Document: Interpretation and Construction of Penal Statutes (G.R. Nos. 74226-27, L-289,) (CASE-175 SCRA 610) | Section: § V. Problems discussed

It would seem that the dissent is more in consonant with logic and reason, considering that penal laws have to be interpreted and construed more liberally in favor of the accused and strictly against the State.

1. 1. Repeal and amendments of penal laws.—The effect of a repealing or amendatory law to a penal provision is another problem encountered in the interpretation and construction of penal statutes.

When the repeal is total and absolute and the act which was penalized by a prior law ceased to be a criminal act under the new law, the previous offense is obliterated, and in this case it would be illogical for the court to attempt to sentence an accused for an offense that no longer exists. It was said that total repeal deprives the court of jurisdiction to try violations of the old law prior to the repeal.

The earlier rule was that repeal of a criminal act by its reenactment, even without a saving clause, would not destroy criminal liability, but since the Tamayo and Sindiong de Pastor cases, the converse rule, prevailing in common law countries, had become the prevailing rule here. As now formulated, the doctrine is that where the repealing law fails to penalize the acts which constituted the offense defined and penalized in the repealed law, the repeal carries with it the deprivation of the courts of jurisdiction to try, convict, and sentence persons charged with violations of the old law prior to the repeal.

In the case of an amendment, where the amendatory law provides for a more severe penalty for the act defined as an offense, the amendatory law should not be applied; conversely, if the amendatory law provides for a lesser penalty or extends to the accused a special circumstance which will lighten the penalty, then it must be applied.

There was, however, a debate concerning the correct interpretation of article 22 of the Revised Penal Code, in view of the provision of article 366 of the same Code. The latter article reads as follows:

“Without prejudice to the provisions contained in article 22 of this Code, felonies and misdemeanors, committed prior to the date of effectiveness of this Code shall be punished in accordance with the Code or Acts in force at the time of their commission.”

Justice Villamor was of the view that “the intention of the Legislature in embodying this provision (art. 366) in the Revised Penal Code was to insure that the elimination from this Code (of certain criminal acts) should not have the effect of pardoning guilty persons who were serving their sentences for the commission of such crimes.” Chief Justice Avanceña, however, made a well-reasoned dissenting opinion. He said:

Document: Interpretation and Construction of Penal Statutes (G.R. Nos. 74226-27, L-289,) (CASE-175 SCRA 610) | Section: § IV. Substantive provisions—problems encountered

1.

1.

Date of effectivity (prospective or retroactive application) of penal statutes.—The civil law rule is that “laws shall take effect after fifteen days following the completion of their publication in the Official Gazette, unless it is otherwise provided;” which enshrines the general rule that laws are prospective in operation.

This is in a sense corroborated or reinforced by the provision of the Revised Penal Code that “no felony shall be punishable by any penalty prescribed by law prior to its commission,” but the said Code also provides that “penal laws shall have retroactive effect insofar as they favor the person guilty of a felony, x x x although at the time of the publication of such laws a final sentence has been pronounced and the convict is serving the same.” 2.

2.

What are “penal laws?”—Article 22 of the Revised Penal Code authorizes the retroactive application of “penal laws” if they favor the accused.

The question arises what are “penal laws” within the contemplation of said provision.

3.

3.

What are “special laws”?—The Revised Penal Code also provides that “offenses which are or in the future may be pun1.

ishable under special laws are not subject to the provisions of this Code.

This Code shall be supplementary to such laws, unless the latter should specially provide the contrary.” What are “special laws” under this provision?

2.

4.

When may the Revised Penal Code be applied in a suppletory manner to special laws?—This is another controversial issue which had not been clearly answered in the adjudicated cases.

3.

5.

Repeal and amendment of laws.—“Laws are repealed only by subsequent ones, and their violation or non-observance shall not be excused by disuse, or customs or practice to the contrary,” but suppose the repeal or amendment favors the accused, what course of action is open to the courts?

4.

6.

Absence of specific provision.—The civil code provides that “no judge or court shall decline to render judgment by rea-son of the silence, obscurity or insufficiency of the laws,” while the penal law states that “whenever a court has knowledge of any act which it may deem proper to repress and which is not punishable by law, it shall render the proper decision, x x x” What is the “proper decision”?

5.

7.

Document: Interpretation and Construction of Penal Statutes (G.R. Nos. 74226-27, L-289,) (CASE-175 SCRA 610) | Section: § V. Problems discussed

§ V. Problems discussed

1. 1. Effectivity of penal statutes; prospective and retroactive application.—These two problems are treated together they being interrelated.

Under this topic, the first sub-issue that became the subject of debate is whether or not it is essential that a penal law should first be published before it becomes binding and effective. In two early cases, both penned by Justice Montemayor, the rule was announced that as a rule, circulars and regulations which prescribe a penalty for their violation should be published before becoming effective, this, on the general principle and theory that before the public is bound by its contents, especially its penal provisions, a law, regulation, or circular must first be published and the people officially and especially informed of said contents and its penalties. Thus, although the issue of the Official Gazette in which Batas Pambansa Blg. 22 was published is dated April 9, 1979, but said issue was officially released for circulation only on June 14, 1979, and the law provides that it shall take effect fifteen days after its publication in the Official Gazette, it was held that the term publication should be given the ordinary meaning, that is, to make known to the people in general, such that the law became effective only on June 29, 1979, and an act contemplated by the law performed in May, 1979, cannot be considered as a violation thereof because there was yet no law to be violated. To the same effect is a 1959 ruling stating that it is an elementary rule of fairplay and justice that a reasonable opportunity to be informed must be afforded to the people who are commanded to obey before they can be punished for its violation.

Document: Interpretation and Construction of Penal Statutes (G.R. Nos. 74226-27, L-289,) (CASE-175 SCRA 610) | Section: § V. Problems discussed

Under article 47 of the Revised Penal Code, enacted when the Supreme Court was of eight members, the imposition of the death penalty should be by unanimous decision of the members. Under the Judiciary Act of 1948 it is provided that whenever the judgment of the lower court imposes the death penalty, the case shall be determined by eight Justices of the Court, and that when eight Justices fail to reach a decision as therein provided, the penalty next lower in degree than the death penalty shall be imposed. A question arose whether this provision of the Judiciary Act should be given retroactive effect. A majority of the Members of the Supreme Court were of the opinion that the new law may be given retroactive effect so as to cover a case involving an offense committed prior to its enactment, on the ground that the matter referring to the number of Justices necessary for the imposition of the death penalty is merely one of procedure. Then Chief Justice Paras, however, believed that the requisite of unanimity among the Justices as to the propriety of the imposition of the death penalty is a substantive matter so that the new law may not be applied to cases involving crimes committed prior to its enactment as it is unfavorable to the accused. In an early case, it was held that although Act 1773, doing away with the jurisdictional requirement that private offenses must be commenced by complaint of the offended party, was procedural, it could not be applied retroactively to a case committed before the effectivity of the law (although the case was filed after its effectivity) because it was prejudicial to the accused.

It would seem that the better rule should be that whether a law is substantive or procedural, it should be given retroactive effect if it favors the accused; otherwise it should only have prospective operation.

The accused was charged for a violation of Art. 159 of the Revised Penal Code. The acts complained of occurred in or about and during the period from October 1, 1929 to December 1, 1929. The Revised Penal Code took effect on January 1, 1932 and prior to that date, there was no law punishing the offense of violation of conditional pardon. Although the accused pleaded guilty to the charge, the Supreme Court, through Justice Abad Santos, ruled:

Document: Interpretation and Construction of Penal Statutes (G.R. Nos. 74226-27, L-289,) (CASE-175 SCRA 610) | Section: § I. Foreword

§ I. Foreword

The decision of the Third Division of the Supreme Court in the case of People v. Mispah R. Reyes is not only timely but also very relevant to present-day administration of criminal justice. The legal principles therein announced should be emphasized not only to lawyers but also to prosecutors and judges as well if we must attain orderly and effective administration of justice.

The decision re-states the universal principle that laws imposing criminal responsibility must be strictly construed against the State and in favor of the accused. And what makes the decision a landmark one is that it blasted the myth of previous adjudications refusing to apply the rules of interpretation of limitation statutes applicable to civil actions, and more than that, it adopted the doctrine of “constructive notice” in construing the start of prescriptive period of offenses.

These annotations seek to elucidate on the issues involved in the application of the basic principle of strict construction and interpretation of penal statutes, in the hope that in some way it would ease the work of the researcher and the scholar, if not the judge who may be confronted with such problems.

Document: Jurisprudential Abreaction to the Ex Post Facto Law and Prospectivity of Laws (G.R. Nos. 115835-36,) (CASE-ATP170-rw) | Section: Art. 255. This Code shall have retroactive effect insofar as it does not prejudice or impair vested or acquired rights in accordance with the Civil Code or other laws.

Thus, the Juvenile Justice and Welfare Act of 2006 provides for its retroactive application. Thus, it was held: “Sec. 68 of Republic Act No. 9344 allows the retroactive application of the Act to those who have been convicted and are serving sentence at the time of the effectivity of the said Act, and who were below the age of 18 years at the time of the commission of the offense. (People v. Hidalgo, 769 SCRA 31 [2015]; People v. Ancajas, 773 SCRA 518 [2015])

§28. The Drunk Driving Law is not retroactive**

Under Art. 22 of the Revised Penal Code, penal laws shall be given retroactive effect insofar as they are favorable to the accused. Sec. 19 of R.A. No. 10586 expressly modified Sec. 56(f) of R.A. No. 4136. By force of Art. 22 of the Revised Penal Code in relation to Sec. 3(e) of R.A. No. 10586, a person could be acquitted for the charge of driving under the influence of alcohol if the inculpatory act occurred in 2006. (Sydeco v. People, 740 SCRA 288 [2014])

§ 29. Doubt must be resolved against retrospective effect

It is a rule of statutory construction that all statutes are to be construed as having only a prospective operation unless the purpose and intention of the Legislature to give them retrospective effect is expressly declared or is necessarily implied from the language used. In every case of doubt, the doubt must be resolved against the retrospective effect. (Universal Corn Products, Inc. v. Rice and Corn Board, 20 SCRA 1048 [1967])

726

§ 30. Executive Order No. 187 repealed some Presidential Decrees laws and restored some Articles of the Revised Penal Code

Document: Interpretation and Construction of Penal Statutes (G.R. Nos. 74226-27, L-289,) (CASE-175 SCRA 610) | Section: § IV. Substantive provisions—problems encountered

1.

1.

Date of effectivity (prospective or retroactive application) of penal statutes.—The civil law rule is that “laws shall take effect after fifteen days following the completion of their publication in the Official Gazette, unless it is otherwise provided;” which enshrines the general rule that laws are prospective in operation.

This is in a sense corroborated or reinforced by the provision of the Revised Penal Code that “no felony shall be punishable by any penalty prescribed by law prior to its commission,” but the said Code also provides that “penal laws shall have retroactive effect insofar as they favor the person guilty of a felony, x x x although at the time of the publication of such laws a final sentence has been pronounced and the convict is serving the same.” 2.

2.

What are “penal laws?”—Article 22 of the Revised Penal Code authorizes the retroactive application of “penal laws” if they favor the accused.

The question arises what are “penal laws” within the contemplation of said provision.

3.

3.

What are “special laws”?—The Revised Penal Code also provides that “offenses which are or in the future may be pun1.

ishable under special laws are not subject to the provisions of this Code.

This Code shall be supplementary to such laws, unless the latter should specially provide the contrary.” What are “special laws” under this provision?

2.

4.

When may the Revised Penal Code be applied in a suppletory manner to special laws?—This is another controversial issue which had not been clearly answered in the adjudicated cases.

3.

5.

Repeal and amendment of laws.—“Laws are repealed only by subsequent ones, and their violation or non-observance shall not be excused by disuse, or customs or practice to the contrary,” but suppose the repeal or amendment favors the accused, what course of action is open to the courts?

4.

6.

Absence of specific provision.—The civil code provides that “no judge or court shall decline to render judgment by rea-son of the silence, obscurity or insufficiency of the laws,” while the penal law states that “whenever a court has knowledge of any act which it may deem proper to repress and which is not punishable by law, it shall render the proper decision, x x x” What is the “proper decision”?

5.

7.

