Torres and Tuason for Specific Performance, Damages, etc. to convey to him a parcel of land mentioned in a previous cased filed by Tuason & Co. against Alarcon for recovery of possession (accion publiciana). The Supreme Court in an appeal from the dismissal of the action for specific performance declared as follows:

Document: The Fundamentals of Lis Pendens in the Dismissal of Civil Cases (CASE-91 SCRA 283) | Section: C. *Judgment Would As a Result Amount to Res Judicata

In the case of Olayvar vs. Olayvar, wherein the husband filed an action for legal separation against his wife, claiming adultery on the part of the latter, while the wife, on the other hand, filed a subsequent case for support wherein she claimed that her husband’s propensity for women made him neglectful of his marital duties, the Supreme Court in recognizing the existence of lis pendens declared that if the husband wins the wife can no longer claim support because her infidelity is a valid defense against such claim while if the wife wins then the husband will continue supporting his wife as his legal obligation and for this reason whatever judgment may be rendered in the first case renders the second case unnecessary.

Moreover, in the case of J. M. Tuason & Co., Inc. vs. Rafor, wherein defendant Rafor interposed a motion to dismiss the action filed against him to vacate the land in question on the ground that another action involving the same land was pending in court, the Supreme Court declared as follows:

“x x x even granting that the parties in the two cases represent the same interest, assert the same rights or pray for the same relief and, the relief is founded on the same facts x x x still the fourth requisite, that the judgment to be rendered in the first case, regardless of which party is successful, will amount to res judicata against the second action is not present here. For, if Tuason & Co. wins in the first case, the present action should still proceed to judgment to determine the liability of defendant Rafor for the unlawful detention of the property. In the circumstances, the trial court was not in error in denying the motion to dismiss. x x x”

Document: Silva vs Lo (G.R. No. 206667) (CASE-AVF386-rw) | Section: Syllabi

Syllabi

Remedial Law; Special Civil Action; Partition; Rule 69 of the Rules of Court have laid down two (2) phases of an action for partition:first, the trial court, after determining that a co-ownership in fact exists and that partition is proper, issues an order for partition; and,second, the trial court promulgates a decision confirming the sketch and subdivision of the properties submitted by the parties (if the parties reach an agreement) or by the appointed commissioners (if the parties fail to agree), as the case may be.—Rule 69 of the Rules of Court have laid down two phases of an action for partition: first, the trial court, after determining that a co-ownership in fact exists and that partition is proper, issues an order for partition; and second, the trial court promulgates a decision confirming the sketch and subdivision of the properties submitted by the parties (if the parties reach an agreement) or by the appointed commissioners (if the parties fail to agree), as the case may be. In this case, while the property to be partitioned is the entirety of Carlos, Jr.’s estate, only one of the properties thereof, the subject property, is the subject matter of the controversy before us. The CA overlooked the fact that the first stage of the partition has long been terminated by the RTC. In fact, the status of the parties as the compulsory heirs of Carlos, Jr. was immediately stipulated among them. As early as January 11, 2000, the trial court had already issued an Order of Partition of the Estate among the heirs pursuant to a compromise agreement. Notably, none of the parties appeared to have appealed this final order of partition.

Same; Same; Interlocutory Order; Words and Phrases; The Supreme Court (SC) have defined an interlocutory order as referring to something between the commencement and end of the suit which decides some point or matter but it is not the final decision on the whole controversy.—We have defined an interlocutory order as referring to something between the commencement and end of the suit which decides some point or matter but it is not the final decision on the whole contro444

Document: CladoReyes vs Limpe (G.R. No. 163876) (CASE-AVQ898-rw) | Section: Syllabi

Syllabi

Civil Law; Land Titles; Property; Two Indispensable Requisites in order that an Action to Quiet Title Could Prosper.—Under Articles 476 and 477 of the New Civil Code, there are two indispensable requisites in order that an action to quiet title could prosper: (1) that the plaintiff or complainant has a legal or an equitable title to or interest in the real property subject of the action; and (2) that the deed, claim, encumbrance or proceeding claimed to be casting cloud on his title must be shown to be in fact invalid or inoperative despite its prima facie appearance of validity or legal efficacy.

Same; Same; Same; Evidence; Time and again Supreme Court has held that a mere allegation is not evidence, and he who alleges has the burden of proving the allegation with the requisite quantum of evidence.—To prove their case, petitioners merely cited Section 4 of Article XIII of the 1987 Constitution and Section 2 of the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law and stated that their title was founded upon those provisions. They hardly argued on the matter. Neither was there positive evidence (1) that their predecessor had legal title, i.e., a certificate of land transfer; (2) that the lot was an agricultural lot and not a commercial one as contended by respondents; and (3) that they are qualified beneficiaries under the Agrarian Reform Law. Time and again we have held that a mere allegation is not evidence, and he who alleges has the burden of proving the allegation with the requisite quantum of evidence.

Same; Same; Same; Realty tax payments constitute proof that the holder has a claim of title over the property.—Although tax declarations or realty tax receipts are not conclusive evidence of ownership, nevertheless, they are good indicia of possession in the concept of an owner, for no one in his right mind would be paying taxes for a property that is not in his actual or at least constructive possession. As we previously held, such realty tax payments constitute proof that the holder has a claim of title over the property.

PETITION for review on certiorari of the decision and resolution of the Court of Appeals.

The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court.

Ernesto M. Tomaneng for petitioners.

Mario P. Ontal for respondents.

QUISUMBING, J.:

Document: Valisno vs. Adriano (CASE-161 SCRA 398) | Section: Syllabi

Syllabi

• Civil Law; Easements and Servitudes; Land Titles; Existence of an apparent sign of easement between two estates, maintained by the owner of both, shall be considered as a title.—The existence of the irrigation canal on defendant’s land for the passage of water from the Pampanga River to Honorata’s land prior to and at the time of the sale of Honorata’s land to the plaintiff was equivalent to a title for the vendee of the land to continue using it, as provided in Article 624 of the Civil Code: “Article 624. The existence of an apparent sign of easement between two estates, established or maintained by the owner of both shall be considered, should either of them be alienated, as a title in order that the easement may continue actively and passively, unless at the time the ownership of the two estates is divided, the contrary should be provided in the title of conveyance of either of them, or the sign aforesaid should be removed before the execution of the deed. This provision shall also apply in case of the division of a thing owned in common by two or more persons.” (Civil Code)

• Same; Same; Same; Same; Water rights appurtenant to a parcel of land pass with the conveyance of the land, although not specifically mentioned in the conveyance.—Water rights, such as the right to use a drainage ditch for irrigation purposes, which are appurtenant to a parcel of land, pass with the conveyance of the land, although not specifically mentioned in the conveyance. The purchaser’s easement of necessity in a water ditch running across the grantor’s land cannot be defeated even if the water is supplied by a third person (Watson vs. French, 112 Me 371, 19 C J. 868–897). The fact that an easement by grant may also have qualified as an easement of necessity does not detract from its permanency as property right, which survives the determination of the necessity (Benedicto vs. CA, 25 SCRA 145). As an easement of waters in favor of the appellant has been established, he is entitled to enjoy it free from obstruction, disturbance or wrongful interference (19 CJ 984), such as the appellee’s act of levelling the irrigation canal to deprive him of the use of water from the Pampanga River.

APPEAL from the decision of the Court of First Instance of Nueva Ecija, Br. I.

The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court.

Honorio Valisno Garcia I for plaintiff-appellant.

Felipe K. Medina for defendant-appellee.

GRIÑO-AQUINO, J.:

Document: Constantino vs. Espiritu (G.R. No. L-16853, L-18292, L-28646, L-11156, L-14321, L-17951, L-18884, L-21166, L-22731, L-25147, L-18491, L-19519) (CASE-45 SCRA 557) | Section: Syllabi

Syllabi

• Land titles and deeds; Purpose of system of land registration.—The real purpose of the system is to quiet title of land; to put a stop forever to any question of the legality of the title, except claims which were noted at the time of registration, in the certificate, or which may arise subsequent thereto. That being the purpose of the law, it would seem that once a title is registered the owner may rest secure, without the necessity of waiting in the portals of a court, or sitting in the ‘mirador de su casa’ to avoid the possibility of losing His land. For such title accumulates in one document a precise and correct statement of the exact status of the fee held by its owner. The certificate, in the absence of fraud, is the evidence of title and shows exactly the real interest of its owner. The title once registered, with very few exceptions, should not thereafter be impugned, altered, changed, modified, enlarged, or diminished, except in some direct proceeding permitted by law. Otherwise all security in registered titles would be lost. Such a principle applies not only to the holder of the title but to one who buys it from him for value.

• Same; Purpose of lis pendens.—The notice of lis pendens is an announcement to the whole world that a particular real property is in litigation, and serves as a warning that one who acquires an interest over said property does so at his own risk, or that he gambles on the result of the litigation over said property. Where, however, the notice of lis pendens was already cancelled by virtue of a court order at the time of the purchase of the land, a subsequent decision of the court ordering the restoration of such notice on the ground that there was bad faith in its cancellation will not affect the rights of said purchaser whose purchase was made in good faith and for value.

APPEAL from an order of the Court of First Instance of Rizal. Andres Reyes, J.

The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court.

David Guevara for plaintiffs-movants-appellees.

Silva & Gonzales for purchaser-oppositor-appellant.

FERNANDO, J.:

Document: Bustamante vs. Rosel (G.R) (CASE-319 SCRA 413) | Section: Syllabi

Syllabi

• Civil Law; Contracts; Pactum Commissorium; Article 1306 of the Civil Code is one of the exceptions to the rule that contracts have the force of law between the contracting parties and must be complied with in good faith.—Respondents argue that contracts have the force of law between the contracting parties and must be complied with in good faith. There are, however, certain exceptions to the rule, specifically Article 1306 of the Civil Code, which provides: “Article 1306. The contracting parties may establish such stipulations, clauses, terms and conditions as they may deem convenient, provided they are not contrary to law, morals, good customs, public order, or public policy.” A scrutiny of the stipulation of the parties reveals a subtle intention of the creditor to acquire the property given as security for the loan. This is embraced in the concept of pactum commissorium, which is proscribed by law.

• Same; Same; Same; Elements of Pactum Commissorium.—“The elements of pactum commissorium are as follows: (1) there should be a property mortgaged by way of security for the payment of the principal obligation, and (2) there should be a stipulation for automatic appropriation by the creditor of the thing mortgaged in case of non-payment of the principal obligation within the stipulated period.”

PETITION for review on certiorari of a decision of the Court of Appeals.

The facts are stated in the resolutions of the Court.

Emerico B. Lomibao for petitioner.

Julio C. Contreras for private respondents.

Document: In Re: Testate Estate Of Christensen, Aznar vs. Garcia, G.R. No. L-16749 (DSR-G.R. No. L-16749) | Section: G. R. No. L-16749, January 31, 1963

If it accepts the so-called Renvoi doctrine, it will

follow the latter course, thus applying its own law.

"This is one type of Renvoi.

A jural matter is presented which the

conflict-of-laws rule of the forum refers to a foreign law; the conflict-of-laws rule of which, in turn refers the matter back again to the law of the forum.

This is Renvoi in the norrower sense.

The German

term for this judicial process is 'Ruckverweisung.'" (Harvard Law Review, Vol.

31, pp.

523-571.)

"After a decision has been arrived at that a foreign law is to be resorted to as governing a particular case, the further question may arise: Are the rules as to the conflict of laws contained in such foreign law also to be resorted to?

This is a question which, while it has been considered by the

courts in but a few instances, has been the subject of frequent discussion by textwriters and essayists; and the doctrine involved has been descriptively designated by them as the 'Renvoyer' to send back, or the Ruchverswisung', or the 'Weiterverweisung', since an affirmative answer to the question postulated and the operation of the Adoption of the foreign law in toto would in many cases result in returning the main controversy to be decided according to the law of the forum' * * *" (15 C.J.S.

872.)

"Another theory, known as the 'doctrine of Renvoi', has been advanced.

The theory of the doctrine of Renvoi is

that the court of the forum, in determining the question before it, must take into account the whole law of the other Jurisdiction, but also its rules as to conflict of laws, and then apply the law to the actual question which the rules of the other Jurisdiction prescribe.

This may be the law of the forum.

The doctrine of the Renvoi has

generally been repudiated by the American authorities." (2 Am.

Jur.

296.)

Document: In Re: Testate Estate Of Christensen, Aznar vs. Garcia, G.R. No. L-16749 (DSR-G.R. No. L-16749) | Section: G. R. No. L-16749, January 31, 1963

The scope of the theory of Renvoi has also been defined and the reasons for its application in a country explained by Prof. Lorenzen in an article in the Yale Law Journal, Vol. 27, 1917-1918, pp. 509-531. The pertinent parts of the article are quoted herein below:

"The recognition of the Renvoi theory implies that the rules of the conflict of laws are to be understood as incorporating not only the ordinary or internal law of the foreign state or country, but its rules of the conflict of laws as well. According to this theory the law of a country’ means the whole of its law.

*       *       *       *       *       *       *

"Von Bar presented his views at the meeting of the institute of International Law , at Neuchatel, in 1900, in the form of the following theses:

"(1) Every court shall observe the law of its country as regards the application of foreign laws.

"(2) Provided that no express provision to the contrary exists, the court shall respect:

"(a) The provisions of a foreign law which disclaims the right to bind its nationals abroad as regards their personal statute, and desires that said personal statute shall be determined by law of the domicile, or even by the law of the place where the act in question occurred.

"(b) The decision of two or more foreign systems of law, provided it be certain that one of them is necessarily competent, which agree in attributing the determination of a question to the same system of law.

*       *       *       *       *       *       *

"If, for example, the English Law directs its judge to distribute the personal estate of an Englishman who has died domiciled in Belgium in accordance with the law of his domicile, he must first inquire whether the law of Belgium would, distribute personal property upon death in accordance with the law of domicile, and if he finds that the Belgian law would make the distribution in accordance with the law of nationality—that is the English law,—he must accept this reference back to his own law."

Document: Aznar vs Garcia (G.R. Nos. L-11483-84) (CASE-ASL812-rw) | Section: Syllabi

This is a question which, while it has been considered by the courts in but a few instances, has been the subject of frequent discussion by textwriters and essayists; and the doctrine involved has been descriptively designated by them as the ‘Renvoyer’to send back, or the ‘Ruchversweisung’, or the ‘Weiterverweisung’, since an affirmative answer to the question postulated and the operation of the adoption of the foreign law in toto would in many cases result in returning the main controversy to be decided according to the law of the forum.

x x x (16 C.J.S.

872.)

“Another theory, known as the “doctrine of renvoi”, has been advanced.

The theory of the doctrine of renvoi is that the court of the forum, in determining the question before it, must take into account the whole law of the other jurisdiction, but also its rules as to conflict of laws, and then apply the law to the actual question which the rules of the other jurisdiction prescribe.

This may be the law of the forum.

The doctrine of the renvoi has generally been repudiated by the American authorities.” (2 Am.

Jur.

296)

The scope of the theory of renvoi has also been defined and the reasons for its application in a country explained by Prof. Lorenzen in an article in the Yale Law Journal, Vol. 27, 1917-1918, pp. 529-531. The pertinent parts of the article are quoted herein below:

Document: In Re: Testate Estate Of Christensen, Aznar vs. Garcia, G.R. No. L-16749 (DSR-G.R. No. L-16749) | Section: G. R. No. L-16749, January 31, 1963

"The problem has been stated in this way: 'When the Conflict of Laws rule of the forum refers a jural matter to a foreign law for decision, is the reference to the corresponding rule of the Conflict of Law of that foreign law, or is the reference to the purely internal rules of law of the foreign system; i.e., to the totality of the foreign law, minus its Conflict of Laws rules?’

"On logic, the solution, is' not an easy one.

The Michigan court chose, to

accept the Renvoi, that is, applied the Conflict of Laws rule of Illinois which referred the matter back to Michigan law.

But once

having: determined that the Conflict of Laws principle is the rule looked to, it is difficult to see why the reference back should not have been to Michigan Conflict of Laws.

This would have resuited in the

'endless chain of references' which has so often been criticized by legal writers.

The opponents of the Renvoi would have looked merely to

the internal law of Illinois , thus rejecting the Renvoi or the reference back.

Yet there seems no compelling logical reason why the

original reference should be to the internal law rather than to the Conflict of Laws rule.

It is true that such a solution avoids going on

a merry-go-round, but those who have accepted the Renvoi theory avoid this inextricabilis circulus by getting off at the second reference and at that point applying internal law.

Perhaps the opponents of the

Renvoi are a bit more consistent for they look always to internal law as the rule of reference.

"Strangely enough, both the advocates for and the objectors to the Renvoi plead that greater uniformity will result from Adoption of their respective views.

And

still more strange is the fact that the only way to achieve uniformity in this choice-of-law problem is if in the dispute the two states whose laws form the legal basis of the litigation disagree as to whether the Renvoi should be accepted.

It both reject, or both accept the doctrine,

the result of the litigation will vary with the choice of the forum.

Document: Aznar vs Garcia (G.R. Nos. L-11483-84) (CASE-ASL812-rw) | Section: Syllabi

“The recognition of the renvoi theory implies that the rules of the conflict of laws are to be understood as incorporating not only the ordinary or internal law of the foreign state or country, but its rules of the conflict of laws as well. According to this theory ‘the law of a country’ means the whole of its law.

x x x x x x x

“Von Bar presented his views at the meeting of the Institute of International Law, at Neuchatel, in 1900, in the form of the following theses:

“(1) Every court shall observe the law of its country as regards the application of foreign laws.

“(2) Provided that no express provision to the contrary exists, the court shall respect:

“(a) The provisions of a foreign law which disclaims the right to bind its nationals abroad as regards their personal statute, and desires that said personal statute shall be determined by the law of the domicile, or even by the law of the place where the act in question occurred.

“(b) The decision of two or more foreign systems of law, provided it be certain that one of them is necessarily competent, which agree in attributing the determination of a question to the same system of law.

x x x x x x x

“If, for example, the English law directs its judge to distribute the personal estate of an Englishman who has died domiciled in Belgium in accordance with the law of his domicile, he must first inquire whether the law of Belgium would distribute personal property upon death in accordance with the law of domicile, and if he finds that the Belgian law would make the distribution in accordance with the law of nationality — that is the English law — he must accept this reference back to his own law.”

We note that Article 946 of the California Civil Code is its conflict of laws rule, while the rule applied in In re Kaufman, Supra, its internal law. If the law on succession and the conflict of laws rules of California are to be enforced jointly, each in its own intended and appropriate sphere, the principle cited In re Kaufman should apply to citizens living in the State, but Article 946 should apply to such of its citizens as are not domiciled in California but in other jurisdictions. The rule laid down of resorting to the law of the domicile in the determination of matters with foreign element involved is in accord with the general principle of American law that the domiciliary law should govern in most matters or rights which follow the person of the owner.

Document: The Value of Presumption in the Handling of a Case (G.R. No. 108490,) (CASE-245 SCRA 287) | Section: A. *Presumption Juris or of Law

A. Presumption Juris or of Law

A presumption juris or of law is a deduction which the law considers as established from facts proven. It is a presumption determined by law (Roces vs. Posadas, 58 Phil. 115) and it consists of a presumption juris et de jure or conclusive presumption, which is not permitted to be overcome by any proof to the contrary, however, strong; (Mercado vs. Santos, 66 Phil. 215) and a presumption juris tantum or disputable presumption, which is a presumption that stands unless rebutted by evidence. (Bahia vs. Litonjua, 30 Phil. 627) A presumption which is known as processual presumption and which states that the law of a foreign country on a particular matter is the same as our law, (Collector of Internal Revenue vs. Fisher, 110 Phil. 699), is a presumption juris tantum.

Document: The Mechanics of Resolving a Prejudicial Question (CASE-100 SCRA 131 (2)) | Section: § 2. Ascertainment of the existence of prejudicial question

§ 2. Ascertainment of the existence of prejudicial question

The fact that a criminal case is pending at the same time that a civil case is pending involving the same facts as the criminal case does not necessarily make the civil case pre-judicial to the criminal case. In this regard, the Supreme Court has carefully laid down the rule to the effect that for a civil case to be considered prejudicial to a criminal action as to cause the suspension of the latter pending the civil case’s final determination, it must appear not only that the civil case involves the same facts upon which the criminal prosecution would be based, but also that in the resolution of the issue or issues raised in the aforesaid civil action, the guilt or innocence of the accused would necessarily be determined. Correspondingly, where a civil case for quieting of title was filed against one of the accused in a criminal prosecution over a property involved in the criminal case, the Supreme Court declared that as the burden of the criminal complaint is the falsification which allegedly caused the fraudulent and illegal disbursement of the funds of the bank in violation of the Banking Law and the Revised Penal Code, the validity of the transfers of ownership over the land is but an incident, because even if the ownership of one of the respondents is upheld in the case to quiet title, such a decision will not finally conclude that the other respondents who are not parties to the said civil action are innocent of the falsification that enabled them to obtain, through fraudulent misrepresentations and false narration of facts in the public documents the illegal disbursements of the bank’s funds in the way of loans.

Similarly, in a case involving prosecution for the violation of the Copyright Law where the accused brought an action against the complainant in the criminal case for the cancellation of the copyrights allegedly violated on the ground that the same were obtained by fraud, the Supreme Court declared that the action for cancellation does not involve a prejudicial question because, unless cancelled, copyrights are presumed to be duly granted and issued.

Furthermore, in a case of falsification of public document against a Notary Public for subscribing a false document used in a cadastral case, where the accused sought suspension of the criminal proceedings until after the cadastral case has been terminated, the Supreme Court in overruling the request for suspension of the criminal proceedings declared that the civil case does not involve a question prejudicial to the criminal case, for to whomsoever the land may be awarded after all the evidence has been presented in the civil case may not affect the alleged crime committed by the Notary Public, which is the subject of the criminal case.

Document: The Mechanics of Resolving a Prejudicial Question (CASE-100 SCRA 131) | Section: § 2. Ascertainment of the existence of prejudicial question

§ 2. Ascertainment of the existence of prejudicial question

The fact that a criminal case is pending at the same time that a civil case is pending involving the same facts as the criminal case does not necessarily make the civil case pre-judicial to the criminal case. In this regard, the Supreme Court has carefully laid down the rule to the effect that for a civil case to be considered prejudicial to a criminal action as to cause the suspension of the latter pending the civil case’s final determination, it must appear not only that the civil case involves the same facts upon which the criminal prosecution would be based, but also that in the resolution of the issue or issues raised in the aforesaid civil action, the guilt or innocence of the accused would necessarily be determined. Correspondingly, where a civil case for quieting of title was filed against one of the accused in a criminal prosecution over a property involved in the criminal case, the Supreme Court declared that as the burden of the criminal complaint is the falsification which allegedly caused the fraudulent and illegal disbursement of the funds of the bank in violation of the Banking Law and the Revised Penal Code, the validity of the transfers of ownership over the land is but an incident, because even if the ownership of one of the respondents is upheld in the case to quiet title, such a decision will not finally conclude that the other respondents who are not parties to the said civil action are innocent of the falsification that enabled them to obtain, through fraudulent misrepresentations and false narration of facts in the public documents the illegal disbursements of the bank’s funds in the way of loans.

Similarly, in a case involving prosecution for the violation of the Copyright Law where the accused brought an action against the complainant in the criminal case for the cancellation of the copyrights allegedly violated on the ground that the same were obtained by fraud, the Supreme Court declared that the action for cancellation does not involve a prejudicial question because, unless cancelled, copyrights are presumed to be duly granted and issued.

Furthermore, in a case of falsification of public document against a Notary Public for subscribing a false document used in a cadastral case, where the accused sought suspension of the criminal proceedings until after the cadastral case has been terminated, the Supreme Court in overruling the request for suspension of the criminal proceedings declared that the civil case does not involve a question prejudicial to the criminal case, for to whomsoever the land may be awarded after all the evidence has been presented in the civil case may not affect the alleged crime committed by the Notary Public, which is the subject of the criminal case.

Document: Ambrose vs SuqueAmbrose (G.R. No. 206761) (CASE-AVF387-rw) | Section: Syllabi

Remedial Law; Civil Procedure; Capacity to Sue; Legal capacity to sue or the capacity to institute legal action is governed by Section 1, Rule 3 of the Rules of Civil Procedure, under which, “[o]nly natural or juridical persons, or entities authorized by law may be parties in a civil action.”—The petitioner’s action assails the psychological incapacity of the respondent to perform the essential marital obligations. Ultimately, therefore, the result of the action would have an effect on the personal status of the respondent. With this, there is no reason to foreclose the petitioner’s right to institute the instant petition for nullity of marriage. Furthermore, a review of procedural rules present no obstacle in the instant action being instituted by a foreigner. Legal capacity to sue or the capacity to institute legal action is governed by Section 1, Rule 3 of the Rules of Civil Procedure, under which, “[o]nly natural or juridical persons, or entities authorized by law may be parties in a civil action.” The absence of legal capacity to sue indicates the general disability of a plaintiff to sue as when a plaintiff is not in the exercise of his or her civil rights, does not have the necessary qualification to appear in the case, or does not have the character or representation; which may be on account of minority, insanity, incompetence, lack of juridical personality, or other similar grounds for disqualification.

Same; Same; Same; Lack of Capacity to Sue; Lack of Legal Personality to Sue; Lack of capacity to sue is distinguished from lack of legal personality to sue while the former refers to the general disqualification of a plaintiff to institute an action, the latter refers to the fact that the plaintiff is not the real party-in-interest.—Lack of capacity to sue is distinguished from lack of legal personality to sue while the former refers to the general disqualification of a plaintiff to institute an action, the latter refers to the fact that the plaintiff is not the real party-in-interest. As defined under Section 2, Rule 3 of the Rules of Civil Procedure, “[a] real party-in-interest is the party who stands to be benefited or injured by the judgment in the suit, or the party entitled to the avails of the suit.” A real party-in-interest is one who possesses a substantial interest in the case as a result of breach of a legal right. Both “lack of legal capacity to sue” and “lack of legal personality” to sue are affirmative defenses. In the first, the ground is “that the plaintiff has no legal capacity to sue,” while in the second, the ground is based on the fact “that the pleading asserting the

485

Document: Lopez v People (G.R. No. 249196) (CASE-AVF459-rw) | Section: Syllabi

experience as to what course human affairs ordinarily take.” [Footnote *: ] In law, a presumption is an inference of the existence or nonexistence of a fact which courts are permitted to draw from proof of other facts, [Footnote *: ] and is mandatory unless rebutted. [Footnote *: ]

The application of disputable presumptions on a given circumstance must be based on the existence of certain facts on which they are meant to operate. [Footnote *: ] Since “[p]resumptions are not allegations, nor do they supply their absence[,]” [Footnote *: ] disputable presumptions apply only in the absence of contrary evidence or explanations. They do not apply when there are no facts or allegations to support them, [Footnote *: ] as in this case.

Without establishing beyond reasonable doubt that the item which has been the subject of theft is the same object in the possession of petitioner, the presumption under Section 5 of PD 1612 would not operate.

The prosecution failed to establish the elements of fencing

335

Further, the prosecution failed to prove the remaining elements of fencing. There is no evidence shown that petitioner is neither the principal nor an accomplice of the alleged thievery reported by Mendoza, and that he possessed or disposed of the latter’s alleged bicycle. No proof was offered to show that petitioner had knowledge that the bicycle he gave to Magno was stolen, or that he had intent to gain therefrom. It is necessary to remember that in all criminal prosecutions, the burden of proof is on the prosecution to establish the guilt of the accused beyond reasonable doubt. It has the duty to prove each and every element of the crime charged in the information to warrant a finding of guilt for the said crime. [Footnote *: ]

To be sure, the prosecution has failed to discharge its onus of proving, beyond reasonable doubt, the guilt of petitioner for violation of PD 1612. For settled is the rule that in every criminal prosecution, the accused is presumed innocent until the contrary is established by the prosecution. Thus, if the prosecution fails, it fails utterly, even if the defense is weak, or indeed, even if there is no defense at all. The prosecution, at all times, bears the burden of establishing an accused’s guilt beyond reasonable doubt. No matter how weak the defense may be, it is not and cannot be the sole basis of conviction if, on the other hand, the evidence for the prosecution is even weaker. [Footnote *: ]

Document: R.A. No. 6809 - An Act Lowering the Age of Majority from Twenty-one to Eighteen Years, Amending for the Purpose Executive Order Numbered Two Hundred Nine, and for Other Purposes (RA-6809) | Section: Document Body

S. No. 181 H. No. 143 / 85 OG No. 51, 80 Supp (Dec. 18, 1989) ; Malaya 12/16/89 ; Star 12/18/89 ; 1VLD 115 2d

Document: R.A. No. 6809 - An Act Lowering the Age of Majority from Twenty-one to Eighteen Years, Amending for the Purpose Executive Order Numbered Two Hundred Nine, and for Other Purposes (RA-6809) | Section: [ REPUBLIC ACT NO. 6809, December 13, 1989 ]

[ REPUBLIC ACT NO. 6809, December 13, 1989 ]

Document: R.A. No. 6809 - An Act Lowering the Age of Majority from Twenty-one to Eighteen Years, Amending for the Purpose Executive Order Numbered Two Hundred Nine, and for Other Purposes (RA-6809) | Section: AN ACT LOWERING THE AGE OF MAJORITY FROM TWENTY-ONE TO EIGHTEEN YEARS, AMENDING FOR THE PURPOSE EXECUTIVE ORDER NUMBERED TWO HUNDRED NINE, AND FOR OTHER PURPOSES

AN ACT LOWERING THE AGE OF MAJORITY FROM TWENTY-ONE TO EIGHTEEN YEARS, AMENDING FOR THE PURPOSE EXECUTIVE ORDER NUMBERED TWO HUNDRED NINE, AND FOR OTHER PURPOSES

Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the Philippines in Congress assembled:

SECTION 1. Article 234 of Executive Order No. 209, the Family Code of the Philippines, is hereby amended to read as follows: "ART. 234. Emancipation takes place by the attainment of majority. Unless otherwise provided, majority commences at the age of eighteen years." SEC. 2. Articles 235 and 237 of the same Code are hereby repealed.

SEC. 3. Article 236 of the same Code is also hereby amended to read as follows: "ART. 236. Emancipation shall terminate parental authority over the person and property of the child who shall then be qualified and responsible for all acts of civil life, save the exceptions established by existing laws in special cases.

"Contracting marriage shall require parental consent until the age of twenty-one.

"Nothing in this Code shall be construed to derogate from the duty or responsibility of parents and guardians for children and wards below twenty-one years of age mentioned in the second and third paragraphs of Article 2180 of the Civil Code." SEC. 4. Upon the effectivity of this Act, existing wills, bequests, donations, grants, insurance policies and similar instruments containing references and provisions favorable to minors will not retroact to their prejudice.

Document: R.A. No. 6809 - An Act Lowering the Age of Majority from Twenty-one to Eighteen Years, Amending for the Purpose Executive Order Numbered Two Hundred Nine, and for Other Purposes (RA-6809) | Section: SEC. 5. This Act shall take effect upon completion of its publication in at least two (2) newspapers of general circulation.

SEC. 5. This Act shall take effect upon completion of its publication in at least two (2) newspapers of general circulation.

Approved,

(Sgd.) JOVITO R. SALONGA | (Sgd.) RAMON V. MITRA President of the Senate | Speaker of the House of Representatives

This Act which is a consolidation of House Bill No. 143 and Senate Bill No. 181 was finally passed by the House of Representatives and the Senate on October 20, 1989.

(Sgd.) EDWIN P. ACOBA | (Sgd.) QUIRINO D. ABAD SANTOS, JR. Secretary of the Senate | Secretary of the House of Representatives

Approved: Approved: December 13, 1989

(Sgd.) CORAZON C. AQUINO

President of the Philippines

Document: R.A. No. 386 - An Act to Ordain and Institute the CIVIL Code of the Philippines (RA-386) | Section: ART. 121. In order that any modification in the marriage settlements may be valid, it must be made before the celebration of the marriage, subject to the provisions of Art. 191. (1319a)

ART. 121. In order that any modification in the marriage settlements may be valid, it must be made before the celebration of the marriage, subject to the provisions of Art. 191. (1319a)

ART. 122. The marriage settlements and any modification thereof shall be governed by the Statute of Frauds, and executed before the celebration of the marriage. They shall not prejudice third persons unless they are recorded in the Registry of Property. (1321a)

ART. 123. For the validity of marriage settlements executed by any person upon whom a sentence of civil interdiction has been pronounced, the presence and participation of the guardian shall be indispensable, who for this purpose shall be designated by a competent court, in accordance with the provisions of the Rules of Court. (1323a)

ART. 124. If the marriage is between a citizen of the Philippines and a foreigner, whether celebrated in the Philippines or abroad, the following rules shall prevail: (1) If the husband is a citizen of the Philippines while the wife is a foreigner, the provisions of this Code shall govern their property relations;

(2) If the husband is a foreigner and the wife is a citizen of the Philippines, the laws of the husband’s country shall be followed, without prejudice to the provisions of this Code with regard to immovable property. (1325a) ART. 125. Everything stipulated in the settlements or contracts referred to in the preceding articles in consideration of a future marriage shall be rendered void and without effect whatever, if the marriage should not take place. However, those stipulations that do not depend upon the celebration of the marriage shall be valid. (1326a)

**CHAPTER 2

DONATIONS BY REASON OF MARRIAGE**

Document: R.A. No. 386 - An Act to Ordain and Institute the CIVIL Code of the Philippines (RA-386) | Section: ART. 69. It shall be the duty of the local civil registrar to prepare the documents required by this Title, and to administer oaths to all interested parties without any charge in both cases.