Document: Jurisprudential Abreaction to the Ex Post Facto Law and Prospectivity of Laws (G.R. Nos. 115835-36,) (CASE-ATP170-rw) | Section: Art. 2266. The following shall have not only prospective but also retroactive effect

The only means of giving retroactive effect to a penal provision favorable to the accused when the trial Judge has lost jurisdiction over the case, is the writ of habeas corpus. (Directo v. Director of Prisons, 56 Phil. 692 [1970]. See also Lamen v. Director, Bureau of Corrections, 241 SCRA 573 [1995]). In one case, the Supreme Court ordered the Director of the New Bilibid Prisons to submit a complete inventory of all prisoners in view of a law that was passed (R.A. No. 7659), which is favorable to them. (See Ordoñez v. Vinarao, 239 SCRA 114 [1994])

Moreover, where the decision is already final, the appropriate remedy of an accused to secure release from prison in view of the retroactive effect of a favorable law is to file a petition for habeas corpus. (People v. Caco, 269 SCRA 271 [1997])

§ 25. Retirement laws has no retroactive effect

Retirement laws should only apply for personnel at the time of its approval. It has no retroactive effect, only prospective. (Carolino v. Senga, 756 SCRA 55 [2015])

§ 26. The retroactive application of procedural laws does not violate of any right of a person. Law and jurisprudence

The Family Code of the Philippines provides that:

724

Document: Interpretation and Construction of Penal Statutes (G.R. Nos. 74226-27, L-289,) (CASE-175 SCRA 610) | Section: § V. Problems discussed

It has been said that article 22 of the Revised Penal Code qualifies article 21 in the sense that penal laws shall have retroactive effect insofar as they favor persons convicted of a crime or misdemeanor. The courts of Spain and the learned commentators on Spanish penal law have construed article 22 of the penal code to mean that penal laws are to be given a retroactive effect only in so far as they favor the defendant charged with a crime or misdemeanor.

It should be mentioned in this regard that articles 21 and 22 of the Revised Penal Code implement the constitutional precept that “no ex post facto law x x x shall be enacted,” and in this connection, every law that makes an action, done before the passage of the law, and which was innocent when done, criminal, and punishes such action, is an ex post facto law; and an act which when committed was not a crime, can not be made so by statute without violating the constitutional inhibition as to ex post facto laws.

It was held that the Court of Industrial Relations could not impose a fine for acts considered as unfair labor practice performed before Rep. Act No. 875 took effect, because said law, being penal in character, should not and could not be applied retroactively.

Document: Jurisprudential Abreaction to the Ex Post Facto Law and Prospectivity of Laws (G.R. Nos. 115835-36,) (CASE-ATP170-rw) | Section: Art. 2266. The following shall have not only prospective but also retroactive effect

crime of illegal recruitment and provides for higher penalties. The restrictive provisions of this new law is not applicable to a pending case at the time said law was passed. (People v. Diaz, 259 SCRA 441 [1996]) Thus, a person should not be unduly prejudiced by the imposition of a more severe penalty than that provided in the law then in force. (People v. Villamar, 298 SCRA 398 [1998]. See also People v. Banela, 301 SCRA 84 [1999], where the civil indemnity for rape remained at P50,000.00 and not P75,000.00 because the law should be prospectively applied, People v. Langres, 316 SCRA 769 [1999]. See also People v. Montera, 55 Phil. 933 [1931]; Pomeroy v. Dir. of Prisons and Superintendent of Correctional Institution for Women, 107 Phil. 50 [1960])

In addition, a law imposing a new penalty or a new liability or disability, or giving a new right of action, must not be construed as having a retroactive effect. It is elementary that the laws in force at the time the contract was made must govern its interpretation and application. Laws must be construed prospectively and not retrospectively. If a contract is legal at its inception, it cannot be rendered illegal by any subsequent legislation. If that were permitted, then the obligations of a contract might be impaired, which is prohibited by the organic law. (U.S. v. Constantino Tan Quingco Chua, 39 Phil. 552 [1919]; Aguilar v. Rubiato and Gonzales Vila, 40 Phil. 570 [1919]; People v. Vilo, 82 Phil. 524 [1949])

Likewise, B.P. 877, the Rental Law at that time, was held prospective in application. (Juarez v. Court of Appeals, 214 SCRA 475 [1949])

Lastly, all laws operate prospectively only and only when the legislative has clearly indicated its intention that the law operates retroactively will the courts so apply it. Retroactive operation will more readily be ascribed to legislation that is curative or legalizing than to legislation which may disadvantageously, though legally, effect past relations and transactions. (People v. Zeta, 98 Phil. 143 [1955])

722

Document: Hopeless Mess of our Criminal Law System (G.R. No. 115988) (CASE-254 SCRA 745) | Section: § 2. Basic theory of the Revised Penal Code; Classical and Positivist schools

§ 2. Basic theory of the Revised Penal Code; Classical and Positivist schools

Since the Revised Penal Code was based on the Spanish Penal Code of 1870, which in turn traced its descent from the French Penal Code of 1810, it belongs to the classical or juristic school of criminal law, as distinguished from the positivist or realistic school.

The basic postulate of the Classic penal system is that men are rational and calculating beings who guide their actions with reference to the principles of pleasure and pain. Thus, they will refrain from criminal acts if threatened with punishment sufficient to cancel the hope of possible gain or advantage. Becaria, the leading exponent of classical penology during the 18th century, said that “in every criminal cause the judge should reason syllogistically. The major (premise) should be the general law, the minor, the conformity of the action or its opposition to the laws; the conclusion, liberty or punishment.” The classic penal system lays stress on the crime. It is primarily retributive and punitive. Punishment is standardized and proportioned to the gravity or nature of the offense.

On the other hand, the Positivist school (Scoula Positiva) views crime as a social phenomenon and attaches much importance to the criminal or the actor. Positivist criminology is reformative and preventive and it individualizes punishment. As Seagle noted, “a new and epoch-making idea had been broached which is simply that the ‘criminal’ is only a sick man who needs not to be punished but cured. The victim of heredity and environment, he is more sinned against than sinning. The whole concept of moral guilt upon which classical penology rests is an ironic irrelevancy. For the concept of guilt must be substituted (by) that of ‘social dangerousness.’ The incurable criminal is to be treated, and the prison is to constitute a criminological hospital. This is the whole sum and substance of what is called ‘positivist criminology,’ which, like classical penology, was born in Italy, where its foundations were laid by Cesare Lombroso, Enrico Ferri and Rafaelle Garofalo.

Document: The Malum Prohibitum Doctrine in Philippine Criminal Law (G.R. No. 07578) (CASE-223 SCRA 606) | Section: Foreword

Foreword

In a very recent per curiam decision of the Supreme Court en banc, a Regional Trial Judge was adjudged grossly ignorant of the law for applying previous rulings requiring animus possidendi cases of illegal possession of firearms and for that reason the Court decreed his dismissal from office.

It is the purpose of this piece to analyze the doctrine of malum prohibitum as known and applied in Philippine criminal law.

Document: The Malum Prohibitum Doctrine in Philippine Criminal Law (G.R. No. 07578) (CASE-223 SCRA 606) | Section: § 6. Summary of the rulings

§ 6. Summary of the rulings

From the above-catalogued decisions, the following propositions may be formulated in summary:

1. 1. In possessory mala prohibita offenses (e.g., illegal possession of contrabands, such as firearms, drugs, untaxed highly dutiable goods, etc.), both actual physical and constructive possessions are punishable;
2. 1. In actual physical possession, such act alone consummates the offense and renders the possessor criminally responsible;
3. 1. In constructive possession, however, proof of knowledge or animus possidendi (not necessarily intent or motive) has to be given, without which, no conviction can be had;
4. 1. In non-possessory mala prohibita offenses, “mere performance of the prohibited act” does not necessarily justify imposition of the penalty provided by the special law. It is essential for the court to determine whether imposition of such penalty upon the accused will

best serve the interest of the wronged society or coincide with the noblepurposes of the law. Conviction should not glorify the practice of the“actual potential wrongdoer” if he is other than the accused.

Document: The Malum Prohibitum Doctrine in Philippine Criminal Law (G.R. No. 07578) (CASE-223 SCRA 606) | Section: § 4. Specific cases on mala prohibits

In American law, making “knowledge” as an element of the offense is making the offense committed with moral turpitude. Moral turpitude is moral depravity, touching on the workings of the mind or involving motive or intention, so much so that in one case it was held that conviction of a professional of a violation of B.P. Blg. 22 justifies the convict’s suspension from the exercise of his profession which demands high moral standards in its exercise. [Footnote 19c: People v. Tuanda (1990), 181 SCRA 692.] The Lozano decision may not, therefore, be considered doctrinal not only because of the inconsistencies noted therein but also because the use of the term “malum prohibitum” in said decision was made loosely and not in its strict legal sense.

Document: The Malum Prohibitum Doctrine in Philippine Criminal Law (G.R. No. 07578) (CASE-223 SCRA 606) | Section: § 1. What is an offense malum prohibitum?

§ 1. What is an offense malum prohibitum?

According to prior decisions an offense malum prohibitum is an act not inherently immoral but becomes so because its commission is expressly forbidden by law; an offense not such of itself but because prohibited by statute; an illegal act because of the prohibition of the law; evil because it is prohibited; and, it is consummated by the very fact of its performance.

In a case, Justice Moreland said that in many crimes made such by statutory enactment, the intention of the person who commits the crime is entirely immaterial. In these crimes the evil to society and to the Government does not depend upon the state of mind of the one who performs the prohibited act, but upon the effect which the act has upon the public mind.

In short, an offense malum prohibitum is a punishable act not because it is inherently evil according to social moral standards, but simply because the law prohibits its performance. Intent or motive on the part of the doer is generally irrelevant, in contrast with dolo or mens rea felonies.

Document: "kokoy"romualdez vs. Pcgg, G.R. Nos. 165510-33 (DSR-G.R. Nos. 165510-33) | Section: Article 10 of the Revised Penal Code provides

Article 10 of the Revised Penal Code provides:

ART. 10. Offenses not subject to the provisions of this Code. - Offenses which are or in the future may be punishable under special laws are not subject to the provisions of this Code. This Code shall be supplementary to such laws, unless the latter should specially provide the contrary.

Pursuant thereto, one may be tempted to hastily conclude that a special law such as RA No. 3019 is supplemented by the Revised Penal Code in any and all cases. As it is, Mr. Justice Carpio stated in his Dissenting Opinion that -

There is no gap in the law. Where the special law is silent, Article 10 of the RPC applies suppletorily, as the Court has held in a long line of decisions since 1934, starting with People v. Moreno. Thus, the Court has applied suppletorily various provisions of the RPC to resolve cases where the special laws are silent on the matters in issue. The law on the applicability of Article 10 of the RPC is thus well-settled, with the latest reiteration made by this Court in 2004 in Jao Yu v. People.

However, it must be pointed out that the suppletory application of the Revised Penal Code to special laws, by virtue of Article 10 thereof, finds relevance only when the provisions of the special law are silent on a particular matter as evident from the cases cited and relied upon in the Dissenting Opinion:

In the case of People v. Moreno,[37] this Court, before ruling that the subsidiary penalty under Article 39 of the Revised Penal Code may be applied in cases of violations of Act No. 3992 or the Revised Motor Vehicle Law, noted that the special law did not contain any provision that the defendant can be sentenced with subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency.

In the case of People v. Li Wai Cheung,[38] this Court applied the rules on the service of sentences provided in Article 70 of the Revised Penal Code in favor of the accused who was found guilty of multiple violations of RA No. 6425 or The Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972 considering the lack of similar rules under the special law.

Document: Interpretation and Construction of Penal Statutes (G.R. Nos. 74226-27, L-289,) (CASE-175 SCRA 610) | Section: § V. Problems discussed

The conclusion reached in Moran was the same as that reached in People v. Parel, simultaneously decided on the same date as Moran.

Justice Malcolm, with whom two other members of the court agreed, filed a dissenting opinion to both the Moran and Parel majority rulings, asserting the theory that “penal laws” refer only to amendments to the Penal Code, and that the provisions on prescription of offenses are procedural rather than substantive in nature because they relate to the remedy and not to the right, to the procedure and not to the crime. In effect, his view was to apply article 22 of the Penal Code independently of the provision of the second clause of article 7 (now article 10) of the same Code, a contention which is not in consonance with another principle of statutory construction that all parts of a statute must be construed together.

In any event, the phrase “penal laws” was also referred to in the adjudicated cases to mean “laws that impose criminal liability,” and “statutes creating and defining crimes,” and according to Justice Tuason, it embraces both “substantive and remedial or procedural” statutes.