ART. 74. A marriage in articulo mortis may also be solemnized by the captain of a ship or chief of an airplane during a voyage, or by the commanding officer of a military unit, in the absence of a chaplain, during war. The duties mentioned in the two preceding articles shall be complied with by the ship captain, airplane chief or commanding officer. (n)

ART. 75. Marriages between Filipino citizens abroad may be solemnized by consuls and vice-consuls of the Republic of the Philippines. The duties of the local civil registrar and of a judge or justice of the peace or mayor with regard to the celebration of marriage shall be performed by such consuls and vice-consuls. (n)

ART. 76. No marriage license shall be necessary when a man and a woman who have attained the age of majority and who, being unmarried, have lived together as husband and wife for at least five years, desire to marry each other. The contracting parties shall state the foregoing facts in an affidavit before any person authorized by law to administer oaths. The official, priest or minister who solemnized the marriage shall also state in an affidavit that he took steps to ascertain the ages and other qualifications of the contracting parties and that he found no legal impediment to the marriage. (n)

ART. 77. In case two persons married in accordance with law desire to ratify their union in conformity with the regulations, rites, or practices of any church, sect, or religion, it shall no longer be necessary to comply with the requirements of Chapter 1 of this Title and any ratification so made shall merely be considered as a purely religious ceremony. (23)

ART. 78. Marriages between Mohammedans or pagans who live in the non-Christian provinces may be performed in accordance with their customs, rites or practices. No marriage license or formal requisites shall be necessary. Nor shall the persons solemnizing these marriages be obliged to comply with article 92.

However, thirty years after the approval of this Code, all marriages performed between Muslims or other non-Christians shall be solemnized in accordance with the provisions of this Code. But the President of the Philippines, upon recommendation of the Commissioner of National Integration, may at any time before the expiration of said period, by proclamation, make any of said provisions applicable to the Muslims and non-Christian inhabitants of any of the non-Christian provinces.

Document: R.A. No. 386 - An Act to Ordain and Institute the CIVIL Code of the Philippines (RA-386) | Section: ART. 270. Legitimation shall take place by the subsequent marriage between the parents. (120a)

ART. 270. Legitimation shall take place by the subsequent marriage between the parents. (120a)

ART. 271. Only natural children who have been recognized by the parents before or after the celebration of the marriage, or have been declared natural children by final judgment, may be considered legitimated by subsequent marriage.

If a natural child is recognized or judicially declared as natural, such recognition or declaration shall extend to his or her brothers or sisters of the full blood: Provided, That the consent of the latter shall be implied if they do not impugn the recognition within four years from the time of such recognition, or in case they are minors, within four years following the attainment of majority. (121a)

Document: Recognition of Partial Divorce under the Family Code (A Reexamination (G.R. No. 133743,) (CASE-514 SCRA 318) | Section: § I. Introductory

§ I. Introductory

Since the effectivity of the New Civil Code, absolute divorce by Philippine nationals even obtained outside the Philippines is null and void. Unhappily married couples attempt to evade the policy set in the New Civil Code and Philippine Jurisprudence by going abroad and secure divorce decrees. Such divorces are considered null and void as long as they remain Philippine nationals.

Several problems arose especially with Philippine nationals married to foreign spouses. It is very often that such marriages do not last as usually the foreign spouses secure a divorce in foreign countries. The situation occurs when the foreign spouse marries another individual while the Filipino spouse remains married to the divorced foreign spouse.

The problem was resolved by the Civil Code Revision Committee by the second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code, which reads:

“Where a marriage between a Filipino citizen and a foreigner is validly celebrated and a divorce is thereafter validly obtained abroad by the alien spouse capacitating him or her to remarry, the Filipino spouse shall have capacity to remarry under Philippine law.”

In two consolidated petitions for review, the Supreme Court sustained a retroactive application of paragraph 2 of the Family Code (Edgar San Luis vs. Felicidad San Luis, G.R. No. 133743; Rodolfo San Luis vs. Felicidad Sagalongos alias Felicidad San Luis, G.R. 134029, February 6, 2007). The case concerned the administration of the Estate of Felicisimo San Luis, former Governor of Laguna, who entered into three marriages.

Felicisimo San Luis was first married to Virgini Sulit by whom he had six children. After the death of Virginia, Felicisimo married Merry Lee Corwin, an American citizen. Merry divorced Felicisimo in the United States on December 14, 1973. On June 30, 1974, Felicisimo married Felicidad Sagalongos in Los Angeles, California.

The family dispute arose when Felicidad, the third wife, filed a petition for letters of administration for the estate of Felicisimo.

Rodolfo San Luis, one of the children by the first marriage questioned the personality of Felicidad, alleging her marriage to Felicisimo is null and void as he remained married to Merry Lee Corwin. The divorce obtained by Merry is null and void as to Felicisimo.

Several procedural issues were raised. This annotation is limited on the effect of divorce obtained in a foreign country of the Filipino spouses.

Document: Recognition of Partial Divorce under the Family Code (A Reexamination (G.R. No. 133743,) (CASE-514 SCRA 318) | Section: § VII. Ruling in the Obrecido **Case Must be Reexamined

§ VII. Ruling in the Obrecido Case Must be Reexamined**

In Republic vs. Obrecido III, 472 SCRA 174 [2005], at the time of the marriage, both husband and wife were Filipino citizens. Later, the wife became a naturalized citizen of the United States, and obtained a divorce decree and remarried a certain Stanley.

The issue is whether the second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code applies.

The Supreme Court said the provision applies stating that the reckoning period is not at the time when the marriage was celebrated but at the time the divorce was obtained. We beg to disagree.

With due respect, we have our reservations on the court’s interpretation. This interpretation will open the floodgates of Filipino citizens of evading the public policy set in the Civil Code and affirmed in Philippine jurisprudence. An unhappily married Filipino spouse can go to a foreign country where divorce is allowed by being naturalized in said country and divorces his spouse. The spirit and intent of the second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code is that one of the spouses was rightfully an alien at the time of the marriage.

Usually, it is the husband who finds work overseas and leaves the wife in the Philippines. The husband falls in love with another woman. To marry her, he obtains a divorce decree in a foreign court. Some States in the United States simply notify the wife in the Philippines serving by summons through mail to acquire jurisdiction and issues a decree of divorce leaving the poor wife abandoned. This is what happened in the Obrecido case, although it was the Filipino wife who obtained the divorce.

There should be a reexamination of the ruling in the Obrecido case.

In Tenchavez vs. Escaño, 15 SCRA 356 [1960], the ponente, Justice J.B.L. Reyes precisely set the principle that if one of the Filipino spouses goes abroad and naturalized in the foreign state for the purpose of divorcing his spouse, such decree of divorce cannot be recognized in the Philippines citing Article 17 of the New Civil Code, Justice Reyes said:

“Even more, the grant of effectivity in this jurisdiction to such foreign divorce decrees would, in effect, give rise to an irritating and scandalous discrimination in favor of wealthy citizens, to the detriment of those members of our polity whose means do not permit them to sojourn abroad and obtain absolute divorces outside the Philippines. (Coquia, Conflict of Laws, p. 278)”

Document: R.A. No. 386 - An Act to Ordain and Institute the CIVIL Code of the Philippines (RA-386) | Section: ART. 69. It shall be the duty of the local civil registrar to prepare the documents required by this Title, and to administer oaths to all interested parties without any charge in both cases.

ART. 79. Mixed marriages between a Christian male and a Mohammedan or pagan female shall be governed by the general provisions of this Title and not by those of the last preceding article, but mixed marriages between a Mohammedan or pagan male and a Christian female may be performed under the provisions of the last preceding article if so desired by the contracting parties, subject, however, in the latter case to the provisions of the second paragraph of said article. (26)

CHAPTER 3

VOID AND VOIDABLE MARRIAGES

ART. 80. The following marriages shall be void from the beginning: (1) Those contracted under the ages of sixteen and fourteen years by the male and female respectively, even with the consent of the parents;

(2) Those solemnized by any person not legally authorized to perform marriages;

(3) Those solemnized without a marriage license, save marriages of exceptional character;

(4) Bigamous or polygamous marriages not falling under article 83, number 2;

(5) Incestuous marriages mentioned in article 81;

(6) Those where one or both contracting parties have been found guilty of the killing of the spouse of either of them;

(7) Those between stepbrothers and stepsisters and other marriages specified in article 82. (n) ART. 81. Marriages between the following are incestuous and void from their performance, whether the relationship between the parties be legitimate or illegitimate: (1) Between ascendants and descendants of any degree;

(2) Between brothers and sisters, whether of the full or half blood;

(3) Between collateral relatives by blood within the fourth civil degree. (28a) ART. 82. The following marriages shall also be void from the beginning: (1) Between stepfathers and stepdaughters, and stepmothers and stepsons;

(2) Between the adopting father or mother and the adopted, between the latter and the surviving spouse of the former, and between the former and the surviving spouse of the latter;

(3) Between the legitimate children of the adopter and the adopted. (28a) ART. 83. Any marriage subsequently contracted by any person during the lifetime of the first spouse of such person with any person other than such first spouse shall be illegal and void from its performance, unless: (1) The first marriage was annulled or dissolved; or

Document: R.A. No. 386 - An Act to Ordain and Institute the CIVIL Code of the Philippines (RA-386) | Section: ART. 69. It shall be the duty of the local civil registrar to prepare the documents required by this Title, and to administer oaths to all interested parties without any charge in both cases.

ART. 97. A petition for legal separation may be filed: (1) For adultery on the part of the wife and for concubinage on the part of the husband as defined in the Penal Code; or

(2) An attempt by one spouse against the life of the other. (n) ART. 98. In every case the court must take steps, before granting the legal separation, toward the reconciliation of the spouses, and must be fully satisfied that such reconciliation is highly improbable. (n)

ART. 99. No person shall be entitled to a legal separation who has not resided in the Philippines for one year prior to the filing of the petition, unless the cause for the legal separation has taken place within the territory of this Republic. (Sec. 2a, Act No. 2710).

ART. 100. The legal separation may be claimed only by the innocent spouse, provided there has been no condonation of or consent to the adultery or concubinage. Where both spouses are offenders, a legal separation cannot be claimed by either of them. Collusion between the parties to obtain legal separation shall cause the dismissal of the petition. (3a, Act No. 2710)

Document: R.A. No. 386 - An Act to Ordain and Institute the CIVIL Code of the Philippines (RA-386) | Section: ART. 50. For the exercise of civil rights and the fulfillment of civil obligations, the domicile of natural persons is the place of their habitual residence. (40a)

ART. 64. Upon being advised of any alleged impediment to the marriage, the local civil registrar shall forthwith make an investigation, examining persons under oath. If he is convinced that there is an impediment to the marriage, it shall be his duty to withhold the marriage license, unless he is otherwise ordered by a competent court. (n)

ART. 65. The local civil registrar shall demand the previous payment of fees required by law or regulations for each license issued. No other sum shall be collected, in the nature of a fee or tax of any kind, for the issuance of a marriage license. Marriage licenses shall be issued free of charge to indigent parties, when both male and female do not each own assessed real property in excess of five hundred pesos, a fact certified to, without cost, by the provincial treasurer, or in the absence thereof, by a statement duly sworn to by the contracting parties before the local civil registrar. The license shall be valid in any part of the Philippines; but it shall be good for no more than one hundred and twenty days from the date on which it is issued and shall be deemed cancelled at the expiration of said period if the interested parties have not made use of it. (11a)

ART. 66. When either or both of the contracting parties are citizens or subjects of a foreign country, it shall be necessary, before a marriage license can be obtained, to provide themselves with a certificate of legal capacity to contract marriage, to be issued by their respective diplomatic or consular officials. (13a)

ART. 67. The marriage certificate in which the contracting parties shall state that they take each other as husband and wife, shall also contain: (1) The full names and domiciles of the contracting parties;

(2) The age of each;

(3) A statement that the proper marriage license has been issued according to law and that the contracting parties have the consent of their parents in case the male is under twenty or the female under eighteen years of age; and

Document: Recognition of Partial Divorce under the Family Code (A Reexamination (G.R. No. 133743,) (CASE-514 SCRA 318) | Section: § III. The Legislative Intent of the Second Paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code Already Found in Previous Supreme Court Decisions

§ III. The Legislative Intent of the Second Paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code Already Found in Previous Supreme Court Decisions

The Philippine Supreme Court has been confronted with problems of mixed marriages. The Court traced the origin of the legislative intent of the second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code (See this Annotator’s comments entitled “Some Legal Problems on Divorces Obtained by Filipino Nationals Abroad,” 300 SCRA 417 [1998]).

The Court cited the cases of Van Dorn vs. Romillo, Jr., 139 SCRA 139 [1985]; Pilapil vs. Hon. Somera-Ibay, 174 SCRA 653 [1974]; Quita vs. Court of Appeals, 300 SCRA 406 [1998] and Republic vs. Obrecido III, 472 SCRA 414 [2005]. Although no divorce was involved, I may add the case of Cheesman vs. IAC, 193 SCRA 93 [1991] as to the property relations of mixed marriages.

Document: Recognition of Partial Divorce under the Family Code (A Reexamination (G.R. No. 133743,) (CASE-514 SCRA 318) | Section: § I. Introductory

§ I. Introductory

Since the effectivity of the New Civil Code, absolute divorce by Philippine nationals even obtained outside the Philippines is null and void. Unhappily married couples attempt to evade the policy set in the New Civil Code and Philippine Jurisprudence by going abroad and secure divorce decrees. Such divorces are considered null and void as long as they remain Philippine nationals.

Several problems arose especially with Philippine nationals married to foreign spouses. It is very often that such marriages do not last as usually the foreign spouses secure a divorce in foreign countries. The situation occurs when the foreign spouse marries another individual while the Filipino spouse remains married to the divorced foreign spouse.

The problem was resolved by the Civil Code Revision Committee by the second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code, which reads:

“Where a marriage between a Filipino citizen and a foreigner is validly celebrated and a divorce is thereafter validly obtained abroad by the alien spouse capacitating him or her to remarry, the Filipino spouse shall have capacity to remarry under Philippine law.”

In two consolidated petitions for review, the Supreme Court sustained a retroactive application of paragraph 2 of the Family Code (Edgar San Luis vs. Felicidad San Luis, G.R. No. 133743; Rodolfo San Luis vs. Felicidad Sagalongos alias Felicidad San Luis, G.R. 134029, February 6, 2007). The case concerned the administration of the Estate of Felicisimo San Luis, former Governor of Laguna, who entered into three marriages.

Felicisimo San Luis was first married to Virgini Sulit by whom he had six children. After the death of Virginia, Felicisimo married Merry Lee Corwin, an American citizen. Merry divorced Felicisimo in the United States on December 14, 1973. On June 30, 1974, Felicisimo married Felicidad Sagalongos in Los Angeles, California.

The family dispute arose when Felicidad, the third wife, filed a petition for letters of administration for the estate of Felicisimo.

Rodolfo San Luis, one of the children by the first marriage questioned the personality of Felicidad, alleging her marriage to Felicisimo is null and void as he remained married to Merry Lee Corwin. The divorce obtained by Merry is null and void as to Felicisimo.

Several procedural issues were raised. This annotation is limited on the effect of divorce obtained in a foreign country of the Filipino spouses.

Document: R.A. No. 386 - An Act to Ordain and Institute the CIVIL Code of the Philippines (RA-386) | Section: ART. 69. It shall be the duty of the local civil registrar to prepare the documents required by this Title, and to administer oaths to all interested parties without any charge in both cases.

ART. 89. Children conceived or born of marriages which are void from the beginning shall have the same status, rights and obligations as acknowledged natural children, and are called natural children by legal fiction.

Children conceived of voidable marriages before the decree of annulment shall be considered as legitimate; and children conceived thereafter shall have the same status, rights and obligations as acknowledged natural children, and are also called natural children by legal fiction. (n)

ART. 90. When a marriage is annulled, the court shall award the custody of the children as it may deem best, and make provision for their education and support. Attorney’s fees and expenses incurred in the litigation shall be charged to the conjugal partnership property, unless the action fails. (33a)

ART. 91. Damages may be awarded in the following cases when the marriage is judicially annulled or declared void from the beginning: (1) If there has been fraud, force or intimidation in obtaining the consent of one of the contracting parties;

(2) If either party was, at the time of the marriage, physically incapable of entering into the married state, and the other party was unaware thereof;

(3) If the person solemnizing the marriage was not legally authorized to perform marriages, and that fact was known to one of the contracting parties, but he or she concealed it from the other;

(4) If a bigamous or polygamous marriage was celebrated, and the impediment was concealed from the plaintiff by the party disqualified;

(5) If in an incestuous marriage, or a marriage between a stepbrother and a stepsister or other marriage prohibited by article 82, the relationship was known to only one of the contracting parties but was not disclosed to the other; (6) If one party was insane and the other was aware thereof at the time of the marriage. (n)

CHAPTER 4

AUTHORITY TO SOLEMNIZE MARRIAGES

Document: R.A. No. 386 - An Act to Ordain and Institute the CIVIL Code of the Philippines (RA-386) | Section: ART. 69. It shall be the duty of the local civil registrar to prepare the documents required by this Title, and to administer oaths to all interested parties without any charge in both cases.

ART. 79. Mixed marriages between a Christian male and a Mohammedan or pagan female shall be governed by the general provisions of this Title and not by those of the last preceding article, but mixed marriages between a Mohammedan or pagan male and a Christian female may be performed under the provisions of the last preceding article if so desired by the contracting parties, subject, however, in the latter case to the provisions of the second paragraph of said article. (26)

CHAPTER 3

VOID AND VOIDABLE MARRIAGES

ART. 80. The following marriages shall be void from the beginning: (1) Those contracted under the ages of sixteen and fourteen years by the male and female respectively, even with the consent of the parents;

(2) Those solemnized by any person not legally authorized to perform marriages;

(3) Those solemnized without a marriage license, save marriages of exceptional character;

(4) Bigamous or polygamous marriages not falling under article 83, number 2;

(5) Incestuous marriages mentioned in article 81;

(6) Those where one or both contracting parties have been found guilty of the killing of the spouse of either of them;

(7) Those between stepbrothers and stepsisters and other marriages specified in article 82. (n) ART. 81. Marriages between the following are incestuous and void from their performance, whether the relationship between the parties be legitimate or illegitimate: (1) Between ascendants and descendants of any degree;

(2) Between brothers and sisters, whether of the full or half blood;

(3) Between collateral relatives by blood within the fourth civil degree. (28a) ART. 82. The following marriages shall also be void from the beginning: (1) Between stepfathers and stepdaughters, and stepmothers and stepsons;

(2) Between the adopting father or mother and the adopted, between the latter and the surviving spouse of the former, and between the former and the surviving spouse of the latter;

(3) Between the legitimate children of the adopter and the adopted. (28a) ART. 83. Any marriage subsequently contracted by any person during the lifetime of the first spouse of such person with any person other than such first spouse shall be illegal and void from its performance, unless: (1) The first marriage was annulled or dissolved; or

Document: R.A. No. 386 - An Act to Ordain and Institute the CIVIL Code of the Philippines (RA-386) | Section: ART. 69. It shall be the duty of the local civil registrar to prepare the documents required by this Title, and to administer oaths to all interested parties without any charge in both cases.

(2) The first spouse had been absent for seven consecutive years at the time of the second marriage without the spouse present having news of the absentee being alive, or if the absentee, though he has been absent for less than seven years, is generally considered as dead and believed to be so by the spouse present at the time of contracting such subsequent marriage, or if the absentee is presumed dead according to articles 390 and 391. The marriage so contracted shall be valid in any of the three cases until declared null and void by a competent court. (29a) ART. 84. No marriage license shall be issued to a widow till after three hundred days following the death of her husband, unless in the meantime she has given birth to a child. (n)

ART. 85. A marriage may be annulled for any of the following causes, existing at the time of the marriage: (1) That the party in whose behalf it is sought to have the marriage annulled was between the ages of sixteen and twenty years, if male, or between the ages of fourteen and eighteen years, if female, and the marriage was solemnized without the consent of the parent, guardian or person having authority over the party, unless after attaining the ages of twenty or eighteen years, as the case may be, such party freely cohabited with the other and both lived together as husband and wife;

(2) In a subsequent marriage under article 83, number 2, that the former husband or wife believed to be dead was in fact living and the marriage with such former husband or wife was then in force;

(3) That either party was of unsound mind, unless such party, after coming to reason, freely cohabited with the other as husband or wife;

(4) That the consent of either party was obtained by fraud, unless such party afterwards, with full knowledge of the facts constituting the fraud, freely cohabited with the other as her husband or his wife, as the case may be;

(5) That the consent of either party was obtained by force or intimidation, unless the violence or threat having disappeared, such party afterwards freely cohabited with the other as her husband or his wife, as the case may be;

Document: Recognition of Partial Divorce under the Family Code (A Reexamination (G.R. No. 133743,) (CASE-514 SCRA 318) | Section: § I. Introductory

§ I. Introductory

Since the effectivity of the New Civil Code, absolute divorce by Philippine nationals even obtained outside the Philippines is null and void. Unhappily married couples attempt to evade the policy set in the New Civil Code and Philippine Jurisprudence by going abroad and secure divorce decrees. Such divorces are considered null and void as long as they remain Philippine nationals.

Several problems arose especially with Philippine nationals married to foreign spouses. It is very often that such marriages do not last as usually the foreign spouses secure a divorce in foreign countries. The situation occurs when the foreign spouse marries another individual while the Filipino spouse remains married to the divorced foreign spouse.

The problem was resolved by the Civil Code Revision Committee by the second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code, which reads:

“Where a marriage between a Filipino citizen and a foreigner is validly celebrated and a divorce is thereafter validly obtained abroad by the alien spouse capacitating him or her to remarry, the Filipino spouse shall have capacity to remarry under Philippine law.”

In two consolidated petitions for review, the Supreme Court sustained a retroactive application of paragraph 2 of the Family Code (Edgar San Luis vs. Felicidad San Luis, G.R. No. 133743; Rodolfo San Luis vs. Felicidad Sagalongos alias Felicidad San Luis, G.R. 134029, February 6, 2007). The case concerned the administration of the Estate of Felicisimo San Luis, former Governor of Laguna, who entered into three marriages.

Felicisimo San Luis was first married to Virgini Sulit by whom he had six children. After the death of Virginia, Felicisimo married Merry Lee Corwin, an American citizen. Merry divorced Felicisimo in the United States on December 14, 1973. On June 30, 1974, Felicisimo married Felicidad Sagalongos in Los Angeles, California.

The family dispute arose when Felicidad, the third wife, filed a petition for letters of administration for the estate of Felicisimo.

Rodolfo San Luis, one of the children by the first marriage questioned the personality of Felicidad, alleging her marriage to Felicisimo is null and void as he remained married to Merry Lee Corwin. The divorce obtained by Merry is null and void as to Felicisimo.

Several procedural issues were raised. This annotation is limited on the effect of divorce obtained in a foreign country of the Filipino spouses.

Document: Recognition of Partial Divorce under the Family Code (A Reexamination (G.R. No. 133743,) (CASE-514 SCRA 318) | Section: § III. The Legislative Intent of the Second Paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code Already Found in Previous Supreme Court Decisions

§ III. The Legislative Intent of the Second Paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code Already Found in Previous Supreme Court Decisions

The Philippine Supreme Court has been confronted with problems of mixed marriages. The Court traced the origin of the legislative intent of the second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code (See this Annotator’s comments entitled “Some Legal Problems on Divorces Obtained by Filipino Nationals Abroad,” 300 SCRA 417 [1998]).

The Court cited the cases of Van Dorn vs. Romillo, Jr., 139 SCRA 139 [1985]; Pilapil vs. Hon. Somera-Ibay, 174 SCRA 653 [1974]; Quita vs. Court of Appeals, 300 SCRA 406 [1998] and Republic vs. Obrecido III, 472 SCRA 414 [2005]. Although no divorce was involved, I may add the case of Cheesman vs. IAC, 193 SCRA 93 [1991] as to the property relations of mixed marriages.

Document: R.A. No. 386 - An Act to Ordain and Institute the CIVIL Code of the Philippines (RA-386) | Section: ART. 69. It shall be the duty of the local civil registrar to prepare the documents required by this Title, and to administer oaths to all interested parties without any charge in both cases.

ART. 89. Children conceived or born of marriages which are void from the beginning shall have the same status, rights and obligations as acknowledged natural children, and are called natural children by legal fiction.

Children conceived of voidable marriages before the decree of annulment shall be considered as legitimate; and children conceived thereafter shall have the same status, rights and obligations as acknowledged natural children, and are also called natural children by legal fiction. (n)

ART. 90. When a marriage is annulled, the court shall award the custody of the children as it may deem best, and make provision for their education and support. Attorney’s fees and expenses incurred in the litigation shall be charged to the conjugal partnership property, unless the action fails. (33a)

ART. 91. Damages may be awarded in the following cases when the marriage is judicially annulled or declared void from the beginning: (1) If there has been fraud, force or intimidation in obtaining the consent of one of the contracting parties;

(2) If either party was, at the time of the marriage, physically incapable of entering into the married state, and the other party was unaware thereof;

(3) If the person solemnizing the marriage was not legally authorized to perform marriages, and that fact was known to one of the contracting parties, but he or she concealed it from the other;

(4) If a bigamous or polygamous marriage was celebrated, and the impediment was concealed from the plaintiff by the party disqualified;

(5) If in an incestuous marriage, or a marriage between a stepbrother and a stepsister or other marriage prohibited by article 82, the relationship was known to only one of the contracting parties but was not disclosed to the other; (6) If one party was insane and the other was aware thereof at the time of the marriage. (n)

CHAPTER 4

AUTHORITY TO SOLEMNIZE MARRIAGES

Document: R.A. No. 386 - An Act to Ordain and Institute the CIVIL Code of the Philippines (RA-386) | Section: ART. 69. It shall be the duty of the local civil registrar to prepare the documents required by this Title, and to administer oaths to all interested parties without any charge in both cases.

ART. 79. Mixed marriages between a Christian male and a Mohammedan or pagan female shall be governed by the general provisions of this Title and not by those of the last preceding article, but mixed marriages between a Mohammedan or pagan male and a Christian female may be performed under the provisions of the last preceding article if so desired by the contracting parties, subject, however, in the latter case to the provisions of the second paragraph of said article. (26)

CHAPTER 3

VOID AND VOIDABLE MARRIAGES

ART. 80. The following marriages shall be void from the beginning: (1) Those contracted under the ages of sixteen and fourteen years by the male and female respectively, even with the consent of the parents;

(2) Those solemnized by any person not legally authorized to perform marriages;

(3) Those solemnized without a marriage license, save marriages of exceptional character;

(4) Bigamous or polygamous marriages not falling under article 83, number 2;

(5) Incestuous marriages mentioned in article 81;

(6) Those where one or both contracting parties have been found guilty of the killing of the spouse of either of them;

(7) Those between stepbrothers and stepsisters and other marriages specified in article 82. (n) ART. 81. Marriages between the following are incestuous and void from their performance, whether the relationship between the parties be legitimate or illegitimate: (1) Between ascendants and descendants of any degree;

(2) Between brothers and sisters, whether of the full or half blood;

(3) Between collateral relatives by blood within the fourth civil degree. (28a) ART. 82. The following marriages shall also be void from the beginning: (1) Between stepfathers and stepdaughters, and stepmothers and stepsons;

(2) Between the adopting father or mother and the adopted, between the latter and the surviving spouse of the former, and between the former and the surviving spouse of the latter;

(3) Between the legitimate children of the adopter and the adopted. (28a) ART. 83. Any marriage subsequently contracted by any person during the lifetime of the first spouse of such person with any person other than such first spouse shall be illegal and void from its performance, unless: (1) The first marriage was annulled or dissolved; or

Document: R.A. No. 386 - An Act to Ordain and Institute the CIVIL Code of the Philippines (RA-386) | Section: ART. 69. It shall be the duty of the local civil registrar to prepare the documents required by this Title, and to administer oaths to all interested parties without any charge in both cases.

(2) The first spouse had been absent for seven consecutive years at the time of the second marriage without the spouse present having news of the absentee being alive, or if the absentee, though he has been absent for less than seven years, is generally considered as dead and believed to be so by the spouse present at the time of contracting such subsequent marriage, or if the absentee is presumed dead according to articles 390 and 391. The marriage so contracted shall be valid in any of the three cases until declared null and void by a competent court. (29a) ART. 84. No marriage license shall be issued to a widow till after three hundred days following the death of her husband, unless in the meantime she has given birth to a child. (n)

ART. 85. A marriage may be annulled for any of the following causes, existing at the time of the marriage: (1) That the party in whose behalf it is sought to have the marriage annulled was between the ages of sixteen and twenty years, if male, or between the ages of fourteen and eighteen years, if female, and the marriage was solemnized without the consent of the parent, guardian or person having authority over the party, unless after attaining the ages of twenty or eighteen years, as the case may be, such party freely cohabited with the other and both lived together as husband and wife;

(2) In a subsequent marriage under article 83, number 2, that the former husband or wife believed to be dead was in fact living and the marriage with such former husband or wife was then in force;

(3) That either party was of unsound mind, unless such party, after coming to reason, freely cohabited with the other as husband or wife;

(4) That the consent of either party was obtained by fraud, unless such party afterwards, with full knowledge of the facts constituting the fraud, freely cohabited with the other as her husband or his wife, as the case may be;

(5) That the consent of either party was obtained by force or intimidation, unless the violence or threat having disappeared, such party afterwards freely cohabited with the other as her husband or his wife, as the case may be;

Document: Till Death Do Us Part Revisiting Marriage as provided under the Philippine Family Code (CASE-ATJ853-rw) | Section: Document Body

These are provisions on marriage, legal separation, property relations, the family home, paternity and filiation, adoption, [Footnote *: ] parental authority, and support among other things as contained in Titles III, IV, V, VI, VIII, IX, XI, and XV of Book 1 of the Civil Code, as well as Articles 17, 18, 19, 27, 28, 29, 30, 31, 39, 40, 41, and 42 of the Child and Youth Welfare Code. [Footnote *: ]

§ 3. Grounds for Void and Voidable Marriages

The Family Code for grounds for void and voidable marriages.

A void marriage is a marriage that is void from the very beginning. In other words, it is void ab initio.

Under Article 35 of the Family Code, the following marriages shall be void from the beginning:

1. Those contracted by any party below eighteen years of age even with the consent of parents or guardians;

2. Those solemnized by any person not legally authorized to perform marriages unless such marriages were contracted with either or both parties believing in  good faith that the solemnizing officer had the legal  authority to do so;

3. Those solemnized without license, except those under extraordinary circumstances;

4. Those bigamous or polygamous marriages not failing under Article 41 of the Family Code;

5. Those contracted through mistake of one contracting party as to the identity of the other; and

6. Those subsequent marriages that are void under Article 53 of the Family Code.

a.Psychological Incapacity**

An innovative feature provided under the Family Code, it states that a marriage contracted by any party who, at the time of the celebration, was psychologically  incapacitated to comply with the essential marital obligations of marriage, shall likewise be void even if such incapacity becomes manifest only after its solemnization. [Footnote *: ]

Psychological incapacity must be more than just a “difficulty,” “refusal” or “neglect” in the performance of some marital obligations. The intention of the law is to confine the meaning of “psychological incapacity” to the most serious cases of personality disorders clearly demonstrative of an utter insensitivity or inability to give meaning and significance to the marriage. Article 36 of the Family Code is not to be confused with divorce law that cuts the marital bond at the time the causes thereof manifested themselves. Article 36 refers to a serious psychological illness afflicting a party even before the celebration of the marriage. [Footnote *: ]

b.Incestuous Marriages**

Document: Till Death Do Us Part Revisiting Marriage as provided under the Philippine Family Code (CASE-ATJ853-rw) | Section: Document Body

Incestuous marriages are those contracted between ascendants and descendants of any degree; and between brothers and sisters, whether of the full or half blood. [Footnote *: ]

c.Void Marriages By Reason of Public Policy**

Under the Family Code, the following marriages are void by reason of public policy: [Footnote *: ]

1. Between collateral blood relatives whether legitimate or illegitimate, up to the fourth civil degree;

2. Between step-parents and step-children;

3. Between parents-in-law and children-in-law;

4. Between the adopting parent and the adopted child;

5. Between the surviving spouse of the adopting parent and the adopted child;

6. Between the surviving spouse of the adopted child and the adopter;

7. Between an adopted child and a legitimate child of the adopter;

8. Between adopted children of the same adopter; and

9. Between parties where one, with the intention to marry the other, killed that other person’s spouse, or his or her own spouse.

Under the Family Code, [Footnote *: ] the following marriages are void from the beginning:

1. Those contracted by any party below eighteen years of age even with the consent of parents or guardians;

2. Those solemnized by any person not legally authorized to perform marriages unless such marriages were contracted with either or both parties believing in good faith that the solemnizing officer had the legal authority to do so;

3. Those solemnized without license, except those that no longer require it;

4. Those bigamous or polygamous marriages; and

5. Those contracted through mistake of one contracting party as to the identity of the other.

The action or defense for the declaration of absolute nullity of a marriage shall not prescribe. [Footnote *: ]

d.Previous Marriage**

The absolute nullity of a previous marriage may be invoked for purposes of remarriage on the basis solely of a final judgment declaring such previous marriage void. [Footnote *: ]

e.Bigamous Marriage**

Document: R.A. No. 386 - An Act to Ordain and Institute the CIVIL Code of the Philippines (RA-386) | Section: ART. 104. After the filing of the petition for legal separation, the spouses shall be entitled to live separately from each other and manage their respective property.