1. 1. Supplementary application of Revised Penal Code to special laws.—It is necessary to know the meaning of “special laws” within the purview of article 10 of the Revised Penal Code. In earlier cases the phrase “special laws” (leyes especiales), then used in article 7 of the old Penal Code (now article 10 of the Revised Penal Code), was construed to mean “a law other than the provisions of the Penal Code.” With this interpretation and notwithstanding the provisions of said article 7 of the Penal Code, the Supreme Court refused to apply the provisions of the Code in supplementary character to various indictments charging violations of laws other than the provisions of the Penal Code.

In later decisions, however, the Supreme Court apparently changed its mind by applying the provisions of the Revised Penal Code to cases involving violations of laws other than the said Code, but even so, there were still some decisions which continued refusing to apply the Revised Penal Code to cases of illegal possession of firearms.

In the case of People v. Gonzales, supra, a well-reasoned dissenting opinion to the non-application of the Revised Penal Code to a prosecution involving a special law was filed by Justice Perfecto, which, among others, stated:

Document: Interpretation and Construction of Penal Statutes (G.R. Nos. 74226-27, L-289,) (CASE-175 SCRA 610) | Section: § IV. Substantive provisions—problems encountered

1.

1.

Date of effectivity (prospective or retroactive application) of penal statutes.—The civil law rule is that “laws shall take effect after fifteen days following the completion of their publication in the Official Gazette, unless it is otherwise provided;” which enshrines the general rule that laws are prospective in operation.

This is in a sense corroborated or reinforced by the provision of the Revised Penal Code that “no felony shall be punishable by any penalty prescribed by law prior to its commission,” but the said Code also provides that “penal laws shall have retroactive effect insofar as they favor the person guilty of a felony, x x x although at the time of the publication of such laws a final sentence has been pronounced and the convict is serving the same.” 2.

2.

What are “penal laws?”—Article 22 of the Revised Penal Code authorizes the retroactive application of “penal laws” if they favor the accused.

The question arises what are “penal laws” within the contemplation of said provision.

3.

3.

What are “special laws”?—The Revised Penal Code also provides that “offenses which are or in the future may be pun1.

ishable under special laws are not subject to the provisions of this Code.

This Code shall be supplementary to such laws, unless the latter should specially provide the contrary.” What are “special laws” under this provision?

2.

4.

When may the Revised Penal Code be applied in a suppletory manner to special laws?—This is another controversial issue which had not been clearly answered in the adjudicated cases.

3.

5.

Repeal and amendment of laws.—“Laws are repealed only by subsequent ones, and their violation or non-observance shall not be excused by disuse, or customs or practice to the contrary,” but suppose the repeal or amendment favors the accused, what course of action is open to the courts?

4.

6.

Absence of specific provision.—The civil code provides that “no judge or court shall decline to render judgment by rea-son of the silence, obscurity or insufficiency of the laws,” while the penal law states that “whenever a court has knowledge of any act which it may deem proper to repress and which is not punishable by law, it shall render the proper decision, x x x” What is the “proper decision”?

5.

7.

Document: Romualdez vs Marcelo (G.R. Nos. 165510-33) (CASE-ATL685-rw) | Section: Article 10 of the Revised Penal Code provides

Article 10 of the Revised Penal Code provides:

ART. 10. Offenses not subject to the provisions of this Code.—Offenses which are or in the future may be punishable under special laws are not subject to the provisions of this Code. This Code shall be supplementary to such laws, unless the latter should specially provide the contrary.

Pursuant thereto, one may be tempted to hastily conclude that a special law such as RA No. 3019 is supplemented by the Revised Penal Code in any and all cases. As it is, Mr. Justice Carpio stated in his Dissenting Opinion that—

“There is no gap in the law. Where the special law is silent, Article 10 of the RPC applies suppletorily, as the Court has held in a long line of decisions since 1934, starting with People v. Moreno. Thus, the Court has applied suppletorily various provisions of the RPC to resolve cases where the special laws are silent on the matters in issue. The law on the applicability of Article 10 of the RPC is thus well-settled, with the latest reiteration made by this Court in 2004 in Jao Yu v. People.”

However, it must be pointed out that the suppletory application of the Revised Penal Code to special laws, by virtue of Article 10 thereof, finds relevance only when the provisions of the special law are silent on a particular matter as evident from the cases cited and relied upon in the Dissenting Opinion:

In the case of People v. Moreno, [Footnote *: ] this Court, before ruling that the subsidiary penalty under Article 39 of the Revised Penal Code may be applied in cases of violations of Act No. 3992 or the Revised Motor Vehicle Law, noted that the special law did not contain any provision that the defendant can be sentenced with subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency.

In the case of People v. Li Wai Cheung, [Footnote *: ] this Court applied the rules on the service of sentences provided in Article 70 of the Revised Penal Code in favor of the accused who was foundguilty of multiple violations of RA No. 6425 or The Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972 considering the lack of similar rules under the special law.

Document: Interpretation and Construction of Penal Statutes (G.R. Nos. 74226-27, L-289,) (CASE-175 SCRA 610) | Section: § V. Problems discussed

1. 1. What are “penal laws” contemplated under article 22 of the Revised Penal Code?—An enlightening discussion of this question was made in the case of People v. Moran, supra, wherein Chief Justice Araullo wrote as follows:

Document: Hopeless Mess of our Criminal Law System (G.R. No. 115988) (CASE-254 SCRA 745) | Section: § 4. Comingling of special and penal code crimes and penalties renders enforcement and administration of our penal laws more difficult and unwieldy

Inspite of the clear differentiation of the rules for the determination of the indeterminate sentences provided by this positive law, decisions also confuse its application. Classic example of this is the recent decision of the Supreme Court in the case of People v. Simon. The majority decision in said case considered drug-related offenses as punished under the penal code, clearly a strained if not a twisted interpretation. As Mr. Justice Davide, Jr. in his dissent said, the fact that the amendments to the Dangerous Drugs Act by Rep. Act No. 7659 adopted penal code nomenclature of penalties does not make those offenses punished by the Revised Penal Code.

Another disturbing decision concerning penalties is that announced in People v. Lucas, holding that the penalty of reclusion perpetua, which was given a duration of 20 years and one day to forty years by Rep. Act No. 7659, is still an indivisible penalty. Justification for this ruling are quotations from the discussions of the legislators.

Mr. Justice Albert, that noted criminologist, has said that penalties which have fixed durations are divisible because they can be divided into periods. The Lucas decision is another example of an interpretation contrary to the clear wordings of the statute, because the legislature is always assumed to have intended what it wrote. It must be remembered that the primary guide in getting the meaning and intent of the law are the words of the statute itself. It is only when the words used are so ambiguous that interpretation and construction come into play. But even so, in interpreting and construing a statute, it is the intention of the legislature that is the objective. The remarks of the legislators may only express their individual intents but they do not necessarily mean the intent of the lawmaking body. It is the collective intent of the legislators assembled as a body that counts, not the individual views of each or any group of them. The reason is that the legislative assembly transacts business and exercises its functions as a body.

In the case under annotation, the Supreme Court expressed its aversion to the mixture or comingling of penalties. Yet, this is what the Court is doing in many of its decisions.

Perhaps it is now time to re-examine objectives, to the end that the wordings of penal legislations may be more simplified to insure their effective enforcement and application, and that court decisions be more direct and simply worded instead of exhibitions of literary prowess. We should evolve our own style of legal writing along uncomplicated patterns instead of copycatting from others.

Document: Hopeless Mess of our Criminal Law System (G.R. No. 115988) (CASE-254 SCRA 745) | Section: § 4. Comingling of special and penal code crimes and penalties renders enforcement and administration of our penal laws more difficult and unwieldy

Judicial creativeness and innovations should be concentrated more on procedural matters the formulations of which had strictly been judicialized under the 1987 Constitution. When it comes to the definition of crimes and ordination of their punishment, such is a distinct function that must be left to the legislature and no court decision should tamper with what the lawmakers have written. If there are defects of deficiencies let Congress correct itself instead of the courts indulging in judicial craftsmanship.

Document: Hopeless Mess of our Criminal Law System (G.R. No. 115988) (CASE-254 SCRA 745) | Section: § 2. Basic theory of the Revised Penal Code; Classical and Positivist schools

§ 2. Basic theory of the Revised Penal Code; Classical and Positivist schools

Since the Revised Penal Code was based on the Spanish Penal Code of 1870, which in turn traced its descent from the French Penal Code of 1810, it belongs to the classical or juristic school of criminal law, as distinguished from the positivist or realistic school.

The basic postulate of the Classic penal system is that men are rational and calculating beings who guide their actions with reference to the principles of pleasure and pain. Thus, they will refrain from criminal acts if threatened with punishment sufficient to cancel the hope of possible gain or advantage. Becaria, the leading exponent of classical penology during the 18th century, said that “in every criminal cause the judge should reason syllogistically. The major (premise) should be the general law, the minor, the conformity of the action or its opposition to the laws; the conclusion, liberty or punishment.” The classic penal system lays stress on the crime. It is primarily retributive and punitive. Punishment is standardized and proportioned to the gravity or nature of the offense.

On the other hand, the Positivist school (Scoula Positiva) views crime as a social phenomenon and attaches much importance to the criminal or the actor. Positivist criminology is reformative and preventive and it individualizes punishment. As Seagle noted, “a new and epoch-making idea had been broached which is simply that the ‘criminal’ is only a sick man who needs not to be punished but cured. The victim of heredity and environment, he is more sinned against than sinning. The whole concept of moral guilt upon which classical penology rests is an ironic irrelevancy. For the concept of guilt must be substituted (by) that of ‘social dangerousness.’ The incurable criminal is to be treated, and the prison is to constitute a criminological hospital. This is the whole sum and substance of what is called ‘positivist criminology,’ which, like classical penology, was born in Italy, where its foundations were laid by Cesare Lombroso, Enrico Ferri and Rafaelle Garofalo.

Document: Hopeless Mess of our Criminal Law System (G.R. No. 115988) (CASE-254 SCRA 745) | Section: HOPELESS MESS OF OUR CRIMINAL LAW SYSTEM

HOPELESS MESS OF OUR CRIMINAL LAW SYSTEM

_______________

_______________

An American jurist was quoted as saying that our system of criminal law is a giant monstrosity. This may not at all be a groundless assessment. This state of our criminal law must have been brought about by the adoption of two systems of penology—the classical and the positivist—without any apparent attempt to clearly delineate the applicability of one system vis a vis the other.

Document: Hopeless Mess of our Criminal Law System (G.R. No. 115988) (CASE-254 SCRA 745) | Section: § 4. Comingling of special and penal code crimes and penalties renders enforcement and administration of our penal laws more difficult and unwieldy

§ 4. Comingling of special and penal code crimes and penalties renders enforcement and administration of our penal laws more difficult and unwieldy

The comingling of special and penal code offenses and penalties in our system of criminal law had, no doubt, spawned more controversies and made the enforcement and administration of our penal laws more difficult and complicated.

The application of the Indeterminate Sentence Law alone is a classic example. The said law provides for different rules in its application to penal code felonies, on one hand, and to special crimes, on the other. Thus, it provides that—

“*** in imposing a prison sentence for an offense punished by the Revised Penal Code, or its amendments, the court shall sentence the accused to an indeterminate sentence the maximum term of which shall be that which, in view of the attending circumstances, could be properly imposed under the rules of said Code, and the minimum of which shall be within the range of the penalty next lower to that prescribed by the Code for the offense;”

whereas,

“*** if the offense is punished by any other law, the court shall sentence the accused to an indeterminate penalty, the maximum of which shall not exceed the maximum fixed by said law and the minimum term of which shall not be less than the minimum term prescribed by the same.”

It is clear from the foregoing provision of the law that in applying it to offenses penalized by the Revised Penal Code, the attendant modifying circumstances have to be taken into account in ascertaining the penalty imposable, and in fixing the minimum of the indeterminate sentence to be imposed on the accused, the court shall go down to the penalty next lower in degree. In the cases punished by special laws, however, the modifying circumstances are totally ignored and that the penalty next lower in degree is never considered, and the rationale behind this different rule is that in special laws, there are usually no modifying circumstances and that they do not provide graduation of penalties or divisions thereof into degrees.

Document: Reiteration of the Rule of Strict Construction of Penal Statutes (G.R. No. L-38019, L-18615) (CASE-97 SCRA 601) | Section: SCOPE OF CRIMINAL LAW

SCOPE OF CRIMINAL LAW

Substantive criminal law relates to the definition and classification of crimes generally, the criminal act, the criminal intent, the capacity to commit crime and exemptions from criminal liability, the parties to crime, and finally, a consideration of the elements or characteristics of particular offenses.

The law of criminal procedure consists of the rules according to which the substantive criminal law itself is administered.

In its broader phases, criminal law is concerned not only with the substantive criminal law and the criminal procedure but with all the legal relations which are involved in the commonly used expression “the administration of criminal justice”, which includes the organization of courts of criminal jurisdiction, probation, parole, prison administration, juvenile courts and laws designed to change social and industrial conditions in order to prevent crime. (Francisco, The Revised Penal Code, 1958 p. 2)

Document: Navaja vs De Castro (G.R. No. 182926) (CASE-ATD805-rw) | Section: Syllabi

It is a fundamental rule that for jurisdiction to be acquired by courts in criminal cases the offense should have been committed or any one of its essential ingredients took place within the territorial jurisdiction of the court. Territorial jurisdiction in criminal cases is the territory where the court has jurisdiction to take cognizance or to try the offense allegedly committed therein by the accused. Thus, it cannot take jurisdiction over a person charged with an offense allegedly committed outside of that limited territory. Furthermore, the jurisdiction of a court over the criminal case is determined by the allegations in the complaint or information. And once it is so shown, the court may validly take cognizance of the case. However, if the evidence adduced during the trial show that the offense was committed somewhere else, the court should dismiss the action for want of jurisdiction. [Footnote *: ]

In determining the venue where the criminal action is to be instituted and the court which has jurisdiction over it, Section 15(a), Rule 110 of the 2000 Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure provides:

(a) Subject to existing laws, the criminal action shall be instituted and tried in the court or municipality or territory where the offense was committed or where any of its essential ingredients occurred.

Document: Evidence To Be Believed Must Be Credible In Itself (G.R. No. 50631) (CASE-105 SCRA 241) | Section: (a) *Scope

(a) Scope

The charge of robbery with homicide, and, murder are covered by the Revised Penal Code. Hence, a part of criminal law.

Penal or criminal law is that branch or division of law which defines crimes, treats of their nature and provides for their punishment. (Abbot L.D.)

Scope of criminal law

The definition quoted above refers to the substantive criminal law. Substantive criminal law relates to the definition and classification of crimes generally, the criminal act, the criminal intent, the capacity to commit crime and exemptions from criminal liability, the parties to crime, and finally, a consideration of the elements or characteristics of particular offenses.

The law of criminal procedure consists of the rules according to which the substantive criminal law itself is administered.

In its broader phases, criminal law is concerned not only with the substantive criminal law and the criminal procedure but with all of the legal relations which are involved in the commonly used expression “the administration of criminal justice,” which includes the organization of courts of criminal jurisdiction, probation, parole, prison administration, juvenile courts and laws designed to change social and industrial conditions in order to prevent crime.

Function of criminal law

Document: The Supreme Court Should Reconcile Its Conflicting Judicial Interpretation (G.R. No. L-38755) (CASE-102 SCRA 148) | Section: (a) *Generally

(a) Generally

Criminal Law In General

Penal or Criminal law is that branch or division of law which defines crimes, treats of their nature and provides for their punishment. (Abbot L.D.)

The definition quoted above refers to the substantive criminal law. Substantive criminal law relates to the definition and classification of crimes generally, the criminal act, the criminal intent, the capacity to commit crime and exemptions from criminal liability, the parties to crime, and finally, a consideration of the elements or characteristics of particular offenses.

The law on criminal procedure consists of the rules according to which the substantive criminal law itself is administered.

In its broader phases, criminal law is concerned not only with the substantive criminal law and the criminal procedure but with all of the legal relations which are involved in the commonly used expression “the administration of criminal justice”, which includes the organization of courts of criminal jurisdiction, probation, parole, prison administration, juvenile courts and laws designed to change social and industrial conditions in order to prevent crime. (The Revised Penal Code by Francisco)

Document: Navaja vs. De Castro, G.R. No. 182926 (DSR-G.R. No. 182926) | Section: G.R. No. 182926, June 22, 2015

It is a fundamental rule that for Jurisdiction to be acquired by courts in criminal cases the offense should have been committed or any one of its essential ingredients took place within the territorial Jurisdiction of the court. Territorial Jurisdiction in criminal cases is the territory where the court has Jurisdiction to take cognizance or to try the offense allegedly committed therein by the accused. Thus, it cannot take Jurisdiction over a person charged with an offense allegedly committed outside of that limited territory. Furthermore, the Jurisdiction of a court over the criminal case is determined by the allegations in the Complaint or information. And once it is so shown, the court may validly take cognizance of the case. However, if the Evidence adduced during the trial show that the offense was committed somewhere else, the court should dismiss the action for want of Jurisdiction.[15]

In determining the venue where the criminal action is to be instituted and the court which has Jurisdiction over it, Section 15(a), Rule 110 of the 2000 Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure provides:

(a) Subject to existing laws, the criminal action shall be instituted and tried in the court or municipality or territory where the offense was committed or where any of its essential ingredients occurred.

Document: Hopeless Mess of our Criminal Law System (G.R. No. 115988) (CASE-254 SCRA 745) | Section: § 2. Basic theory of the Revised Penal Code; Classical and Positivist schools

§ 2. Basic theory of the Revised Penal Code; Classical and Positivist schools

Since the Revised Penal Code was based on the Spanish Penal Code of 1870, which in turn traced its descent from the French Penal Code of 1810, it belongs to the classical or juristic school of criminal law, as distinguished from the positivist or realistic school.

The basic postulate of the Classic penal system is that men are rational and calculating beings who guide their actions with reference to the principles of pleasure and pain. Thus, they will refrain from criminal acts if threatened with punishment sufficient to cancel the hope of possible gain or advantage. Becaria, the leading exponent of classical penology during the 18th century, said that “in every criminal cause the judge should reason syllogistically. The major (premise) should be the general law, the minor, the conformity of the action or its opposition to the laws; the conclusion, liberty or punishment.” The classic penal system lays stress on the crime. It is primarily retributive and punitive. Punishment is standardized and proportioned to the gravity or nature of the offense.

On the other hand, the Positivist school (Scoula Positiva) views crime as a social phenomenon and attaches much importance to the criminal or the actor. Positivist criminology is reformative and preventive and it individualizes punishment. As Seagle noted, “a new and epoch-making idea had been broached which is simply that the ‘criminal’ is only a sick man who needs not to be punished but cured. The victim of heredity and environment, he is more sinned against than sinning. The whole concept of moral guilt upon which classical penology rests is an ironic irrelevancy. For the concept of guilt must be substituted (by) that of ‘social dangerousness.’ The incurable criminal is to be treated, and the prison is to constitute a criminological hospital. This is the whole sum and substance of what is called ‘positivist criminology,’ which, like classical penology, was born in Italy, where its foundations were laid by Cesare Lombroso, Enrico Ferri and Rafaelle Garofalo.

Document: The Malum Prohibitum Doctrine in Philippine Criminal Law (G.R. No. 07578) (CASE-223 SCRA 606) | Section: Foreword

Foreword

In a very recent per curiam decision of the Supreme Court en banc, a Regional Trial Judge was adjudged grossly ignorant of the law for applying previous rulings requiring animus possidendi cases of illegal possession of firearms and for that reason the Court decreed his dismissal from office.

It is the purpose of this piece to analyze the doctrine of malum prohibitum as known and applied in Philippine criminal law.

Document: Hopeless Mess of our Criminal Law System (G.R. No. 115988) (CASE-254 SCRA 745) | Section: § 4. Comingling of special and penal code crimes and penalties renders enforcement and administration of our penal laws more difficult and unwieldy

Inspite of the clear differentiation of the rules for the determination of the indeterminate sentences provided by this positive law, decisions also confuse its application. Classic example of this is the recent decision of the Supreme Court in the case of People v. Simon. The majority decision in said case considered drug-related offenses as punished under the penal code, clearly a strained if not a twisted interpretation. As Mr. Justice Davide, Jr. in his dissent said, the fact that the amendments to the Dangerous Drugs Act by Rep. Act No. 7659 adopted penal code nomenclature of penalties does not make those offenses punished by the Revised Penal Code.

Another disturbing decision concerning penalties is that announced in People v. Lucas, holding that the penalty of reclusion perpetua, which was given a duration of 20 years and one day to forty years by Rep. Act No. 7659, is still an indivisible penalty. Justification for this ruling are quotations from the discussions of the legislators.

Mr. Justice Albert, that noted criminologist, has said that penalties which have fixed durations are divisible because they can be divided into periods. The Lucas decision is another example of an interpretation contrary to the clear wordings of the statute, because the legislature is always assumed to have intended what it wrote. It must be remembered that the primary guide in getting the meaning and intent of the law are the words of the statute itself. It is only when the words used are so ambiguous that interpretation and construction come into play. But even so, in interpreting and construing a statute, it is the intention of the legislature that is the objective. The remarks of the legislators may only express their individual intents but they do not necessarily mean the intent of the lawmaking body. It is the collective intent of the legislators assembled as a body that counts, not the individual views of each or any group of them. The reason is that the legislative assembly transacts business and exercises its functions as a body.

In the case under annotation, the Supreme Court expressed its aversion to the mixture or comingling of penalties. Yet, this is what the Court is doing in many of its decisions.

Perhaps it is now time to re-examine objectives, to the end that the wordings of penal legislations may be more simplified to insure their effective enforcement and application, and that court decisions be more direct and simply worded instead of exhibitions of literary prowess. We should evolve our own style of legal writing along uncomplicated patterns instead of copycatting from others.

Document: The Malum Prohibitum Doctrine in Philippine Criminal Law (G.R. No. 07578) (CASE-223 SCRA 606) | Section: § 6. Summary of the rulings

§ 6. Summary of the rulings

From the above-catalogued decisions, the following propositions may be formulated in summary:

1. 1. In possessory mala prohibita offenses (e.g., illegal possession of contrabands, such as firearms, drugs, untaxed highly dutiable goods, etc.), both actual physical and constructive possessions are punishable;
2. 1. In actual physical possession, such act alone consummates the offense and renders the possessor criminally responsible;
3. 1. In constructive possession, however, proof of knowledge or animus possidendi (not necessarily intent or motive) has to be given, without which, no conviction can be had;
4. 1. In non-possessory mala prohibita offenses, “mere performance of the prohibited act” does not necessarily justify imposition of the penalty provided by the special law. It is essential for the court to determine whether imposition of such penalty upon the accused will

best serve the interest of the wronged society or coincide with the noblepurposes of the law. Conviction should not glorify the practice of the“actual potential wrongdoer” if he is other than the accused.

Document: Hopeless Mess of our Criminal Law System (G.R. No. 115988) (CASE-254 SCRA 745) | Section: § 2. Basic theory of the Revised Penal Code; Classical and Positivist schools

In working out the classical theory, the Spanish Penal Code of 1870 placed more stress upon the effect or result of the felonious act than upon the man—criminal himself, and endeavored to establish a mechanical and direct proportion between crime and penalty. Eventually, however, the classical method of considering the offender an abstract being, and of prefixing for him, through a series of hard-and-fast rules, a great multitude of penalties with scant regard for the human element, found stubborn and severe critics in the persons of Dr. Cesare Lombroso and Professors Rafaelle Garofalo and Enrico Ferri, who were the founders of the Positivist school of criminology.

Document: B.P. Blg. 122 - An Act to Submit to the Filipino People, for Ratification or Rejection, the Amendments to the Constitution of the Philippines, Proposed by the Batasang Pambansa, Sitting As a Consti... (BP-122) | Section: [ BATAS PAMBANSA BLG. 122, March 10, 1981 ]

To vote for the rejection thereof, write the word "No" or its equivalent.