ART. 104. After the filing of the petition for legal separation, the spouses shall be entitled to live separately from each other and manage their respective property.

The husband shall continue to manage the conjugal partnership property but if the court deems it proper, it may appoint another to manage said property, in which case the administrator shall have the same rights and duties as a guardian and shall not be allowed to dispose of the income or of the capital except in accordance with the orders of the court. (6, Act 2710)

ART. 105. During the pendency of legal separation proceedings the court shall make provision for the care of the minor children in accordance with the circumstances, and may order the conjugal partnership property or the income therefrom to be set aside for their support; and in default thereof said minor children shall be cared for in conformity with the provisions of this Code; but the Court shall abstain from making any order in this respect in case the parents have by mutual agreement, made provision for the care of said minor children and these are, in the judgment of the court, well cared for. (7a, Act 2710)

ART. 106. The decree of legal separation shall have the following effects: (1) The spouses shall be entitled to live separately from each other, but the marriage bonds shall not be severed;

(2) The conjugal partnership of gains or the absolute conjugal community of property shall be dissolved and liquidated, but the offending spouse shall have no right to any share of the profits earned by the partnership or community, without prejudice to the provisions of article 176;

(3) The custody of the minor children shall be awarded to the innocent spouse, unless otherwise directed by the court in the interest of said minors, for whom said court may appoint a guardian;

(4) The offending spouse shall be disqualified from inheriting from the innocent spouse by intestate succession. Moreover, provisions in favor of the offending spouse made in the will of the innocent one shall be revoked by operation of law. (n) ART. 107. The innocent spouse, after a decree of legal separation has been granted, may revoke the donations by reason of marriage made by him or by her to the offending spouse. Alienations and mortgages made before the notation of the complaint for revocation in the Registry of Property shall be valid.

This action lapses after four years following the date the decree became final. (n)

Document: R.A. No. 386 - An Act to Ordain and Institute the CIVIL Code of the Philippines (RA-386) | Section: ART. 69. It shall be the duty of the local civil registrar to prepare the documents required by this Title, and to administer oaths to all interested parties without any charge in both cases.

ART. 97. A petition for legal separation may be filed: (1) For adultery on the part of the wife and for concubinage on the part of the husband as defined in the Penal Code; or

(2) An attempt by one spouse against the life of the other. (n) ART. 98. In every case the court must take steps, before granting the legal separation, toward the reconciliation of the spouses, and must be fully satisfied that such reconciliation is highly improbable. (n)

ART. 99. No person shall be entitled to a legal separation who has not resided in the Philippines for one year prior to the filing of the petition, unless the cause for the legal separation has taken place within the territory of this Republic. (Sec. 2a, Act No. 2710).

ART. 100. The legal separation may be claimed only by the innocent spouse, provided there has been no condonation of or consent to the adultery or concubinage. Where both spouses are offenders, a legal separation cannot be claimed by either of them. Collusion between the parties to obtain legal separation shall cause the dismissal of the petition. (3a, Act No. 2710)

Document: R.A. No. 386 - An Act to Ordain and Institute the CIVIL Code of the Philippines (RA-386) | Section: ART. 209. When there is a separation in fact between husband and wife, without judicial approval, the provisions of article 178 shall apply.

ART. 209. When there is a separation in fact between husband and wife, without judicial approval, the provisions of article 178 shall apply.

ART. 210. Upon the dissolution and liquidation of the community, the net assets shall be divided equally between the husband and the wife or their heirs. In case of legal separation or annulment of marriage, the provisions of articles 176 and 177 shall apply to the net profits acquired during the marriage.

Document: Recognition of Partial Divorce under the Family Code (A Reexamination (G.R. No. 133743,) (CASE-514 SCRA 318) | Section: § III. The Legislative Intent of the Second Paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code Already Found in Previous Supreme Court Decisions

§ III. The Legislative Intent of the Second Paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code Already Found in Previous Supreme Court Decisions

The Philippine Supreme Court has been confronted with problems of mixed marriages. The Court traced the origin of the legislative intent of the second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code (See this Annotator’s comments entitled “Some Legal Problems on Divorces Obtained by Filipino Nationals Abroad,” 300 SCRA 417 [1998]).

The Court cited the cases of Van Dorn vs. Romillo, Jr., 139 SCRA 139 [1985]; Pilapil vs. Hon. Somera-Ibay, 174 SCRA 653 [1974]; Quita vs. Court of Appeals, 300 SCRA 406 [1998] and Republic vs. Obrecido III, 472 SCRA 414 [2005]. Although no divorce was involved, I may add the case of Cheesman vs. IAC, 193 SCRA 93 [1991] as to the property relations of mixed marriages.

Document: Recognition of Partial Divorce under the Family Code (A Reexamination (G.R. No. 133743,) (CASE-514 SCRA 318) | Section: § VII. Ruling in the Obrecido **Case Must be Reexamined

Summarizing, the Court ruled:

1. (1) That a foreign divorce between Filipino citizens, sought and decreed after the effectivity of the present Civil Code (Rep. Act 396), is not entitled to recognition as valid in this jurisdiction; and neither is the marriage contracted with another party by the divorced consort, subsequently to the foreign decree of divorce, entitled to validity in the country;
2. (2) That the remarriage of divorced wife and her cohabitation with a person other than the lawful husband entitle the latter to a decree of legal separation conformably to Philippine law;
3. (3) That the desertion and securing of an invalid divorce decree by one consort entitled the other to recover damages;
4. (4) That an action for alienation of affections against the parents of one consort does not lie in the absence of proof of malice or unworthy motives on their part. (Coquia, Conflict of Laws, pp. 279280)

Accordingly, the intent of adding the second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code as provided in Executive Order No. 227, 17 July 1987, the Filipino national is married to a foreigner. It does not cover a marriage of both Filipino nationals and one of the spouses changes his or her nationality by being naturalized in a foreign country.

Document: Recognition of Partial Divorce under the Family Code (A Reexamination (G.R. No. 133743,) (CASE-514 SCRA 318) | Section: § III. The Legislative Intent of the Second Paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code Already Found in Previous Supreme Court Decisions

§ III. The Legislative Intent of the Second Paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code Already Found in Previous Supreme Court Decisions

The Philippine Supreme Court has been confronted with problems of mixed marriages. The Court traced the origin of the legislative intent of the second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code (See this Annotator’s comments entitled “Some Legal Problems on Divorces Obtained by Filipino Nationals Abroad,” 300 SCRA 417 [1998]).

The Court cited the cases of Van Dorn vs. Romillo, Jr., 139 SCRA 139 [1985]; Pilapil vs. Hon. Somera-Ibay, 174 SCRA 653 [1974]; Quita vs. Court of Appeals, 300 SCRA 406 [1998] and Republic vs. Obrecido III, 472 SCRA 414 [2005]. Although no divorce was involved, I may add the case of Cheesman vs. IAC, 193 SCRA 93 [1991] as to the property relations of mixed marriages.

Document: Till Death Do Us Part Revisiting Marriage as provided under the Philippine Family Code (CASE-ATJ853-rw) | Section: Document Body

Moreover, the law provides that it is a special contract of permanent union between a man and a woman entered into in accordance with law for the establishment of conjugal and family life. It is the foundation of the family and an inviolable social institution whose nature, consequences, and incidents are governed by law and not subject to stipulation, except that marriage settlements may fix the property relations during the marriage within the limits provided by the Family Code. [Footnote *: ]

Note that there are essential and formal requisites of marriage.

The essential requisites are: a) legal capacity of the contracting parties who must be a male and a female; and b) consent freely given in the presence of the solemnizing officer while the formal requisites of marriage are: a) authority of the solemnizing officer; b) a valid marriage license; c) a marriage ceremony which takes place with the appearance of the contracting parties  before the solemnizing officer and their personal declaration that they take each other as husband and wife in the presence of not less than two witnesses of legal age.

It is important to note that under Article 7 of the Family Code, marriages may be solemnized by the following:

a) Any incumbent member of the judiciary within the court’s jurisdiction;

b) Any priest, rabbi, imam, or minister of any church or religious sect duly authorized by his church or religious sect and registered with the civil registrar general, acting within the limits of the written authority granted by his church or religious sect and provided that at least one of the contracting parties belongs to the solemnizing officer’s church or religious sect;

c) Any ship captain or airplane chief only in the case mentioned in Article 31 of the Family Code;

d) Any military commander of a unit to which a chaplain is assigned, in the absence of the latter, during a military operation, likewise only in the cases mentioned in Article 32 of the Family Code; and

e) Any consul-general, consul or vice-consul in the case provided under Article 10 of the Family Code.

The Family Code of the Philippines or more formally designated as Executive Order No. 209, Series of 1987, replaced provisions of the Civil Code.

Document: Recognition of Partial Divorce under the Family Code (A Reexamination (G.R. No. 133743,) (CASE-514 SCRA 318) | Section: § I. Introductory

§ I. Introductory

Since the effectivity of the New Civil Code, absolute divorce by Philippine nationals even obtained outside the Philippines is null and void. Unhappily married couples attempt to evade the policy set in the New Civil Code and Philippine Jurisprudence by going abroad and secure divorce decrees. Such divorces are considered null and void as long as they remain Philippine nationals.

Several problems arose especially with Philippine nationals married to foreign spouses. It is very often that such marriages do not last as usually the foreign spouses secure a divorce in foreign countries. The situation occurs when the foreign spouse marries another individual while the Filipino spouse remains married to the divorced foreign spouse.

The problem was resolved by the Civil Code Revision Committee by the second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code, which reads:

“Where a marriage between a Filipino citizen and a foreigner is validly celebrated and a divorce is thereafter validly obtained abroad by the alien spouse capacitating him or her to remarry, the Filipino spouse shall have capacity to remarry under Philippine law.”

In two consolidated petitions for review, the Supreme Court sustained a retroactive application of paragraph 2 of the Family Code (Edgar San Luis vs. Felicidad San Luis, G.R. No. 133743; Rodolfo San Luis vs. Felicidad Sagalongos alias Felicidad San Luis, G.R. 134029, February 6, 2007). The case concerned the administration of the Estate of Felicisimo San Luis, former Governor of Laguna, who entered into three marriages.

Felicisimo San Luis was first married to Virgini Sulit by whom he had six children. After the death of Virginia, Felicisimo married Merry Lee Corwin, an American citizen. Merry divorced Felicisimo in the United States on December 14, 1973. On June 30, 1974, Felicisimo married Felicidad Sagalongos in Los Angeles, California.

The family dispute arose when Felicidad, the third wife, filed a petition for letters of administration for the estate of Felicisimo.

Rodolfo San Luis, one of the children by the first marriage questioned the personality of Felicidad, alleging her marriage to Felicisimo is null and void as he remained married to Merry Lee Corwin. The divorce obtained by Merry is null and void as to Felicisimo.

Several procedural issues were raised. This annotation is limited on the effect of divorce obtained in a foreign country of the Filipino spouses.

Document: R.A. No. 10572 - An Act Establishing the Liability of the Absolute Community or Conjugal Partnership for an Obligation of a Spouse Who Practices a Profession and the Capability of Either Spouse to ... (RA-10572) | Section: [ REPUBLIC ACT NO. 10572, May 24, 2013 ]

[ REPUBLIC ACT NO. 10572, May 24, 2013 ]

AN ACT ESTABLISHING THE LIABILITY OF THE ABSOLUTE COMMUNITY OR CONJUGAL PARTNERSHIP FOR AN OBLIGATION OF A SPOUSE WHO PRACTICES A PROFESSION AND THE CAPABILITY OF EITHER SPOUSE TO DISPOSE OF AN EXCLUSIVE PROPERTY WITHOUT THE CONSENT OF THE OTHER SPOUSE, AMENDING FOR THE PURPOSE ARTICLES 73 AND 111 OF EXECUTIVE ORDER NO. 209, ALSO KNOWN AS THE FAMILY CODE OF THE PHILIPPINES

Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the Philippines in Congress assembled:

Document: Till Death Do Us Part Revisiting Marriage as provided under the Philippine Family Code (CASE-ATJ853-rw) | Section: Document Body

These are provisions on marriage, legal separation, property relations, the family home, paternity and filiation, adoption, [Footnote *: ] parental authority, and support among other things as contained in Titles III, IV, V, VI, VIII, IX, XI, and XV of Book 1 of the Civil Code, as well as Articles 17, 18, 19, 27, 28, 29, 30, 31, 39, 40, 41, and 42 of the Child and Youth Welfare Code. [Footnote *: ]

§ 3. Grounds for Void and Voidable Marriages

The Family Code for grounds for void and voidable marriages.

A void marriage is a marriage that is void from the very beginning. In other words, it is void ab initio.

Under Article 35 of the Family Code, the following marriages shall be void from the beginning:

1. Those contracted by any party below eighteen years of age even with the consent of parents or guardians;

2. Those solemnized by any person not legally authorized to perform marriages unless such marriages were contracted with either or both parties believing in  good faith that the solemnizing officer had the legal  authority to do so;

3. Those solemnized without license, except those under extraordinary circumstances;

4. Those bigamous or polygamous marriages not failing under Article 41 of the Family Code;

5. Those contracted through mistake of one contracting party as to the identity of the other; and

6. Those subsequent marriages that are void under Article 53 of the Family Code.

a.Psychological Incapacity**

An innovative feature provided under the Family Code, it states that a marriage contracted by any party who, at the time of the celebration, was psychologically  incapacitated to comply with the essential marital obligations of marriage, shall likewise be void even if such incapacity becomes manifest only after its solemnization. [Footnote *: ]

Psychological incapacity must be more than just a “difficulty,” “refusal” or “neglect” in the performance of some marital obligations. The intention of the law is to confine the meaning of “psychological incapacity” to the most serious cases of personality disorders clearly demonstrative of an utter insensitivity or inability to give meaning and significance to the marriage. Article 36 of the Family Code is not to be confused with divorce law that cuts the marital bond at the time the causes thereof manifested themselves. Article 36 refers to a serious psychological illness afflicting a party even before the celebration of the marriage. [Footnote *: ]

b.Incestuous Marriages**

Document: Recognition of Partial Divorce under the Family Code (A Reexamination (G.R. No. 133743,) (CASE-514 SCRA 318) | Section: § III. The Legislative Intent of the Second Paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code Already Found in Previous Supreme Court Decisions

§ III. The Legislative Intent of the Second Paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code Already Found in Previous Supreme Court Decisions

The Philippine Supreme Court has been confronted with problems of mixed marriages. The Court traced the origin of the legislative intent of the second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code (See this Annotator’s comments entitled “Some Legal Problems on Divorces Obtained by Filipino Nationals Abroad,” 300 SCRA 417 [1998]).

The Court cited the cases of Van Dorn vs. Romillo, Jr., 139 SCRA 139 [1985]; Pilapil vs. Hon. Somera-Ibay, 174 SCRA 653 [1974]; Quita vs. Court of Appeals, 300 SCRA 406 [1998] and Republic vs. Obrecido III, 472 SCRA 414 [2005]. Although no divorce was involved, I may add the case of Cheesman vs. IAC, 193 SCRA 93 [1991] as to the property relations of mixed marriages.

Document: Recognition of Partial Divorce under the Family Code (A Reexamination (G.R. No. 133743,) (CASE-514 SCRA 318) | Section: § I. Introductory

§ I. Introductory

Since the effectivity of the New Civil Code, absolute divorce by Philippine nationals even obtained outside the Philippines is null and void. Unhappily married couples attempt to evade the policy set in the New Civil Code and Philippine Jurisprudence by going abroad and secure divorce decrees. Such divorces are considered null and void as long as they remain Philippine nationals.

Several problems arose especially with Philippine nationals married to foreign spouses. It is very often that such marriages do not last as usually the foreign spouses secure a divorce in foreign countries. The situation occurs when the foreign spouse marries another individual while the Filipino spouse remains married to the divorced foreign spouse.

The problem was resolved by the Civil Code Revision Committee by the second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code, which reads:

“Where a marriage between a Filipino citizen and a foreigner is validly celebrated and a divorce is thereafter validly obtained abroad by the alien spouse capacitating him or her to remarry, the Filipino spouse shall have capacity to remarry under Philippine law.”

In two consolidated petitions for review, the Supreme Court sustained a retroactive application of paragraph 2 of the Family Code (Edgar San Luis vs. Felicidad San Luis, G.R. No. 133743; Rodolfo San Luis vs. Felicidad Sagalongos alias Felicidad San Luis, G.R. 134029, February 6, 2007). The case concerned the administration of the Estate of Felicisimo San Luis, former Governor of Laguna, who entered into three marriages.