QUESTION NO. 1

Do you vote for the approval of an amendment to the Constitution and to Amendment No. 2, as proposed by the Batasang Pambansa in Resolution No. 2, which, in substance, calls for the establishment of a modified parliamentary system, amending for this purpose Articles VII, VIII and IX of the Constitution, with the following principal features:

(1) The President is the head of state and Chief Executive of the Republic of the Philippines, elected by direct vote of the people for a term of six years. He has control of the Ministries. He formulates the guidelines of national policy. He nominates the Prime Minister and the Deputy Prime Minister to be elected by the Batasang Pambansa. Upon the advice of the Prime, Minister in writing, whenever the need arises for a vote of confidence on a fundamental issue, the President may dissolve the Batasang Pambansa and call for an election on a date set by him. However, the Batasang Pambansa may not be dissolved: 1) within eighteen (18) months preceding a regular election of the Batasang Pambansa; 2) within eighteen (18) months immediately following such election; 3) during the pendency of impeachment proceedings against the President; or 4) when the Executive Committee or the Speaker, in appropriate cases, exercises the powers or discharges the duties of the President. The President shall be immune from suit during his tenure. Thereafter, no suit whatsoever shall lie for official acts done by him or by others pursuant to his specific orders during his tenure. This immunity shall apply to the incumbent President referred to in Article XVII of this Constitution.

Document: C.A. No. 626 - An Act to Penalize Any Violation of Section It, Article VI, or Subsection (2), Section 11, Article VII, of the Constitution of the Philippines, As Amended. (CA-626) | Section: AN ACT TO PENALIZE ANY VIOLATION OF SECTION IT, ARTICLE VI, OR SUBSECTION (2), SECTION 11, ARTICLE VII, OF THE CONSTITUTION OF THE PHILIPPINES, AS AMENDED.

AN ACT TO PENALIZE ANY VIOLATION OF SECTION IT, ARTICLE VI, OR SUBSECTION (2), SECTION 11, ARTICLE VII, OF THE CONSTITUTION OF THE PHILIPPINES, AS AMENDED.

Be it enacted by  the National Assembly of the Philippines:

SECTION.  1. Any person violating section seventeen, Article VI, or subsection  (2), section 11, Article VII, of the Constitution of the Philippines, as amended, shall be punished by fine of not more than  five thousand pesos, or by imprisonment of not more than two years, or by both, and, in addition  thereto, shall be subject to such administrative or proper action.

Document: B.P. Blg. 122 - An Act to Submit to the Filipino People, for Ratification or Rejection, the Amendments to the Constitution of the Philippines, Proposed by the Batasang Pambansa, Sitting As a Consti... (BP-122) | Section: [ BATAS PAMBANSA BLG. 122, March 10, 1981 ]

(3) The, Executive Committee is composed of not more than 14 members designated by the President, at least half of whom shall be members of the Batasang Pambansa. It is headed by the Prime Minister. The Executive Committee assists the President in the exercise of his powers and functions and in the performance of his duties as he may prescribe. The Executive Committee shall exercise the powers and discharge the duties of the President until a President is elected and qualified in the following cases: (a) if the President-elect dies; or (b) fails to qualify before the beginning of his term; or (c) if the President has not been chosen before the start of his term. In case of permanent disability, death, removal from office or resignation of the President, the Executive Committee headed by the Prime Minister as hereinafter provided shall exercise the powers of the President until a President shall have been elected and qualified. If the permanent disability, death, removal from office or resignation of the President occurs earlier than eighteen (18) months before the expiration of his term, the Batasang Pambansa shall, within thirty days from the time the vacancy occurs, call a special election to be held not earlier than forty-five days nor later than sixty days from the time of such call, to elect a President to serve the unexpired term. In the absence of the Executive Committee, the Speaker of the Batasang Pambansa shall act as President until a President shall have been elected and qualified.

(4) The Cabinet, headed by the Prime Minister, shall be composed of Ministers with or without portfolio appointed by the President. At least a majority of the Cabinet who are heads of ministries shall come from the Regional Representatives of the Batasang Pambansa.

(5) The Prime Minister is the head of the Cabinet and of the Executive Committee. He is elected by the Batasang Pambansa upon nomination by the President from among the Members. The Prime Minister and the Cabinet shall be responsible to the Batasang Pambansa for the program of government approved by the President.

The Deputy Prime Minister, elected by the Batasang Pambansa, upon nomination by the President from among the Members thereof, performs functions assigned to him by the Prime Minister.—

QUESTION NO. 2

Do you vote for the approval of an amendment to the Constitution of the Philippines, as proposed by the Batasang Pambansa in Resolution No. 3, which, in substance, institutes electoral reforms, namely:

Document: B.P. Blg. 643 - An Act to Submit to the Filipino People for Ratification or Rejection the Amendments to the Constitution of the Philippines Proposed by the Batasang Pambansa in Its Sixth Regular Se... (BP-643) | Section: [ BATAS PAMBANSA BLG. 643, December 21, 1983 ]

(2) The Office of the Vice-President is created. The Vice-President shall have the same qualifications and term of office and may be removed from office in the same manner as the President. He may be appointed as a member of the Cabinet and he may be nominated and elected as Prime Minister. He shall be elected with and in the same manner as the President. A vote for the President shall also be a vote for the Vice-President running under the same ticket of a political party, unless otherwise provided by law. The age qualification for President and Vice-President is reduced to 40 years old.

1. Presidential succession before the election of 1987

(1) In case a vacancy in the Office of President occurs before the presidential election of 1987, the Speaker of the Batasang Pambansa shall act as President until a President and a Vice-President or either of them shall have been elected and shall have qualified.

(2) The Batasang Pambansa shall, at ten o'clock in the morning of the third day after the vacancy occurs, convene in accordance with its Rules without need of a call and within seven days enact a law calling for a special election for President and Vice-President to be held not earlier than forty-five days and not later than sixty days from the time of such call. The convening of the Batasang Pambansa cannot be suspended nor the special election postponed. No special election shall be called if the vacancy occurs within seventy days before the date of the presidential election of 1987.

(3) The tenure of office of the President and Viee-President elected in the special election shall commence at noon of the tenth day following their proclamation, and shall end at noon on the thirtieth day of June of the sixth year thereafter.

1. Limitations on the 'powers of the Speaker acting as President

(1) The Acting President may not declare martial law or suspend the privilege of the ¦writ of habeas corpus without the prior consent of at least a majority of all the Members of the Batasang Pambansa.

(2) He may not issue any decree, order or letter of instruction while the lawmaking power of the President is in force.

(3) He shall be deemed automatically on leave and the Speaker Pro-Tempore shall act as Speaker. While acting as President, the Speaker may not be removed.

(4) He shall not lie eligible for election in the immediately succeeding election for President and Vice-President.

Document: B.P. Blg. 643 - An Act to Submit to the Filipino People for Ratification or Rejection the Amendments to the Constitution of the Philippines Proposed by the Batasang Pambansa in Its Sixth Regular Se... (BP-643) | Section: [ BATAS PAMBANSA BLG. 643, December 21, 1983 ]

[ BATAS PAMBANSA BLG. 643, December 21, 1983 ]

AN ACT TO SUBMIT TO THE FILIPINO PEOPLE FOR RATIFICATION OR REJECTION THE AMENDMENTS TO THE CONSTITUTION OF THE PHILIPPINES PROPOSED BY THE BATASANG PAMBANSA IN ITS SIXTH REGULAR SESSION, CALLING A PLEBISCITE FOR THIS PURPOSE, APPROPRIATING FUNDS THEREFOR AND FOR OTHER PURPOSES

Be it enacted by the Batasang Pambansa, in session assembled:

SECTION 1. A plebiscite shall be held on January 27, 1984, pursuant to Article XVI, Sections 1(1) and 2 of the Constitution, for the submission to the people of amendments to the Constitution of the Philippines proposed by the Batasang Pambansa during its Sixth Regular Session.

SEC. 2. The said amendments shall be published at least once in at least three newspapers of nation-wide circulation and once in at least one newspaper of provincial circulation in every province to be determined by raffle, the last publication to be made not later than January 7, 1984. Printed copies of the amendments shall be posted in a conspicuous place in every provincial capitol, municipal, city and barangay hall or building not later than January 7, 1984. Sufficient copies of the proposed amendments shall be furnished each voting center to be available for the qualified voters to read and study on the day of the plebiscite. Copies thereof in the principal dialects shall also be printed and distributed to the electorate. The Commission on Elections is hereby empowered to promulgate rules and regulations to assure widest dissemination through the print and broadcast media and other means of information on the proposed amendments and questions herein prescribed for submission to the electorate.

SEC. 3. The official ballots to be used in the plebiscite shall be printed in English and, in appropriate cases, in Arabic in accordance with the provisions of the Election Code of 1978, in a form to be prescribed by the Commission on Elections which shall include the questions and particulars hereunder stated to be printed in clearly readable type:

OFFICIAL BALLOT

The Batasang Pambansa, in Resolutions Numbered 104, 105, 110, 111 and 112 has proposed that the Constitution of the Philippines be amended in the particulars herein-below stated.

Document: Romualdez vs. Sandiganbayan (G.R. No. 135249,) (CASE-435 SCRA 371) | Section: SEPARATE OPINION

A challenge to a penal statute premised on the argument that the law is vague is a proper invocation of the due process clause. A statute that lacks comprehensible standards that men of common intelligence must necessarily guess at its meaning and differ as to its application violates the due process clause, for failure to accord persons fair notice of the conduct to avoid. As held by the Court in People v. Dela Piedra:

Due process requires that the terms of a penal statute must be sufficiently explicit to inform those who are subject to it what conduct on their part will render them liable to its penalties. A criminal statute that “fails to give a person of ordinary intelligence fair notice that his contemplated conduct is forbidden by the statute,” or is so indefinite that “it encourages arbitrary and erratic arrests and convictions,” is void for vagueness. The constitutional vice in a vague or indefinite statute is the injustice to the accused in placing him on trial for an offense, the nature of which he is given no fair warning.

It should also be reckoned that the Bill of Rights likewise guarantees that no person shall be held to answer for a criminal offense without due process of law, and that the accused enjoys the right to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation against him or her. The Bill of Rights ensures the fullest measure of protection to an accused. If a particular mode of constitutional challenge, such as one predicated on the “void for vagueness” doctrine, is available to an ordinary person deprived of property or means of expression, then more so should it be accessible to one who is in jeopardy of being deprived of liberty or of life.

Document: Pimentel vs Legal Education Board (G.R. No. 230642) (CASE-AVM739-rw) | Section: Syllabi

Due process is thus hostile to any official action marred by lack of reasonableness. Correctly has it been identified as freedom from arbitrariness. It is the embodiment of the sporting idea of fair play. It exacts fealty ‘to those strivings for justice’ and judges the act of officialdom of whatever branch ‘in the light of reason drawn from considerations of fairness that reflect [democratic] traditions of legal and political thought.’ It is not a narrow or ‘technical conception with fixed content unrelated to time, place and circumstances,’ decisions based on such a clause requiring a ‘close and perceptive inquiry into fundamental principles of our society.’ Questions of due process are not to be treated narrowly  or pedantically in slavery to form or phrases.”

Education; Legal Education; Philippine Law School Admission Test; Law Admission; View that for lack of any substantial basis, the administrationofthePhilippineLawSchoolAdmissionTest(PhilSAT)isarbitrary.—Respondent Legal Education Board has not conducted any scientific and empirical study prior to its decision to impose a national standardized test for the admission of students in law schools. All that it has as basis is the study for the Law School Admission Test of the United States. There was no showing of how this foreign experience is applicable, or even relevant, to the Philippine context. For lack of any substantial basis, the administration of the Philippine Law School Admission Test is arbitrary. Moreover, the Philippine Law School Admission Test transgresses due process for being unreasonable. At the core of this test is the enforcement of a written exam that supposedly sifts and sets apart individuals who are likely to survive law school. The exclusionary result is based on a single criterion — if the applicants pass the written exam, they are deemed qualified. There is no other basis used for the evaluation of applicants. Through the Philippine Law School Admission Test, the government imposes a single determinant to ascertain who can pursue legal education. This is insufficient to hurdle the requirement of due process. Reasonableness demands that a multi-varying approach is used in evaluating law school applicants.

Same; Same; Same; Same; Due Process; View that by enforcing an arbitrary and unreasonable measure in the law schools’ admission process,thegovernmentviolatestheapplicants’righttodueprocess.—In this case, by enforcing an arbitrary and unreasonable measure in the law schools’ admission process, the government violates

328

Document: "There Are No \u201CShort Cuts\u201D To Due Process of Law In Criminal\ (G.R. No. 131652) (CASE-287 SCRA 314) | Section: § 2. Due Process in General

§ 2. Due Process in General

Due process of law in general has been understood in several ways. In its early decisions, the Philippine Supreme Court ruled that due process is any legal proceedings enforced by public authority whether sanctioned by age and custom or newly devised in the discretion of the legislative power in furtherance of general public good, which regards and preserves these principles of liberty and justice (U.S. vs. McGovern, 6 Phil. 613).

In U.S. vs. Ocampo, 18 Phil. 38, the Supreme Court said that due process is the law in its regular course of administration through the courts of justice.

The requirement that no person shall be held to answer for a criminal offense “without due process of law” simply requires that the procedure fully protects the life, liberty and property of the citizens of the state, then, it will be held to be “due process of law” (U.S. vs. Ocampo, 18 Phil. 14). Relating to higher crimes, due process of law is said to denote a lawful indictment or presentiment of good and lawful men in public trial before a court of competent jurisdiction (Duran vs. Abad Santos, 75 Phil. 433).

Due process of law does not necessarily mean a judicial proceeding in the regular courts. The guarantee of due process, viewed in its procedural aspect, requires no particular form of procedure. It implies due notice to the individual of the proceedings, an opportunity to defend himself and the problem of the deprivations, under the circumstances presented, must be resolved in a manner consistent with essential fairness. It means essentially a fair and impartial trial and reasonable opportunity for the preparation of defense. (Aquino vs. Military Commission, 63 SCRA 576 [1975]).

As applied to judicial proceedings, due process requires: 1) a court or tribunal clothed with judicial power to hear and determine the matter before it; 2) jurisdiction lawfully acquired over the person of the defendant or over the property subject of the proceedings; 3) an opportunity given to the defendant to be heard; and 4) judgment rendered upon lawful hearing (Banco Español-Filipino vs. Palanca, 37 Phil. 934).

Document: Due Process (G.R. No. 114944,) (CASE-ATZ922-rw) | Section: Document Body

Procedure is merely means to an end, and rules of procedure must be construed liberally so as to afford litigants a speedy and inexpensive means of resolving their controversy. On the other hand, the principle of due process, in general means simply that before a party may be held bound by court proceedings, he must have been impleaded therein or notified thereof and thus given an opportunity to defend his rights. (Torres vs. Caluag, 17 SCRA 808 [1966], cited by Sibal, supra)

§III.Jurisprudence on Due Process

Due process may be procedural, or may be a denial of the constitutional processes. Procedural, when the regular rules of law are complied with. Constitutional due process, when the elements or the material requirements of the Constitution are complied with.

Due process may likewise be criminal due process which requires that the accused must be proceeded against under the orderly processes of law. There is likewise known due process in labor cases.

§IV.Illustrative Cases

The following cases are illustrative of all these kinds of due process:

1. In the case of Manuel Roxas, et al. vs. Vasquez, G.R. No. 114944, May 29, 2002, 382 SCRA 396, the Supreme Court held:

“x x x It appears that petitioners were deprived of due process when the Special Prosecutor reinstated the complaint against them without their knowledge. Due process of law requires that every litigant must be given an opportunity to be heard. He has the right to be present and defend himself in person at every stage of the proceedings. x x x”

The Highest Tribunal continued:

“x x x It did not give petitioners notice of the reinvestigation, which would have enabled them to participate in the proceedings. But when it later found probable cause against petitioners, it should have first given them notice and afforded them an opportunity to be heard before ordering their inclusion in Criminal Case No. 18956. The finding of probable cause against petitioners in proceedings which they had neither knowledge of nor participation in (sic) violated their right to procedural due process. At the very least, they should have been notified that the complaint against them has not yet been finally disposed of; or that the fight was not yet over, so to

speak. They should have been apprised of their possible implication in the criminal case to enable them to meet any new accusations against them head-on, and to prepare for their defense. x x x”

Document: Pimentel vs Legal Education Board (G.R. No. 230642) (CASE-AVM739-rw) | Section: Section 1 , Article VIII of DECS Order No. 27-1989 is clear that the admission requirement pertains to enrollment in a law course, or law school, or legal education, thus

“There is no controlling and precise definition of due process. It furnishes though a standard to which governmental action should conform in order that deprivation of life, liberty or property, in each appropriate case, be valid. What then is the standard of due process which must exist both as a procedural and as substantive requisite to free the challenged ordinance, or any govern565

mental action for that matter, from the imputation of legal infirmity sufficient to spell its doom? It is responsiveness to the supremacy of reason, obedience to the dictates of justice. Negatively put, arbitrariness is ruled out and unfairness avoided. To satisfy the due process requirement, official action, to paraphrase Cardozo, must not outrun the bounds of reason and result in sheer oppression. Due process is thus hostile to any official action marred by lack of reasonableness. Correctly has it been identified as freedom from arbitrariness. It is the embodiment of the sporting idea of fair play. It exacts fealty ‘to those strivings for justice’ and judges the act of officialdom of whatever branch ‘in the light of reason drawn from considerations of fairness that reflect [democratic] traditions of legal and political thought.’ It is not a narrow or ‘technical conception with fixed content unrelated to time, place and circumstances,’ decisions based on such a clause requiring a ‘close and perceptive inquiry into fundamental principles of our society.’ Questions of due process are not to be treated narrowly or pedantically in slavery to form or phrases.” [Footnote *: ] (Citation omitted)

Due process is the protection of the sphere of individual autonomy. It aims to “prevent arbitrary governmental encroachment against the life, liberty and property of individuals.” [Footnote *: ]  Thus, it imposes a burden on the government to observe two (2) separate limits: (1) procedural and (2) substantive due process. In WhiteLightCorporationv.CityofManila: [Footnote *: ]

The due process guaranty has traditionally been interpreted as imposing two related but distinct restrictions on government, “procedural due process” and “substantive due process.” Procedural due process refers to the procedures that the government must follow before it

566

Document: People vs. Ferrer (CASE-48 SCRA 382) | Section: II. Is the Act a Bill of Attainder?

II. Is the Act a Bill of Attainder?

Article III, section 1 (11) of the Constitution states that "No bill of attainder or ex post facto law shall be enacted." A bill of attainder is a legislative act which inflicts punishment without trial. Its essence is the substitution of a legislative for a judicial determination of guilt. The constitutional ban against bills of attainder serves to implement the principle of separation of powers by confining legislatures to rule-making and thereby forestalling legislative usurpation of the judicial function. History in perspective, bills of attainder were employed to suppress unpopular causes and political minorities, and it is against this evil that the constitutional prohibition is directed. The singling out of a definite class, the imposition of a burden on it, and a legislative intent, suffice to stigmatize a statute as a bill of attainder.

In the case at bar, the Anti-Subversion Act was condemned by the court a quo as a bill of attainder because it "tars and feathers" the Communist Party of the Philippines as a "continuing menace to the freedom and security of the country; its existence, a 'clear, present and grave danger to the security of the Philippines.' " By means of the Act, the trial court said, Congress usurped "the powers of the judge," and assumed "judicial magistracy by pronouncing the guilt of the CPP without any of the f orms or saf eguards of judicial trial." Finally, according to the trial court, "if the only issue [to be determined] is whether or not the accused is a knowing and voluntary member, the law is still a bill of attainder because it has expressly created a presumption of organizational guilt which the accused can never hope to overthrow."

1. 1. When the Act is viewed in its actual operation, it will be seen that it does not specify the Communist Party of the Philippines or the members thereof for the purpose of punishment. What it does is simply to declare the Party to be an organized conspiracy for the overthrow of the Government for the purposes of the prohibition, stated in section 4, against membership in the outlawed organization. The term "Communist Party of the Philippines" is used solely for definitional purposes. In fact the Act applies not only to the Communist Party of the Philippines but also to "any other organization having the same purpose and their successors." Its focus is not on individuals but on conduct.

Document: Jurisprudential Abreaction to the Ex Post Facto Law and Prospectivity of Laws (G.R. Nos. 115835-36,) (CASE-ATP170-rw) | Section: Document Body

In 1798, it was determined that this prohibition applies only to criminal laws and is not a general restriction on retroactive legislation. Implicit in the prohibition is the notion that individuals can be punished only in accordance with standards of conduct that they might have ascertained before acting. The clause also serves, in conjunction with the prohibition of bills of attainder, as a safeguard against the historic practice of passing laws to punish particular individuals because of their political beliefs.

In 1867, in Cummings v. Missouri and Ex Parte Garland, the United States Supreme Court condemned as both bills of attainder and ex post facto laws the passage of post-American Civil War loyalty-test oaths, which were designed to keep Confederate sympathizers from practicing certain professions.

The policies underlying ex post facto laws are recognized in most developed legal systems, reflected in the civil law maxim nulla poena sine lege (“no punishment without law”), a principle whose roots are embedded in Roman law. In England Parliament is not prohibited from passing ex post facto laws. However, following the common-law tradition, judges

705

have refused to interpret legislation retroactively unless Parliament has clearly expressed such an intention. (Britanica.com)

When the Americans colonized this country, they also adopted such law and it was a limitation to the exercise of governance. (See Duarte v. Dade, 32 Phil. 36, 50 [1950])

§ 2. Applicable Laws

No ex post facto law or bill of attainder shall be enacted. (Sec. 22, Article III, Constitution)

§ 3. The principle of non-retroactivity of penal laws and related laws

Article 22. Retroactive effect of penal laws.—Penal Laws shall have a retroactive effect insofar as they favor the persons guilty of a felony, who is not a habitual criminal, as this term is defined in Rule 5 of Article 62 of this Code, although at the time of the publication of such laws a final sentence has been pronounced and the convict is serving the same. (Book One, Title Three, Chapter One, Revised Penal Code. See also People v. Salimbago, 314 SCRA 282 [1999])

Document: The Constitutional Safeguard of Due Process (CASE-142 SCRA 307) | Section: F. *On the Prohibition Against Ex Post Facto Law and Bill of Attainder

F. On the Prohibition Against Ex Post Facto Law and Bill of Attainder

(a) Ex Post Facto Law; Requisites

An Ex Post Facto Law is one which:

1. (1) Makes criminal an act done before the passage of the law and which was innocent when done, and punishes such an act;
2. (2) Aggravates a crime, or makes it greater than it was, when committed;
3. (3) Changes the punishment and inflicts a greater punishment than the law annexed to the crime when committed;

4. (4) Alters the legal rules of evidence, and authorizes conviction upon less or different testimony than the law requires

5. at the time of the commission of the offense;

6. (5) Assuming to regulate civil rights and remedies only, in effect imposes a penalty or deprivation which when done was lawful, and
7. (6) Deprives a person accused of a crime of some lawful protection to which he has become entitled, such as the protection of a former conviction or acquittal, or a proclamation of amnesty. (In re: Petition for declaration of rights of Kay Villegas Kami, 35 SCRA 429, Citing Mekin vs. Wolfe, 2 Phil. 24 (1903).

b. Bill of Attainder

In People vs. Ferrer, 48 SCRA 82, the Supreme Court, speaking thru Justice Castro, discussed bill of attainder, thus: “A bill of attainder is a legislative act which inflicts punishment without trial. Its essence is the substitution of a legislative act for a judicial determination of guilt. The Constitutional ban against bills of attainder serves to compliment the principle of separation of powers by confining legislative to rule making and thereby forestalling legislative usurpation of the judicial function.

Document: Anti-Communist Statutes as Bills of Attainder (CASE-48 SCRA 434) | Section: § 6. Characteristics of Bill of Attainder

§ 6. Characteristics of Bill of Attainder

1. (a) Any conviction or sentence pronounced by the legislative department, instead of the courts;
2. (b) The sentence pronounced and the punishment inflicted were determined by no previous law or fixed rule;
3. (c) That the investigation into the guilt of the accused, if such were made, was not necessarily or generally conducted in his presence or that of his counsel, and that no recognized rule of evidence governed his inquiry (Ex Parte Garland, 4 Wall. 388).

Document: Fuertes vs. Senate Of The Philippines, G.R. No. 208162 (DSR-G.R. No. 208162) | Section: SECTION 22. No Ex Post Facto law or Bill of Attainder shall be enacted.

SECTION 22. No Ex Post Facto law or Bill of Attainder shall be enacted.

A Bill of Attainder is rooted in the historical practice of the English Parliament to declare certain persons — such as traitors — attainted, or stained, and that the corruption of their blood extended to their heirs, who would not be allowed to inherit from the "source" of the corruption. These attainted persons and their kin were usually so declared without the benefit of judicial process. [128]

In modern times, a Bill of Attainder is generally understood as a legislative act which inflicts punishment on individuals or members of a particular group without a judicial trial. [129] The earliest form of prohibition against the enactment of bills of attainder was introduced in the Malolos Constitution: [130]

ARTICLE 14. No Filipino can be prosecuted or sentenced except by the judge or court that, by virtue of the laws previous to the crime, has been given Jurisdiction, and in the manner that these laws prescribe.