Felicisimo San Luis was first married to Virgini Sulit by whom he had six children. After the death of Virginia, Felicisimo married Merry Lee Corwin, an American citizen. Merry divorced Felicisimo in the United States on December 14, 1973. On June 30, 1974, Felicisimo married Felicidad Sagalongos in Los Angeles, California.

The family dispute arose when Felicidad, the third wife, filed a petition for letters of administration for the estate of Felicisimo.

Rodolfo San Luis, one of the children by the first marriage questioned the personality of Felicidad, alleging her marriage to Felicisimo is null and void as he remained married to Merry Lee Corwin. The divorce obtained by Merry is null and void as to Felicisimo.

Several procedural issues were raised. This annotation is limited on the effect of divorce obtained in a foreign country of the Filipino spouses.

Document: Recognition of Partial Divorce under the Family Code (A Reexamination (G.R. No. 133743,) (CASE-514 SCRA 318) | Section: § II. Recognition of Partial Divorce in the Family Code

§ II. Recognition of Partial Divorce in the Family Code

In spite of the basic public policy of not allowing absolute divorce by Philippine nationals, the second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code provides an exception if a Filipino citizen is married to a foreigner of a country which allows absolute divorce.

The main legal issue in the case under annotation is whether the marriage of Felicisimo San Luis to Merry Lee and the subsequent divorce is covered under Art. 26 of the Family Code. Felicisimo San Luis married Merry Lee Corwin, an American national on May 1, 1968 and the divorced was secured on October 15, 1971. The Family Code took effect only on August 3, 1988.

Document: R.A. No. 8369 - The Rule on Family Mediation Resolution (RULE-R.A. No. 8369) | Section: SECTION 35. Effectivity*. - This Rule shall take effect 15 calendar days after its publication in the Official Gazette or any newspaper of general circulation.

SECTION 35.Effectivity*. - This Rule shall take effect 15 calendar days after its publication in the Official Gazette or any newspaper of general circulation.

__

[1] THE FAMILY CODE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Title V, Chapter 1, art. 150.

[2]THE FAMILY CODE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Title IV, Chapter 2, art. 87. SeeMatabuena v. Cervantes, 148 Phil. 295 ( I 971) [Per J . Fernando].

[3]Republic Act No. 9262 (2004), Anti-Violence Against Women and Their Children Act of 2004 .

[4]A.M. No . 22-09-15-SC, Rule on International Child Abduction Cases, October 18 , 2022, sec. 4(b).

[5] See https://relationshipsnsw.org.au.

[6] Code of Ethics for Mediators in Cross-Border Disputes Involving Children (CBDIC) Within ASEAN, par. 3.09, as adopted in the Jakarta Declaration of the Council of ASEAN Chief Justices (CACJ).

[7] https://www.unicef.org/serbia/en/ethical-guidelines.

[8] APFM Standards of Practice for Professional Family Mediators, February 2, 2014, Academy of Professional Family Mediators, American Bar Association; https://apfmnet.org.

[9] Section 6.3 (b) Conditions to Action, Proposed Rule on Pleadings and Practice.

[10] APFM Standards of Practice for Professional Family Mediators, February 2, 2014, Academy of Professional Family Mediators, American Bar Association; https://apfmnet.org.

[11] Trauma Informed Approach, Introductory Handbook, https://www.unicef.org/northmacedonia/media/12261/file/Trauma%20Informed%20approach.pdf

[12]Code of PROF. RESPONSIBILITY AND ACCOUNTABILITY, Canon V, sec. 2, 3rd par.

Document: Recognition of Partial Divorce under the Family Code (A Reexamination (G.R. No. 133743,) (CASE-514 SCRA 318) | Section: § VII. Ruling in the Obrecido **Case Must be Reexamined

Summarizing, the Court ruled:

1. (1) That a foreign divorce between Filipino citizens, sought and decreed after the effectivity of the present Civil Code (Rep. Act 396), is not entitled to recognition as valid in this jurisdiction; and neither is the marriage contracted with another party by the divorced consort, subsequently to the foreign decree of divorce, entitled to validity in the country;
2. (2) That the remarriage of divorced wife and her cohabitation with a person other than the lawful husband entitle the latter to a decree of legal separation conformably to Philippine law;
3. (3) That the desertion and securing of an invalid divorce decree by one consort entitled the other to recover damages;
4. (4) That an action for alienation of affections against the parents of one consort does not lie in the absence of proof of malice or unworthy motives on their part. (Coquia, Conflict of Laws, pp. 279280)

Accordingly, the intent of adding the second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code as provided in Executive Order No. 227, 17 July 1987, the Filipino national is married to a foreigner. It does not cover a marriage of both Filipino nationals and one of the spouses changes his or her nationality by being naturalized in a foreign country.

Document: Recognition of Partial Divorce under the Family Code (A Reexamination (G.R. No. 133743,) (CASE-514 SCRA 318) | Section: § III. The Legislative Intent of the Second Paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code Already Found in Previous Supreme Court Decisions

§ III. The Legislative Intent of the Second Paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code Already Found in Previous Supreme Court Decisions

The Philippine Supreme Court has been confronted with problems of mixed marriages. The Court traced the origin of the legislative intent of the second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code (See this Annotator’s comments entitled “Some Legal Problems on Divorces Obtained by Filipino Nationals Abroad,” 300 SCRA 417 [1998]).

The Court cited the cases of Van Dorn vs. Romillo, Jr., 139 SCRA 139 [1985]; Pilapil vs. Hon. Somera-Ibay, 174 SCRA 653 [1974]; Quita vs. Court of Appeals, 300 SCRA 406 [1998] and Republic vs. Obrecido III, 472 SCRA 414 [2005]. Although no divorce was involved, I may add the case of Cheesman vs. IAC, 193 SCRA 93 [1991] as to the property relations of mixed marriages.

Document: R.A. No. 10572 - An Act Establishing the Liability of the Absolute Community or Conjugal Partnership for an Obligation of a Spouse Who Practices a Profession and the Capability of Either Spouse to ... (RA-10572) | Section: SEC. 2. Article 111 of the Family Code, as amended, is hereby further amended to read as follows

SEC. 2. Article 111 of the Family Code, as amended, is hereby further amended to read as follows:

“Art. 111. Either spouse may mortgage, encumber, alienate or otherwise dispose of his or her exclusive property.â€�

SEC. 3. Separability Clause. – If any provision or part hereof is held invalid or unconstitutional, the remainder of the law or the provision not otherwise affected shall remain valid and subsisting.

SEC. 4. Repealing Clause. – Any law, presidential decree or issuance, executive order, letter of instruction, administrative order, rule or regulation contrary to or inconsistent with the provisions of this Act is hereby repealed, modified or amended accordingly.

Document: R.A. No. 10572 - An Act Establishing the Liability of the Absolute Community or Conjugal Partnership for an Obligation of a Spouse Who Practices a Profession and the Capability of Either Spouse to ... (RA-10572) | Section: SECTION 1. Article 73 of the Family Code, as amended, is hereby further amended to read as follows

SECTION 1. Article 73 of the Family Code, as amended, is hereby further amended to read as follows:

“Art. 73. Either spouse may exercise any legitimate profession, occupation, business or activity without the consent of the other. The latter may object only on valid, serious, and moral grounds.

“In case of disagreement, the court shall decide whether or not:

“(1) The objection is proper, and

“(2) Benefit has accrued to the family prior to the objection or thereafter. If the benefit accrued prior to the objection, the resulting obligation shall be enforced against the community property. If the benefit accrued thereafter, such obligation shall be enforced against the separate property of the spouse who has not obtained consent.

“The foregoing provisions shall not prejudice the rights of creditors who acted in good faith.â€�

Document: Recognition of Partial Divorce under the Family Code (A Reexamination (G.R. No. 133743,) (CASE-514 SCRA 318) | Section: RECOGNITION OF PARTIAL DIVORCE UNDER THE FAMILY CODE (A Reexamination of Republic vs. Obrecido, III Ruling)

RECOGNITION OF PARTIAL DIVORCE UNDER THE FAMILY CODE (A Reexamination of Republic vs. Obrecido, III Ruling)

_________________

_________________

Document: Recognition of Partial Divorce under the Family Code (A Reexamination (G.R. No. 133743,) (CASE-514 SCRA 318) | Section: Document Body

A N N O T A T I O N

Document: Recognition of Partial Divorce under the Family Code (A Reexamination (G.R. No. 133743,) (CASE-514 SCRA 318) | Section: § III. The Legislative Intent of the Second Paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code Already Found in Previous Supreme Court Decisions

§ III. The Legislative Intent of the Second Paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code Already Found in Previous Supreme Court Decisions

The Philippine Supreme Court has been confronted with problems of mixed marriages. The Court traced the origin of the legislative intent of the second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code (See this Annotator’s comments entitled “Some Legal Problems on Divorces Obtained by Filipino Nationals Abroad,” 300 SCRA 417 [1998]).

The Court cited the cases of Van Dorn vs. Romillo, Jr., 139 SCRA 139 [1985]; Pilapil vs. Hon. Somera-Ibay, 174 SCRA 653 [1974]; Quita vs. Court of Appeals, 300 SCRA 406 [1998] and Republic vs. Obrecido III, 472 SCRA 414 [2005]. Although no divorce was involved, I may add the case of Cheesman vs. IAC, 193 SCRA 93 [1991] as to the property relations of mixed marriages.

Document: Recognition of Partial Divorce under the Family Code (A Reexamination (G.R. No. 133743,) (CASE-514 SCRA 318) | Section: § I. Introductory

§ I. Introductory

Since the effectivity of the New Civil Code, absolute divorce by Philippine nationals even obtained outside the Philippines is null and void. Unhappily married couples attempt to evade the policy set in the New Civil Code and Philippine Jurisprudence by going abroad and secure divorce decrees. Such divorces are considered null and void as long as they remain Philippine nationals.

Several problems arose especially with Philippine nationals married to foreign spouses. It is very often that such marriages do not last as usually the foreign spouses secure a divorce in foreign countries. The situation occurs when the foreign spouse marries another individual while the Filipino spouse remains married to the divorced foreign spouse.

The problem was resolved by the Civil Code Revision Committee by the second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code, which reads:

“Where a marriage between a Filipino citizen and a foreigner is validly celebrated and a divorce is thereafter validly obtained abroad by the alien spouse capacitating him or her to remarry, the Filipino spouse shall have capacity to remarry under Philippine law.”

In two consolidated petitions for review, the Supreme Court sustained a retroactive application of paragraph 2 of the Family Code (Edgar San Luis vs. Felicidad San Luis, G.R. No. 133743; Rodolfo San Luis vs. Felicidad Sagalongos alias Felicidad San Luis, G.R. 134029, February 6, 2007). The case concerned the administration of the Estate of Felicisimo San Luis, former Governor of Laguna, who entered into three marriages.

Felicisimo San Luis was first married to Virgini Sulit by whom he had six children. After the death of Virginia, Felicisimo married Merry Lee Corwin, an American citizen. Merry divorced Felicisimo in the United States on December 14, 1973. On June 30, 1974, Felicisimo married Felicidad Sagalongos in Los Angeles, California.

The family dispute arose when Felicidad, the third wife, filed a petition for letters of administration for the estate of Felicisimo.

Rodolfo San Luis, one of the children by the first marriage questioned the personality of Felicidad, alleging her marriage to Felicisimo is null and void as he remained married to Merry Lee Corwin. The divorce obtained by Merry is null and void as to Felicisimo.

Several procedural issues were raised. This annotation is limited on the effect of divorce obtained in a foreign country of the Filipino spouses.

Document: Recognition of Partial Divorce under the Family Code (A Reexamination (G.R. No. 133743,) (CASE-514 SCRA 318) | Section: § VII. Ruling in the Obrecido **Case Must be Reexamined

§ VII. Ruling in the Obrecido Case Must be Reexamined**

In Republic vs. Obrecido III, 472 SCRA 174 [2005], at the time of the marriage, both husband and wife were Filipino citizens. Later, the wife became a naturalized citizen of the United States, and obtained a divorce decree and remarried a certain Stanley.

The issue is whether the second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code applies.

The Supreme Court said the provision applies stating that the reckoning period is not at the time when the marriage was celebrated but at the time the divorce was obtained. We beg to disagree.

With due respect, we have our reservations on the court’s interpretation. This interpretation will open the floodgates of Filipino citizens of evading the public policy set in the Civil Code and affirmed in Philippine jurisprudence. An unhappily married Filipino spouse can go to a foreign country where divorce is allowed by being naturalized in said country and divorces his spouse. The spirit and intent of the second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code is that one of the spouses was rightfully an alien at the time of the marriage.

Usually, it is the husband who finds work overseas and leaves the wife in the Philippines. The husband falls in love with another woman. To marry her, he obtains a divorce decree in a foreign court. Some States in the United States simply notify the wife in the Philippines serving by summons through mail to acquire jurisdiction and issues a decree of divorce leaving the poor wife abandoned. This is what happened in the Obrecido case, although it was the Filipino wife who obtained the divorce.

There should be a reexamination of the ruling in the Obrecido case.

In Tenchavez vs. Escaño, 15 SCRA 356 [1960], the ponente, Justice J.B.L. Reyes precisely set the principle that if one of the Filipino spouses goes abroad and naturalized in the foreign state for the purpose of divorcing his spouse, such decree of divorce cannot be recognized in the Philippines citing Article 17 of the New Civil Code, Justice Reyes said:

“Even more, the grant of effectivity in this jurisdiction to such foreign divorce decrees would, in effect, give rise to an irritating and scandalous discrimination in favor of wealthy citizens, to the detriment of those members of our polity whose means do not permit them to sojourn abroad and obtain absolute divorces outside the Philippines. (Coquia, Conflict of Laws, p. 278)”

Document: Recognition of Partial Divorce under the Family Code (A Reexamination (G.R. No. 133743,) (CASE-514 SCRA 318) | Section: § VII. Ruling in the Obrecido **Case Must be Reexamined

Summarizing, the Court ruled:

1. (1) That a foreign divorce between Filipino citizens, sought and decreed after the effectivity of the present Civil Code (Rep. Act 396), is not entitled to recognition as valid in this jurisdiction; and neither is the marriage contracted with another party by the divorced consort, subsequently to the foreign decree of divorce, entitled to validity in the country;
2. (2) That the remarriage of divorced wife and her cohabitation with a person other than the lawful husband entitle the latter to a decree of legal separation conformably to Philippine law;
3. (3) That the desertion and securing of an invalid divorce decree by one consort entitled the other to recover damages;
4. (4) That an action for alienation of affections against the parents of one consort does not lie in the absence of proof of malice or unworthy motives on their part. (Coquia, Conflict of Laws, pp. 279280)

Accordingly, the intent of adding the second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code as provided in Executive Order No. 227, 17 July 1987, the Filipino national is married to a foreigner. It does not cover a marriage of both Filipino nationals and one of the spouses changes his or her nationality by being naturalized in a foreign country.

Document: Recognition of Partial Divorce under the Family Code (A Reexamination (G.R. No. 133743,) (CASE-514 SCRA 318) | Section: § II. Recognition of Partial Divorce in the Family Code

§ II. Recognition of Partial Divorce in the Family Code

In spite of the basic public policy of not allowing absolute divorce by Philippine nationals, the second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code provides an exception if a Filipino citizen is married to a foreigner of a country which allows absolute divorce.

The main legal issue in the case under annotation is whether the marriage of Felicisimo San Luis to Merry Lee and the subsequent divorce is covered under Art. 26 of the Family Code. Felicisimo San Luis married Merry Lee Corwin, an American national on May 1, 1968 and the divorced was secured on October 15, 1971. The Family Code took effect only on August 3, 1988.

Document: R.A. No. 9858 - An Act Providing for the Legitimation of Children Born to Parents below Marrying Age, Amending for the Purpose the Family Code of the Philippines, As Amended (RA-9858) | Section: SECTION 1. Article 177 of Executive Order No. 209, otherwise known as the "Family Code of the Philippines", as amended, is hereby further amended to read as follows

SECTION 1. Article 177 of Executive Order No. 209, otherwise known as the "Family Code of the Philippines", as amended, is hereby further amended to read as follows:

"Art. 177. Children conceived and born outside of wedlock of parents who, at the time of the conception of the former, were not disqualified by any impediment to marry each other, or were so disqualified only because either or both of them were below eighteen (18) years of age, may be legitimated."

"Art. 178. Legitimation shall take place by a subsequent valid marriage between parents. The annulment of a voidable marriage shall not affect the legitimation." SEC. 2. Implementing Rules. — The Civil Registrar General shall, in consultation with the chairpersons of the Committee on Youth, Women and Family Relations of the Senate, the Council for the Welfare of Children, the Department of Justice (DOJ), the Department of Foreign Affairs (DFA), the Office of the Supreme Court Administrator, the Philippine Association of Civil Registrars (PACR) and the UP Law Center, issue the necessary rules/regulations for the effective implementation of this Act not later than one (1) month from its effectivity.