A Bill of Attainder encroaches on the courts' power to determine the guilt or innocence of the accused and to impose the corresponding penalty, violating the doctrine of separation of powers. [131]

For a law to be considered a Bill of Attainder, it must be shown to contain all of the following: "a specification of certain individuals or a group of individuals, the imposition of a punishment, penal or otherwise, and the lack of judicial trial." [132] The most essential of these elements is the complete exclusion of the courts from the determination of guilt and imposable penalty. [133]

In People v. Ferrer,[134] this Court delved into the question of whether the Anti-Subversion Act, which declared illegal the Communist Party of the Philippines and any other organizations that constitute an "organized Conspiracy to overthrow the Government of the Republic of the Philippines for the purpose of establishing in the Philippines a totalitarian regime and place the Government under the control and domination of an alien power[,]" [135] was a Bill of Attainder.

This Court found that the law was, in fact, not. It noted that the Anti-Subversion Act would be a Bill of Attainder only if it had made it unnecessary for members of the Communist Party to have to be charged in court. [136] Moreover, even if the Anti-Subversion Act specifically named the Communist Party, it would be insufficient to declare the law a Bill of Attainder:

Document: Jurisprudential Abreaction to the Ex Post Facto Law and Prospectivity of Laws (G.R. Nos. 115835-36,) (CASE-ATP170-rw) | Section: Section 19. Prospectivity.—Laws shall have prospective effect unless the contrary is expressly provided. (Book I, Chapter 5, Revised Administrative Code of 1987*)

Early commentators understood ex post facto laws to include all laws of retrospective application, whether civil or criminal. However, Chief Justice Salmon P. Chase, citing Blackstone, The Federalist and other early U.S. state constitutions in Calder v. Bull concluded that the concept was limited only to penal and criminal statutes. As conceived under our Constitution, ex post facto laws are 1) statutes that make an act punishable as a crime when such act was not an offense when committed; 2) laws which, while not creating new offenses, aggravate the seriousness of a crime; 3) statutes which prescribe greater punishment for a crime already committed; or 4) laws which alter the rules of evidence so as to make it substantially easier to convict a defendant. Applying the constitutional principle, the (Court) has held that the prohibition applies only to criminal legislation which affects the substantial rights of the accused. This being so, there is absolutely no merit in petitioner’s contention that the ruling of the lower court sustaining the Treaty’s retroactive application with respect to offenses committed prior to the Treaty’s coming into force and effect, violates the Constitutional prohibition against ex post facto laws. As the Court of Appeals correctly concluded, the Treaty is neither a piece of criminal legislation nor a criminal procedural statute. It merely provides for the extradition of persons wanted for prosecution of an offense or a crime which offense or crime was already committed or consummated at the time the treaty was ratified. (Wright v. Court of Appeals, 235 SCRA 341 [1994], 2005 Bar Examination Question)

712

§ 12. The fact that an accused is placed to defraying greater expenses because the Sandiganbayan holds office in Manila does not make the law ex post facto

In one case, the Supreme Court held:

Document: Jurisprudential Abreaction to the Ex Post Facto Law and Prospectivity of Laws (G.R. Nos. 115835-36,) (CASE-ATP170-rw) | Section: Document Body

As a general rule, penal laws should not have a retroactive application, lest they acquire the character of an ex post facto law. An exception to this rule, however, is when the law is advantageous to the accused. According to Mr. Chief Justice Araullo, this is “not as a right” of the offender, “but founded on the very principles on which the right of the State to punish and the commination of the penalty are based, and regards it not as an exception based on political considerations, but as a rule founded on principles of strict justice.” (Valeroso v. People, 546 SCRA 450 [2008])

Thus, when in a sentence of conviction it appears that the defendant voluntarily confessed his guilt in court before the prosecution presented its evidence, such voluntary confession shall be taken into account in a petition for habeas cor-

706

pus to give effect to Article 22 of the Revised Penal Code. (Rodriguez v. Director of Prisons, 57 Phil. 133 [1932])

Document: Jurisprudential Abreaction to the Ex Post Facto Law and Prospectivity of Laws (G.R. Nos. 115835-36,) (CASE-ATP170-rw) | Section: Section 19. Prospectivity.—Laws shall have prospective effect unless the contrary is expressly provided. (Book I, Chapter 5, Revised Administrative Code of 1987*)

The constitutional provision that no ex post facto law shall be enacted, applies only to criminal cases. The power of the Secretary of Public Works and Communications under Republic Act No. 2056 to demolish as public nuisances, the past illegal construction on the channels of navigable rivers, after complying with due process, is not an exercise by the State of the coercive power of its criminal law. It is merely the invocation of an authority already vested in the public works official by Act. No. 3208. (Roman Catholic Bishop of Lipa v. Municipality of Taal, 38 Phil. 367 [1918]; Province of Camarines Sur v. Director of Lands, 64 Phil. 600 [1937]; Philippine National Bank v. Ruperto, 108 Phil. 810 [1960]; Santos, etc., et al. v. Secretary of Public Works and Communications, 19 SCRA 637 [1967])

Retroactive criminal laws, which are forbidden, are those which come under the denomination of ex post facto laws. (People v. Moran, 44 Phil. 387 [1923])

Ex post facto is never used to indicate the obnoxious character of statutes dealing retroactively with civil rights. Of course, retroactive statutes dealing with civil rights may also be unconstitutional if they impair the obligations of contracts or deprive a person with a vested right. (Concepcion v. Garcia, 54 Phil. 81 [1929])

Note however that in one case, it was opined by Justice Melo that a Presidential Memorandum Order may be characterized as an ex post facto law if it provides for the infliction of punishment upon a person for an act done which, when it was committed, was innocent. (See Presidential Ad Hoc Fact-Finding Committee on Behest Loans v. Desierto, 317 SCRA 272 [1999])

710

Likewise in the past, the Supreme Court also held that the provisions on ex post facto or bill of attainder applies only to statutes. (See Montenegro v. Castañeda, 91 Phil. 882 [1952])

Document: Jurisprudential Abreaction to the Ex Post Facto Law and Prospectivity of Laws (G.R. Nos. 115835-36,) (CASE-ATP170-rw) | Section: Document Body

In 1798, it was determined that this prohibition applies only to criminal laws and is not a general restriction on retroactive legislation. Implicit in the prohibition is the notion that individuals can be punished only in accordance with standards of conduct that they might have ascertained before acting. The clause also serves, in conjunction with the prohibition of bills of attainder, as a safeguard against the historic practice of passing laws to punish particular individuals because of their political beliefs.

In 1867, in Cummings v. Missouri and Ex Parte Garland, the United States Supreme Court condemned as both bills of attainder and ex post facto laws the passage of post-American Civil War loyalty-test oaths, which were designed to keep Confederate sympathizers from practicing certain professions.

The policies underlying ex post facto laws are recognized in most developed legal systems, reflected in the civil law maxim nulla poena sine lege (“no punishment without law”), a principle whose roots are embedded in Roman law. In England Parliament is not prohibited from passing ex post facto laws. However, following the common-law tradition, judges

705

have refused to interpret legislation retroactively unless Parliament has clearly expressed such an intention. (Britanica.com)

When the Americans colonized this country, they also adopted such law and it was a limitation to the exercise of governance. (See Duarte v. Dade, 32 Phil. 36, 50 [1950])

§ 2. Applicable Laws

No ex post facto law or bill of attainder shall be enacted. (Sec. 22, Article III, Constitution)

§ 3. The principle of non-retroactivity of penal laws and related laws

Article 22. Retroactive effect of penal laws.—Penal Laws shall have a retroactive effect insofar as they favor the persons guilty of a felony, who is not a habitual criminal, as this term is defined in Rule 5 of Article 62 of this Code, although at the time of the publication of such laws a final sentence has been pronounced and the convict is serving the same. (Book One, Title Three, Chapter One, Revised Penal Code. See also People v. Salimbago, 314 SCRA 282 [1999])

Document: Jurisprudential Abreaction to the Ex Post Facto Law and Prospectivity of Laws (G.R. Nos. 115835-36,) (CASE-ATP170-rw) | Section: Section 19. Prospectivity.—Laws shall have prospective effect unless the contrary is expressly provided. (Book I, Chapter 5, Revised Administrative Code of 1987*)

Lastly, the ex post facto law does not apply to disqualification of political candidates. (Sevilleja v. Commission on Elections, 107 SCRA 141 [1981]; Geronimo v. Commission on Elections, 107 SCRA 614 [1981])

§ 10. Six recognized instances where a law is considered ex post facto

There are six recognized instances when a law is considered as such:

1) it criminalizes and punishes an action that was done before the passing of the law and that was innocent when it was done;

2) it aggravates a crime or makes it greater than it was when it was committed;

3) it changes the punishment and inflicts one that is greater than that imposed by the law annexed to the crime when it was committed;

4) it alters the legal rules of evidence and authorizes conviction upon a less or different testimony than that required by the law at the time of the commission of the offense;

5) it assumes the regulation of civil rights and remedies only, but in effect imposes a penalty or a deprivation of a right as a consequence of something that was considered lawful when it was done; and

6) it deprives a person accused of a crime of some lawful protection to which he or she become entitled, such as the protection of a former conviction or an acquittal or the proclamation of an amnesty. (Mejia v. Pamaran,

711

160 SCRA 457 [1988]; Republic v. Rosemoor Mining and Development Corporation, 426 SCRA 517 [2004])

§ 11. Ex post facto laws does not apply to civil or extradition cases

Document: Interpretation and Construction of Penal Statutes (G.R. Nos. 74226-27, L-289,) (CASE-175 SCRA 610) | Section: § IV. Substantive provisions—problems encountered

Excessive penalty.—“In case of doubt in the interpretation or application of laws, it is presumed that the lawmaking body intended right and justice to prevail,” but in a somewhat countervailing vein, the Revised Penal Code mandates that “when a strict enforcement of the provisions of this Code would result in the imposition of a clearly excessive penalty, taking into consideration the degree of malice and the injury caused by the offense,” “the court shall submit to the Chief Executive, through the Department of Justice, such statement as may be deemed proper, without suspending the execution of the sentence.” On the other hand, the Constitution provides that

1. “excessive fines shall not be imposed, nor cruel, degrading or inhuman punishment inflicted,” not to mention the fact that the present Constitution now provides for protection against human rights violations.

Document: Constitutional Rights of the Accused (CASE-186 SCRA 44) | Section: § 5. Excessive Fines and Cruel, Degrading or Inhuman Punishment

§ 5. Excessive Fines and Cruel, Degrading or Inhuman Punishment

Excessive fines shall not be imposed, nor cruel, degrading or inhuman punishment inflicted. Neither death penalty be imposed, unless, for compelling reasons involving heinous crimes, the Congress hereafter provides for it. Any death penalty already imposed shall be reduced to reclusion perpetua.

According to the Supreme Court, it takes more than merely being harsh, excessive, out of proportions, or severe for a penalty to be obnoxious to the Constitutions. To come under the ban, the punishment must be “flagrantly and plainly oppressive,” “wholly disproportionate to the nature of the offense as to shock the moral sense of the community.”

By this test, the Court adjudged the penalty of imprisonment for five (5) to ten (10) years imposed by law for illegal possession of firearms, not to be cruel and unusual, barbarous, or excessive to the extent of being shocking to public conscience, taking into considerations the public interest at stake and the necessity for a radical measure to meet rampant criminality. In certain exceptional circumstances obtaining in a particular case the penalty may be out of proportion, but is not necessarily offensive to the Constitution just for this reason. In any case constitutionality of a statute is not to be judged in the light of exceptional cases. Fortunately, the law in this jurisdiction authorizes the court in such cases to recommend executive clemency.

The Court has also held that a fine of up to P5,000 for profiteering is not cruel and unusual or shocking to the conscience, considering the necessity to prevent dealers taking advantage of the country’s critical conditions to make unusual profits. It may be thought that in a single sale, as for example, in a sale of one can of milk, the profit may be small, and in a prosecution for this one sale the corresponding penalty may seem out of proportion, but similar transactions add up to a great number, and cause great hardship, particularly on poor people.