SEC. 3. Repealing Clause. — All laws, presidential decrees, executive orders, proclamations and/or administrative regulations which are inconsistent with the provisions of this Act are hereby amended, modified, superseded or repealed accordingly.

Document: R.A. No. 9858 - An Act Providing for the Legitimation of Children Born to Parents below Marrying Age, Amending for the Purpose the Family Code of the Philippines, As Amended (RA-9858) | Section: SEC. 4. Effectivity Clause. — This Act shall take effect fifteen (15) days after its complete publication in the Official Gazette* or in at least two (2) newspapers of national circulation.

SEC. 4. Effectivity Clause. — This Act shall take effect fifteen (15) days after its complete publication in the Official Gazette or in at least two (2) newspapers of national circulation.

Approved,

(Sgd.) JUAN PONCE ENRILE | (Sgd.) PROSPERO C. NOGRALES President of Senate | Speaker of the House of Representatives

This Act which is a consolidation of House Bill No. 5279 and Senate Bill No. 3111 was finally passed by the House of Representatives and Senate on October 13, 2009.

(Sgd.) EMMA LIRIO-REYES | (Sgd.) MARILYN B. BARUA-YAP Secretary of Senate | Secretary General House of Representatives

Approved: DEC 20 2009

(Sgd.) GLORIA MACAPAGAL - ARROYO President of the Philippines

Document: R.A. No. 8533 - An Act Amending Title I, Chapter 3, Article 39 of Executive Order No. 209, Otherwise Known As the Family Code of the Philippines, Nullifying the Prescriptive Period for Action or De... (RA-8533) | Section: SEC. 2. Effectivity Clause. - This Act shall take effect after fifteen (15) days following its publication in the Official Gazette or in two (2) newspapers of general circulation.

SEC. 2. Effectivity Clause. - This Act shall take effect after fifteen (15) days following its publication in the Official Gazette or in two (2) newspapers of general circulation.

Approved,

(Sgd.)JOSE DE VENECIA JR. | (Sgd.) NEPTALI A. GONZALES Speaker of the House of Representatives | President of the Senate

This Act, which originated from the Senate was finally passed by the Senate and the House of Representatives on February 11, 1998 and February 13, 1998, respectively.

(Sgd.)ROBERTO P. NAZARENO | (Sgd.) HEZEL P. GACUTAN Secretary General House of Representatives | Secretary of the Senate

Approved: February 23, 1998.

(Sgd.) FIDEL V. RAMOS President of the Philippines

Document: P.D. No. 1083 - A Decree to Ordain and Promulgate a Code Recognizing the System of Filipino Muslim Laws, Codifying Muslim Personal Laws, and Providing for Its Administration and for Other Purposes (PD-1083) | Section: ARTICLE 43. Household property.*— Household property which customarily pertains to or is used by either spouse shall be prima facie presumed to be the property of said spouse.

ARTICLE 43.Household property.*— Household property which customarily pertains to or is used by either spouse shall be prima facie presumed to be the property of said spouse.

Document: R.A. No. 9858 - An Act Providing for the Legitimation of Children Born to Parents below Marrying Age, Amending for the Purpose the Family Code of the Philippines, As Amended (RA-9858) | Section: Document Body

S. No. 5279 H. No. 3111; 106 OG No. 9, 1161 (March 1, 2010); Manila Times; Manila Standard Today, February 1, 2010

Document: R.A. No. 9858 - An Act Providing for the Legitimation of Children Born to Parents below Marrying Age, Amending for the Purpose the Family Code of the Philippines, As Amended (RA-9858) | Section: SECTION 1. Article 177 of Executive Order No. 209, otherwise known as the "Family Code of the Philippines", as amended, is hereby further amended to read as follows

SECTION 1. Article 177 of Executive Order No. 209, otherwise known as the "Family Code of the Philippines", as amended, is hereby further amended to read as follows:

"Art. 177. Children conceived and born outside of wedlock of parents who, at the time of the conception of the former, were not disqualified by any impediment to marry each other, or were so disqualified only because either or both of them were below eighteen (18) years of age, may be legitimated."

"Art. 178. Legitimation shall take place by a subsequent valid marriage between parents. The annulment of a voidable marriage shall not affect the legitimation." SEC. 2. Implementing Rules. — The Civil Registrar General shall, in consultation with the chairpersons of the Committee on Youth, Women and Family Relations of the Senate, the Council for the Welfare of Children, the Department of Justice (DOJ), the Department of Foreign Affairs (DFA), the Office of the Supreme Court Administrator, the Philippine Association of Civil Registrars (PACR) and the UP Law Center, issue the necessary rules/regulations for the effective implementation of this Act not later than one (1) month from its effectivity.

SEC. 3. Repealing Clause. — All laws, presidential decrees, executive orders, proclamations and/or administrative regulations which are inconsistent with the provisions of this Act are hereby amended, modified, superseded or repealed accordingly.

Document: R.A. No. 9858 - An Act Providing for the Legitimation of Children Born to Parents below Marrying Age, Amending for the Purpose the Family Code of the Philippines, As Amended (RA-9858) | Section: SEC. 4. Effectivity Clause. — This Act shall take effect fifteen (15) days after its complete publication in the Official Gazette* or in at least two (2) newspapers of national circulation.

SEC. 4. Effectivity Clause. — This Act shall take effect fifteen (15) days after its complete publication in the Official Gazette or in at least two (2) newspapers of national circulation.

Approved,

(Sgd.) JUAN PONCE ENRILE | (Sgd.) PROSPERO C. NOGRALES President of Senate | Speaker of the House of Representatives

This Act which is a consolidation of House Bill No. 5279 and Senate Bill No. 3111 was finally passed by the House of Representatives and Senate on October 13, 2009.

(Sgd.) EMMA LIRIO-REYES | (Sgd.) MARILYN B. BARUA-YAP Secretary of Senate | Secretary General House of Representatives

Approved: DEC 20 2009

(Sgd.) GLORIA MACAPAGAL - ARROYO President of the Philippines

Document: R.A. No. 9858 - An Act Providing for the Legitimation of Children Born to Parents below Marrying Age, Amending for the Purpose the Family Code of the Philippines, As Amended (RA-9858) | Section: Document Body

S. No. 5279 H. No. 3111; 106 OG No. 9, 1161 (March 1, 2010); Manila Times; Manila Standard Today, February 1, 2010

Document: R.A. No. 9858 - An Act Providing for the Legitimation of Children Born to Parents below Marrying Age, Amending for the Purpose the Family Code of the Philippines, As Amended (RA-9858) | Section: AN ACT PROVIDING FOR THE LEGITIMATION OF CHILDREN BORN TO PARENTS BELOW MARRYING AGE, AMENDING FOR THE PURPOSE THE FAMILY CODE OF THE PHILIPPINES, AS AMENDED

AN ACT PROVIDING FOR THE LEGITIMATION OF CHILDREN BORN TO PARENTS BELOW MARRYING AGE, AMENDING FOR THE PURPOSE THE FAMILY CODE OF THE PHILIPPINES, AS AMENDED

Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representative of the Philippines in Congress assembled:

Document: R.A. No. 9858 - An Act Providing for the Legitimation of Children Born to Parents below Marrying Age, Amending for the Purpose the Family Code of the Philippines, As Amended (RA-9858) | Section: [ REPUBLIC ACT NO. 9858, December 20, 2009 ]

[ REPUBLIC ACT NO. 9858, December 20, 2009 ]

Document: Rules of Court in the Philippines Promulgated by the Supreme Court of the Philippines Effective January 1, 1964 (RULE-373) | Section: Rule 108 CANCELLATION OR CORRECTION OP ENTRIES IN THE CIVIL REGISTRY

Rule 108 CANCELLATION OR CORRECTION OP ENTRIES IN THE CIVIL REGISTRY

Section 1. Who may file petition.— Any person interested in any act, event, order or decree concerning the civil status of persons which has been recorded in the civil register, may file a verified petition for the cancellation or correction of any entry relating thereto, with the Court of First Instance of the province where the corresponding civil registry is located.

Sec. 2. Entries subject to cancellation or correction.— Upon good and valid grounds, the following entries in the civil register may be cancelled or corrected: (a) births; (b) marriages; (c) deaths; (d) legal separations; (e) Judgments of annulments of marriage; (f) judgments declaring marriages void from the beginning; (g) legitimations; (h) adoptions; (i) acknowledgments of natural children; (j) naturalization; (k) election, loss or recovery of citizenship; (l) civil interdiction; (m) judicial determination of filiation; (n) voluntary emancipation of a minor; and (o) changes of name.

Sec. 3. Parties.—When cancellation or correction of an entry in the civil register is sought, the civil registrar and all persons who have or claim any interest which would be affected thereby shall be made parties to the proceeding.

Sec. 4. Notice and publication.— Upon the filing of the petition, the court shall, by an order, fix the time and place for the hearing of the same, and cause reasonable notice thereof to be given to the persons named in the petition.   The court shall also cause the order to be published once a week for three (3) consecutive weeks in a newspaper of general circulation in the province.

Sec. 5. Opposition.— The civil registrar and any person having or claiming any interest under the entry whose cancellation or correction is sought may, within fifteen (15) days from notice of the petition, or from the last date of publication of such notice, file his opposition thereto.

Sec. 6. Expediting proceedings.—The court in which the proceeding is brought may make orders expediting the proceedings, and may also grant preliminary injunction for the preservation of the rights of the parties pending such proceedings.

Document: Rules of Court in the Philippines Promulgated by the Supreme Court of the Philippines Effective January 1, 1964 (RULE-373) | Section: Rule 108 CANCELLATION OR CORRECTION OP ENTRIES IN THE CIVIL REGISTRY

Sec. 7. Order.—After hearing, the court may either dismiss the petition or issue an order granting the cancellation or correction prayed for. In either case, a certified copy of the judgment shall be served upon the civil registrar concerned who shall annotate the same in his record.

Document: R.A. No. 9048 - An Act Authorizing the City or Municipal CIVIL Registrar or the Consul General to Correct a Clerical or Typographical Error in an Entry And/or Change of First Name or Nickname in th... (RA-9048) | Section: SEC. 11. Retroactivity Clause. - This Act shall have retroactive effect insofar as it does not prejudice or impair vested or acquired rights in accordance with the Civil Code and other laws.

SEC. 11. Retroactivity Clause. - This Act shall have retroactive effect insofar as it does not prejudice or impair vested or acquired rights in accordance with the Civil Code and other laws.

Document: R.A. No. 9048 - An Act Authorizing the City or Municipal CIVIL Registrar or the Consul General to Correct a Clerical or Typographical Error in an Entry And/or Change of First Name or Nickname in th... (RA-9048) | Section: SEC. 2. Definition of Terms. - As used in this Act, the following terms shall mean

SEC. 2. Definition of Terms. - As used in this Act, the following terms shall mean:

"City or municipal civil registrar" refers to the head of the local civil registry office of the city or municipality, as the case may be, who is appointed as such by the city or municipal mayor in accordance with the provisions of existing laws.

"Petitioner" refers to a natural person filing the petition and who has direct and personal interest in the correction of a clerical or typographical error in an entry or change of first name or nickname in the civil register.

"Clerical or typographical error" refers to a mistake committed in the performance of clerical work in writing, copying, transcribing or typing an entry in the civil register that is harmless and innocuous, such as misspelled name or misspelled place of birth or the like, which is visible to the eyes or obvious to the understanding, and can be corrected or changed only by reference to other existing record or records: Provided, however, That no correction must involve the change of nationality, age, status or sex of the petitioner.

"Civil register" refers to the various registry books and related certificates and documents kept in the archives of the local civil registry offices, Philippine Consulate and of the Office of the Civil Registrar General.

"Civil registrar general" refers to the administrator of the National Statistics Office which is the agency mandated to carry out and administer the provision of laws on civil registration.

"First name" refers to a name or a nickname given to a person which may consist of one or more names in addition to the middle and last names.

SEC. 3. Who May File the Petition and Where. - Any person having direct and personal interest in the correction of a clerical or typographical error in an entry and/or change of first name or nickname in the civil register may file in person, a verified petition with the local civil registry office of the city or municipality where the record being sought to be corrected or changed is kept.

In case the petitioner has already migrated to another place in the country and it would not be practical for such party, in terms of transportation expenses, time and effort, to appear in person before the local civil registrar keeping the documents to be corrected or changed, the petition, may be filed in person, with the local civil registrar of the place where the interested party is presently residing or domiciled. The two (2) local civil registrars concerned will then communicate to facilitate the processing of the petition.

Document: R.A. No. 9048 - An Act Authorizing the City or Municipal CIVIL Registrar or the Consul General to Correct a Clerical or Typographical Error in an Entry And/or Change of First Name or Nickname in th... (RA-9048) | Section: Document Body

S. No. 2159 H. No. 9797 / 97 OG No. 26, 3903 (July 25, 2001) ; 15 VLD 2d 286

Document: R.A. No. 9048 - An Act Authorizing the City or Municipal CIVIL Registrar or the Consul General to Correct a Clerical or Typographical Error in an Entry And/or Change of First Name or Nickname in th... (RA-9048) | Section: [ REPUBLIC ACT NO. 9048, March 22, 2001 ]

[ REPUBLIC ACT NO. 9048, March 22, 2001 ]

AN ACT AUTHORIZING THE CITY OR MUNICIPAL CIVIL REGISTRAR OR THE CONSUL GENERAL TO CORRECT A CLERICAL OR TYPOGRAPHICAL ERROR IN AN ENTRY AND/OR CHANGE OF FIRST NAME OR NICKNAME IN THE CIVIL REGISTER WITHOUT NEED OF A JUDICIAL ORDER, AMENDING FOR THIS PURPOSE ARTICLES 376 AND 412 OF THE CIVIL CODE OF THE PHILIPPINES

Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the Philippines in Congress assembled:

SECTION 1. Authority to Correct Clerical or Typographical Error and Change of First Name or Nickname. - No entry in a civil register shall be changed or corrected without a judicial order, except for clerical or typographical errors and change of first name or nickname which can be corrected or changed by the concerned city or municipal civil registrar or consul general in accordance with the provisions of this Act and its implementing, rules and regulations.

Document: R.A. No. 9048 - An Act Authorizing the City or Municipal CIVIL Registrar or the Consul General to Correct a Clerical or Typographical Error in an Entry And/or Change of First Name or Nickname in th... (RA-9048) | Section: SEC. 12. Separability Clause. - If any portion or provision of this Act is declared void or unconstitutional, the remaining portions or provisions thereof shall not be affected by such declaration.

SEC. 12. Separability Clause. - If any portion or provision of this Act is declared void or unconstitutional, the remaining portions or provisions thereof shall not be affected by such declaration.

SEC. 13. Repealing Clause. - All laws, decrees, orders, rules and regulations, other issuances, or parts thereof inconsistent with the provisions of this Act are hereby repealed or modified accordingly.

Document: R.A. No. 11909 - Implementing Rules and Regulations Governing Republic Act No. 11909 Otherwise Known As the Permanent Validity of the Certificate of Live Birth, Death, and Marriage Act (RA-11909) | Section: Rule 6 INSTANCES WHEN THE END-USERS MAY REQUIRE THE SUBMISSION OF A NEW OR UPDATED COPY OF THE CIVIL REGISTRY DOCUMENTS

a) | When the document upon verification appears not to be authentic; b) | The security features of the documents are no longer visible; c) | CRDs which are unreadable or the texts on the certificates appear illegible; d) | CRDs that need to undergo or have undergone judicial corrections; e) | CRDs that need to undergo or has undergone administrative correction pursuant to RA No.

9858 entitled "An Act Providing for the Legitimation of Children Born to Parents Below Marrying Age, Amending for the Purpose the Family Code of the Philippines, as Amended";RA No.

9048 entitled "An Act Authorizing the City of Municipal Civil Registrar or the Consul General to Correct a Clerical or Typographical Error in an Entry and/or Change of First Name or Nickname in the Civil Register without the Need of a Judicial Order, Amending for this Purpose Articles 376 and 412 of the Civil Code of the Philippines"; RA No.

10172 entitled, "An Act Further Authorizing the City or Municipal Civil Registrar or the Consul General to Correct Clerical or Typographical Errors in the Day and Month in the Date of Birth or Sex of a Person Appearing in the Civil Register without Need of a Judicial Order, Amending for the Purpose Republic Act Numbered Ninety Forty-Eight", Supplemental Report, RA No.

9255 entitled "*An Act Allowing Illegitimate Children to Use the Surname of their Father, Amending for the Purpose Article 176 of Executive Order No.

209, otherwise known as the Family Code of the Philippines"*; and including Acknowledgement under the New Civil Code; f) | Administrative and Judicial Adoption pursuant to RA No.

8043 or "Inter-Country Adoption Act of 1995", RA No.

8552 or "Domestic Adoption Law".

RA No.

11222 or the "Simulated Birth Rectification Act", and RA No.

Document: R.A. No. 11909 - Implementing Rules and Regulations Governing Republic Act No. 11909 Otherwise Known As the Permanent Validity of the Certificate of Live Birth, Death, and Marriage Act (RA-11909) | Section: Rule 10 PSA CIVIL REGISTRY DATABASE

Rule 10 PSA CIVIL REGISTRY DATABASE

a) | The PSA shall, in coordination with the DICT, develop a civil registry database in local civil registries and in the PFSPs. b) | The PSA as the central repository of all CRDs submitted by LCROs including all reported vital events by the PFSPs for those occurring abroad and from Shari'a Circuit/District Registrars for Muslim Filipinos, shall be updated on a regular basis. c) | The PSA shall issue appropriate guidelines in the establishment, maintenance, access, and updating of the civil registry database taking into consideration the incorporation of safeguards and controls to ensure confidentiality of information. The guidelines shall include the mechanisms to align discrepancies between PSA and LCROs and PFSPs.

Document: R.A. No. 11909 - Implementing Rules and Regulations Governing Republic Act No. 11909 Otherwise Known As the Permanent Validity of the Certificate of Live Birth, Death, and Marriage Act (RA-11909) | Section: Rule 6 INSTANCES WHEN THE END-USERS MAY REQUIRE THE SUBMISSION OF A NEW OR UPDATED COPY OF THE CIVIL REGISTRY DOCUMENTS

Rule 6 INSTANCES WHEN THE END-USERS MAY REQUIRE THE SUBMISSION OF A NEW OR UPDATED COPY OF THE CIVIL REGISTRY DOCUMENTS

National government agencies and instrumentalities, government-owned and controlled corporations, local government units, private companies, private and public educational institutions, and other non-government entities are prohibited from requiring the submission of another or newer copies of CRDs when a valid certificate can already be presented, except under any of the following instances:

Document: R.A. No. 11909 - Implementing Rules and Regulations Governing Republic Act No. 11909 Otherwise Known As the Permanent Validity of the Certificate of Live Birth, Death, and Marriage Act (RA-11909) | Section: Rule 5 ISSUANCE OF CIVIL REGISTRY DOCUMENTS

Rule 5 ISSUANCE OF CIVIL REGISTRY DOCUMENTS

Regardless of the permanent validity herein established, the document owner or his/her authorized representative, may request for a copy of his/her CRDs in such number of copies or as often as necessary upon payment of the fees as prescribed by the PSA, the local civil registries, and the PFSPs.

Provided that the prescribed fees shall be in accordance with existing laws including rules and regulations on allowable fees issued by the Anti-Red Tape Authority, local revenue codes or ordinances, as the case may be.

Issuance of CRDs shall be free of charge upon presentation of any of the following certificates:

• | Certificate of indigency issued by DSWD;
• | Certificate of indigency issued by LGU subject to verification process; or
• | Certificate of 4Ps issued by DSWS.

Provided,that the certificate of indigency shall be based on the DSWD Listahanan. The CRG shall issue guidelines in the implementation of issuance of CRDs for indigents in coordination with DSWD.

his provision likewise applies to requests for the issuance of reports of birth, death, and marriage by the PFSPs.

Document: R.A. No. 11909 - Implementing Rules and Regulations Governing Republic Act No. 11909 Otherwise Known As the Permanent Validity of the Certificate of Live Birth, Death, and Marriage Act (RA-11909) | Section: Rule 6 INSTANCES WHEN THE END-USERS MAY REQUIRE THE SUBMISSION OF A NEW OR UPDATED COPY OF THE CIVIL REGISTRY DOCUMENTS

11642 or the "Domestic Administrative Adoption and Alternative Child Care Act"; g) | Certified copies of registered legal instruments (i.e., naturalization and/or election of Philippine citizenship); h) | Dissolution and Revocation of Dissolution of Marriages under the customs and traditions of the indigenous people and protected by RA 8371 or the "Indigenous Peoples' Rights Act"; i) | Divorces and Revocation of Divorces under Presidential Decree 1083 or the "Code of Muslim Personal Laws"; j) | CRDs to be used abroad requiring the issuance of apostille; and k) | CRDs compliant with requirements in Republic Act 8239 or the "Passport Act of 1996" to establish identity and citizenship, and to meet International Civil Aviation Organization standards pertaining to security, integrity, and a satisfactory level of confidence in the reliability of travel documents.

l) | Other birth, marriage, or death records that have undergone administrative corrections pursuant to existing civil registration laws, rules and regulations.

Document: R.A. No. 11222 - An Act Allowing the Rectification of Simulated Birth Records and Prescribing Administrative Adoption Proceedings for the Purpose (RA-11222) | Section: SECTION 1. Short Title. -*This Act shall be known as the "Simulated Birth Rectification Act".

SECTION 1. Short Title. -This Act shall be known as the "Simulated Birth Rectification Act".

Document: R.A. No. 11222 - An Act Allowing the Rectification of Simulated Birth Records and Prescribing Administrative Adoption Proceedings for the Purpose (RA-11222) | Section: ARTICLE II

ARTICLE II

RECTIFICATION OF SIMULATED BIRTHS

SEC. 4. Rectification of Simulated Birth Record. -Notwithstanding any provision of law to the contrary, a person or persons who, prior to the effectivity of this Act, simulated the birth of a child, and those who cooperated in the execution of such simulation, shall not be criminally, civilly, or administratively liable for such act: Provided,That the simulation of birth was made for the best interest of the child and that the child has been consistently considered and treated by such person or persons as her, his, or their own daughter or son: provided, further,That such person or persons has or have filed a petition for adoption with an application for the rectification of the simulated birth record within ten (10) years from the effectivity of this Act: Provided, finally,That all the benefits of this Act shall also apply to adult adoptees.

SEC. 5. Administrative Adoption and Rectification. - A person or persons who simulated birth of a child under the conditions provided under Section 4 of this Act may avail of administrative proceedings for the adoption and rectification of the simulated birth record of such child: Provided,That the child has been living with the person for at least three (3) years before the effectivity of this Act: Provided, further,That a certificate declaring the child legally available for adoption (CDCLAA) is issued by the DSWD in favor of such child.

SEC. 6. Inadmissible Evidence. -All petitions, documents, records, and papers relating to adoption and rectification of simulated births under this Act cannot be used as evidence against those who simulated the birth of a child or who cooperated in the execution of such simulation in any criminal, civil, or administrative proceeding.

Document: R.A. No. 11222 - An Act Allowing the Rectification of Simulated Birth Records and Prescribing Administrative Adoption Proceedings for the Purpose (RA-11222) | Section: [ REPUBLIC ACT NO. 11222, February 21, 2019 ]

[ REPUBLIC ACT NO. 11222, February 21, 2019 ]

Document: R.A. No. 11222 - An Act Allowing the Rectification of Simulated Birth Records and Prescribing Administrative Adoption Proceedings for the Purpose (RA-11222) | Section: Document Body

115 OG No. 17, 4162 (April 29, 2019)

Document: R.A. No. 11222 - An Act Allowing the Rectification of Simulated Birth Records and Prescribing Administrative Adoption Proceedings for the Purpose (RA-11222) | Section: SEC. 2. Objectives. -*This Act shall have the following objectives

SEC. 2. Objectives. -This Act shall have the following objectives:

(a) To grant amnesty and allow rectification of the simulated birth of a child where the simulation was made for the best interest of the child, and that such child has been consistently considered and treated by the person or persons who simulated such birth as her, his, or their own daughter or son;

(b) To fix the status and filiation of a child whose birth was simulated by giving such child all the benefits of adoption and ensuring that the child shall be entitled to all the rights provided by law to legally adopted children, without any discrimination of any kind, as well as to love, guidance, and support from the child's adoptive family;

(c) To exempt from criminal, civil, and administrative liability those who simulated the birth record of a child prior to the effectivity of this Act: Provided,That a petition for adoption with an application for the rectification of the simulated birth record is filed within ten (10) years from the effectivity of this Act;

(d) To provide for and allow a simpler and less costly administrative adoption proceeding where the child has been living with the person or persons who simulated her or his birth record for at least three (3) years before the effectivity of this Act; and

(e) To educate and inform the public about the rectification of simulated births, and to encourage people to avail of the benefits of this Act.

Document: R.A. No. 386 - An Act to Ordain and Institute the CIVIL Code of the Philippines (RA-386) | Section: ART. 410. The books making up the civil register and all documents relating thereto shall be considered public documents and shall be prima facie evidence of the facts therein contained. (n)

ART. 410. The books making up the civil register and all documents relating thereto shall be considered public documents and shall be prima facie evidence of the facts therein contained. (n)

ART. 411. Every civil registrar shall be civilly responsible for any unauthorized alteration made in any civil register, to any person suffering damage thereby. However, the civil registrar may exempt himself from such liability if he proves that he has taken every reasonable precaution to prevent the unlawful alteration. (n)

Document: R.A. No. 9048 - An Act Authorizing the City or Municipal CIVIL Registrar or the Consul General to Correct a Clerical or Typographical Error in an Entry And/or Change of First Name or Nickname in th... (RA-9048) | Section: SEC. 11. Retroactivity Clause. - This Act shall have retroactive effect insofar as it does not prejudice or impair vested or acquired rights in accordance with the Civil Code and other laws.

SEC. 11. Retroactivity Clause. - This Act shall have retroactive effect insofar as it does not prejudice or impair vested or acquired rights in accordance with the Civil Code and other laws.

Document: R.A. No. 386 - An Act to Ordain and Institute the CIVIL Code of the Philippines (RA-386) | Section: ART. 407. Acts, events and judicial decrees concerning the civil status of persons shall be recorded in the civil register. (325a)

ART. 407. Acts, events and judicial decrees concerning the civil status of persons shall be recorded in the civil register. (325a)

ART. 408. The following shall be entered in the civil register: (1) Births;

(2) marriages;

(3) deaths;

(4) legal separations;

(5) annulments of marriage;

(6) judgments declaring marriages void from the beginning;

(7) legitimations; (8) adoptions;

(9) acknowledgments of natural children;

(10) naturalization;

(11) loss, or

(12) recovery of citizenship;

(13) civil interdiction; (14) judicial determination of filiation;

(15) voluntary emancipation of a minor; and

(16) changes of name. (326a) ART. 409. In cases of legal separation, adoption, naturalization and other judicial orders mentioned in the preceding article, it shall be the duty of the clerk of the court which issued the decree to ascertain whether the same has been registered, and if this has not been done, to send a copy of said decree to the civil registry of the city or municipality where the court is functioning. (n)

Document: R.A. No. 386 - An Act to Ordain and Institute the CIVIL Code of the Philippines (RA-386) | Section: ART. 537. Acts merely tolerated, and those executed clandestinely and without the knowledge of the possessor of a thing, or by violence, do not affect possession. (444)

ART. 537. Acts merely tolerated, and those executed clandestinely and without the knowledge of the possessor of a thing, or by violence, do not affect possession. (444)

ART. 538. Possession as a fact cannot be recognized at the same time in two different personalities except in the cases of co-possession. Should a question arise regarding the fact of possession, the present possessor shall be preferred; if there are two possessors, the one longer in possession; if the dates of the possession are the same, the one who presents a title; and if all these conditions are equal, the thing shall be placed in judicial deposit pending determination of its possession or ownership through proper proceedings. (445)

CHAPTER 3

EFFECTS OF POSSESSION

ART. 539. Every possessor has a right to be respected in his possession; and should he be disturbed therein he shall be protected in or restored to said possession by the means established by the laws and the Rules of Court.

A possessor deprived of his possession through forcible entry may within ten days from the filing of the complaint present a motion to secure from the competent court, in the action for forcible entry, a writ of preliminary mandatory injunction to restore him in his possession. The court shall decide the motion within thirty (30) days from the filing thereof. (446a)

Document: R.A. No. 386 - An Act to Ordain and Institute the CIVIL Code of the Philippines (RA-386) | Section: ART. 2265. The right of retention of real or personal property arising after this Code becomes effective, includes those things which came into the creditor’s possession before said date. (n)

ART. 2265. The right of retention of real or personal property arising after this Code becomes effective, includes those things which came into the creditor’s possession before said date. (n)

ART. 2266. The following shall have not only prospective but also retroactive effect: (1) Article 315, whereby a descendant cannot be compelled, in a criminal case, to testify against his parents and ascendants;

(2) Articles 101 and 88, providing against collusion in cases of legal separation and annulment of marriage;

(3) Articles 283, 284, and 289, concerning the proof of illegitimate filiation;

(4) Article 838, authorizing the probate of a will on petition of the testator himself;

(5) Articles 1359 to 1369, relative to the reformation of instruments;

(6) Articles 476 to 481, regulating actions to quiet title; (7) Articles 2029 to 2031, which are designed to promote compromises. (n) ART. 2267. The following provisions shall apply not only to future cases but also to those pending on the date this Code becomes effective: (1) Article 29, relative to criminal prosecutions wherein the accused is acquitted on the ground that his guilt has not been proved beyond reasonable doubt;

(2) Article 33, concerning cases of defamation, fraud, and physical injuries. (n) ART. 2268. Suits between members of the same family which are pending at the time this Code goes into effect shall be suspended, under such terms as the court may determine, in order that a compromise may be earnestly sought, or, in case of legal separation proceedings, for the purpose of effecting, if possible, a reconciliation. (n)

Document: R.A. No. 386 - An Act to Ordain and Institute the CIVIL Code of the Philippines (RA-386) | Section: ART. 477. The plaintiff must have legal or equitable title to, or interest in the real property which is the subject-matter of the action. He need not be in possession of said property.

ART. 477. The plaintiff must have legal or equitable title to, or interest in the real property which is the subject-matter of the action. He need not be in possession of said property.

ART. 478. There may also be an action to quiet title or remove a cloud therefrom when the contract, instrument or other obligation has been extinguished or has terminated, or has been barred by extinctive prescription.

Document: R.A. No. 386 - An Act to Ordain and Institute the CIVIL Code of the Philippines (RA-386) | Section: ART. 1089. The titles of acquisition or ownership of each property shall be delivered to the co-heir to whom said property has been adjudicated. (1065a)

ART. 1089. The titles of acquisition or ownership of each property shall be delivered to the co-heir to whom said property has been adjudicated. (1065a)

ART. 1090. When the title comprises two or more pieces of land which have been assigned to two or more co-heirs, or when it covers one piece of land which has been divided between two or more co-heirs, the title shall be delivered to the one having the largest interest, and authentic copies of the title shall be furnished to the other co-heirs at the expense of the estate. If the interest of each co-heir should be the same, the oldest shall have the title. (1066a)

SUBSECTION 2.—Effects of Partition

Document: R.A. No. 386 - An Act to Ordain and Institute the CIVIL Code of the Philippines (RA-386) | Section: ART. 413. All other matters pertaining to the registration of civil status shall be governed by special laws. (n)

ART. 413. All other matters pertaining to the registration of civil status shall be governed by special laws. (n)

BOOK II

PROPERTY, OWNERSHIP, AND ITS MODIFICATIONS

Title I.—CLASSIFICATION OF PROPERTY

PRELIMINARY PROVISIONS

ART. 414. All things which are or may be the object of appropriation are considered either: (1) Immovable or real property; or

(2) Movable or personal property. (333)

CHAPTER 1

IMMOVABLE PROPERTY

ART. 415. The following are immovable property: (1) Land, buildings, roads and constructions of all kinds adhered to the soil;

(2) Trees, plants, and growing fruits, while they are attached to the land or form an integral part of an immovable;

(3) Everything attached to an immovable in a fixed manner, in such a way that it cannot be separated therefrom without breaking the material or deterioration of the object;

(4) Statues, reliefs, paintings or other objects for use or ornamentation, placed in buildings or on lands by the owner of the immovable in such a manner that it reveals the intention to attach them permanently to the tenements;

(5) Machinery, receptacles, instruments or implements intended by the owner of the tenement for an industry or works which may be carried on in a building or on a piece of land, and which tend directly to meet the needs of the said industry or works;

(6) Animal houses, pigeon-houses, beehives, fish ponds or breeding places of similar nature, in case their owner has placed them or preserves them with the intention to have them permanently attached to the land, and forming a permanent part of it; the animals in these places are included;

(7) Fertilizer actually used on a piece of land;

(8) Mines, quarries, and slag dumps, while the matter thereof forms part of the bed, and waters either running or stagnant;

(9) Docks and structures which, though floating, are intended by their nature and object to remain at a fixed place on a river, lake, or coast;

(10) Contracts for public works, and servitudes and other real rights over immovable property. (334a)

CHAPTER 2

MOVABLE PROPERTY

ART. 416. The following things are deemed to be personal property: (1) Those movables susceptible of appropriation which are not included in the preceding article;

(2) Real property which by any special provision of law is considered as personalty;

(3) Forces of nature which are brought under control by science; and