A contempt order committing the party in contempt to imprisonment until he complies with previous orders of the court is remedial in purpose and coercive in character, intended for the benefit of the other party, and the indefinite confinement that may result from continued non compliance is neither cruel nor excessive, particularly so when the imprisoned man “carries the keys to his prison in his own pocket.”

The abolition of capital punishment of death is not absolute. The Congress may impose by enacting a law on capital punishment on offenses involving heinous crimes.

Document: Almonte vs. People, G.R. No. 252117 (DSR-G.R. No. 252117) | Section: SECTION 21. Excessive fines shall not be imposed nor cruel or unusual punishment inflicted. [115]

SECTION 21. Excessive fines shall not be imposed nor cruel or unusual punishment inflicted. [115]

With the enactment of the 1987 Constitution, the words "degrading or inhuman punishment" were added to the prohibition.

In David v. Senate Electoral Tribunal, [116] this Court discussed that interpreting the text of the Constitution involves reviewing how the text has evolved from its previous iterations. The formulation of provisions usually involves a reassessment of old ones in order to better address any shortcomings the old rules failed to account for:

Interpretation grounded on textual primacy likewise looks into how the text has evolved. Unless completely novel, legal provisions are the result of the re-Adoption — often with accompanying re-calibration — of previously existing rules. Even when seemingly novel, provisions are often introduced as a means of addressing the inadequacies and excesses of previously existing rules.

One may trace the historical development of text: by comparing its current iteration with prior counterpart provisions, keenly taking note of changes in syntax, along with accounting for more conspicuous substantive changes such as the addition and deletion of provisos or items in enumerations, shifting terminologies, the use of more emphatic or more moderate qualifiers, and the imposition of heavier penalties. The tension between consistency and change galvanizes meaning. [117]

The adding of "inhuman" and "degrading" to the prohibited punishment reveals that these words are meant to be treated separately from cruel or unusual punishment, and meant to address different circumstances.

In People v. Dionisio, [118] this Court explained that punishment is cruel and unusual when the penalties imposed are inhuman, barbarous, and shocking to the conscience:

Neither fines nor imprisonment constitute in themselves cruel and unusual punishment, for the constitutional stricture has been interpreted as referring to penalties that are inhuman and barbarous, or shocking to the conscience and fines or imprisonment are definitely not in this category.

Nor does mere severity constitute cruel and unusual punishment. In People vs. Estoista, 93 Phil. 655, this Court ruled:

Document: The Death Penalty Law\u2014A Monstrosity In Our Penal System (G.R. No. 7578) (CASE-251 SCRA 345) | Section: § 1. Systems of penology in this country

The Revised Penal Code, however, also recognizes other classes of punishable wrongful acts. Thus, “offenses which are or in the future may be punishable under special laws are not subject to the provisions of (the) Code.” This provision is a recognition of the inherent power of the State to prohibit certain acts which it considers inimical to the well-being of the majority of the citizens or not conducive to a more peaceful and orderly conduct of society. This power of the State is referred to as the police power, exercised through the legislative department by the passage or enactment of such just and reasonable laws, a well-recognized principle in political law and actually practiced in Constitutional system of governments. This system of penology was accentuated by the coming of the Americans.

This gave rise to the inaccurately denominated “statutory offenses,” vis-a-vis penal code felonies, and to the classification of crimes into mala en se and mala prohibita.

As a rule, felonies defined under the Revised Penal Code are mala en se (i.e., they are inherently and intrinsically wrong) while mala prohibita offenses are wrongs only because their performance or commission is prohibited by law. As was well said by Mr. Justice Moreland, in many crimes, made such by statutory enactments, the intention of the person who commits the crime is entirely immaterial *** the evil to society and to the Government does not depend upon the state of mind of the one (who performs the prohibited act), but upon the effect which it has upon the public mind. It was also said that an offense malum prohibitum is an act not inherently immoral but becomes so because its commission is expressly forbidden by law; an offense stances (Art. 14, Ibid.); and Alternative Circumstances (Art. 15, Ibid.). not such of itself but because prohibited by statute; an illegal act because of the prohibition of the law; evil because it is prohibited; and, it is consummated by the very fact of its performance.

The rule on the subject appears to be, that in acts mala en se, the intent governs, but in those considered mala prohibita, the only inquiry is, has the law been violated.

Document: Almonte vs. People, G.R. No. 252117 (DSR-G.R. No. 252117) | Section: SECTION 21. Excessive fines shall not be imposed nor cruel or unusual punishment inflicted. [115]

"It takes more than merely being harsh, excessive, out of proportion, or severe for a penalty to be obnoxious to the Constitution. 'The fact that the punishment authorized by the statute is severe does not make it cruel and unusual.' Expressed in other terms, it has been held that to come under the ban, the punishment must be 'flagrantly and plainly oppressive,' 'wholly disproportionate to the nature of the offense as to shock the moral sense of the community.' (Idem.) Having in mind the necessity for a radical measure and the public interest at stake, we do not believe that five years' confinement for possessing firearms, even as applied to appellant's and similar cases, can be said to be cruel and unusual, barbarous, or excessive to the extent of being shocking to public conscience. It is of interest to note that the validity on constitutional grounds of the Act in question was contested neither at the trial nor in the elaborate printed brief for the appellant; it was raised for the first time in the course of the oral argument in the Court of Appeals. It is also noteworthy, as possible gauge of popular and judicial reaction the duration of the imprisonment stipulated in the statute, that some members of the court at first expressed opposition to any recommendation for executive clemency for the appellant, believing that he deserved imprisonment within the prescribed range." [119] (Citations omitted)

In Maturan v. Commission on Elections, [120] this Court reiterated that it is the punishment's character, not its severity, that makes it cruel and inhuman. It would have to be an infliction of "corporeal or psychological punishment that strips the individual of [their] humanity":

We have already settled that the constitutional proscription under the Bill of Rights extends only to situations of extreme corporeal or psychological punishment that strips the individual of his humanity. The proscription is aimed more at the form or character of the punishment rather than at its severity, as the Court has elucidated in Lim v. People, to wit:

Settled is the rule that a punishment authorized by statute is not cruel, degrading or disproportionate to the nature of the offense unless it is flagrantly and plainly oppressive and wholly disproportionate to the nature of the offense as to shock the moral sense of the community. It takes more than merely being harsh, excessive, out of proportion or severe for a penalty to be obnoxious to the Constitution. Based on this principle, the Court has consistently overruled contentions of the defense that the penalty of fine or imprisonment authorized by the statute involved is cruel and degrading.

Document: Lee Pue Liong vs Chua Pue Chin Lee (G.R. No. 181658) (CASE-ARQ299-rw) | Section: Syllabi

Syllabi

Remedial Law; Criminal Law; Civil Liability; The basis of civil liability arising from crime is the fundamental postulate of our law that every person criminally liable is also civilly liable.—Generally, the basis of civil liability arising from crime is the fundamental postulate of our law that “[e]very person criminally liable x x x is also civilly liable.” Underlying this legal principle is the traditional theory that when a person commits a crime, he offends two entities, namely (1) the society in which he lives in or the political entity, called the State, whose law he has violated; and (2) the individual member of that society whose person, right, honor, chastity or property was actually or directly injured or damaged by the same punishable act or omission.

Criminal Procedure; Offended Party; Words and Phrases; Section 12, Rule 110 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure, as amended, defines an offended party as “the person against whom or against whose property the offense was committed.”—Section 12, Rule 110 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure, as amended, defines an offended party as “the person against whom or against whose property the offense was committed.” In Garcia v. Court of Appeals, 266 SCRA 678 (1997), this Court rejected petitioner’s theory that it is only the State which is the offended party in public offenses like bigamy. We explained that from the language of Section 12, Rule 10 of the Rules of Court, it is reasonable to assume that the offended party in the commission of a crime, public or private, is the party to whom the offender is civilly liable, and therefore the private individual to whom the offender is civilly liable is the offended party.

PETITION for review on certiorari of the decision and resolution of the Court of Appeals.

The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court.

Mutia, Trinidad & Pantanosas Law Offices for petitioner.

Macam, Raro, Ulep & Partners for respondent.

VILLARAMA, JR., J.:

Document: Daluraya vs Olivia (G.R. No. 210148) (CASE-ARM302-rw) | Section: Syllabi

Notes.—The basis of civil liability arising from crime is the fundamental postulate of our law that every person criminally liable is also civilly liable. (Lee Pue Liong vs. Chua Pue Chin Lee, 703 SCRA 240 [2013])

It is axiomatic that every person criminally liable for a felony is also civilly liable. Nevertheless, the acquittal of an accused of the crime charged does not necessarily extinguish his civil liability. (Lumantas vs. Calapiz, 713 SCRA 337 [2014])

Document: Ruego v People (G.R. No. 226745) (CASE-AVF466-rw) | Section: Syllabi

Syllabi

Remedial Law; Appeals; Question of Fact; Finding of Guilt; A finding of guilt beyond reasonable doubt requires courts to evaluate the evidence presented in relation to the elements of the crime charged.The finding of guilt is essentially a question of fact. Thus, the Supreme Court (SC) is constrained to entertain questions of fact in appeals of criminal cases.—As a general rule, only questions of law may be brought in a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court. The factual findings of the lower courts may be considered binding by this Court “because of the opportunity enjoyed by the [lower courts] to observe the demeanor of the witnesses on the stand and assess their testimony.” There are, of course, recognized exceptions to this general rule. In criminal cases, the accused has the fundamental right to be presumed innocent until the contrary is proven. A finding of guilt beyond reasonable doubt requires courts to evaluate the evidence presented in relation to the elements of the crime charged. The finding of guilt is essentially a question of fact. Thus, this Court is constrained to entertain questions of fact in appeals of criminal cases.

Criminal Law; Serious Physical Injuries; Elements of.—Article 263(3) of the Revised Penal Code makes it unlawful for any person to wound, beat, or assault another in a manner that would cause the person injured to suffer a deformity or lose any other part of his body. The provision reads: ARTICLE 263. Serious Physical Injuries.—Any person who shall wound, beat, or assault another, shall be guilty of the crime of serious physical injuries and shall suffer: . . . . 3. The penalty of prisión correccional in its minimum and medium periods, if in consequence of the physical injuries inflicted, the person injured shall have become deformed, or shall have lost any other part of his body, or shall have lost the use thereof, or shall have been ill or incapacitated for the performance of the work in which he was habitually engaged for a period of more than ninety days[.] Under

499

this provision, the prosecution must prove the following elements: first, that the perpetrator wounds, beats, or assaults another; and second, that the person injured shall have gone through any of the following circumstances: (1) become deformed; (2) lost any other part of their body; (3) lost that body part’s use; or (4) been ill or incapacitated for the work performance in which they were habitually engaged for a period of more than 90 days.

Document: D\ (G.R. No. 174181) (CASE-AUG253-rw) | Section: Syllabi

Syllabi

Criminal Procedure; Judgments; Requisites of a Valid Judgment of Conviction.—In any event, a judgment of conviction, pursuant to Section 2, Rule 120 of the Rules of Court, is sufficient if it states: “1) the legal qualification of the offense constituted by the acts committed by the accused and the aggravating or mitigating circumstances which attended its commission; 2) the participation of the accused in the offense, whether as principal, accomplice or accessory; 3) the penalty imposed upon the accused; and 4) the civil liability or damages caused by his wrongful act or omission to be recovered from the accused by the offended party, if there is any, unless the enforcement of the civil liability by a separate civil action has been reserved or waived.” We find that all of these are sufficiently stated in the trial court’s Decision.

Criminal Law; Estafa; Elements of Estafa Under Article 315, paragraph 1(b) of the Revised Penal Code.—Entrenched in jurisprudence are the following essential elements of Estafa under Article 315, paragraph 1(b) of the RPC: 1. That money, goods or other personal properties are received by the offender in trust or on commission, or for administration, or under any other obligation involving the duty to make delivery of or to return, the same; 2. That there is a misappropriation or conversion of such money or property by the offender or denial on his part of such receipt; 3. That such misappropriation or conversion or denial is to the prejudice of another; and 4. That there is a demand made by the offended party on the offender.

Same; Same; Penalties; The penalty in estafa cases as provided under paragraph 1, Article 315 of the Revised Penal Code (RPC) is prision correccional in its maximum period to prision mayor in its minimum period if the amount of the fraud is over P12,000.00 but does not exceed P22,000.00.—The penalty in estafa cases as provided under paragraph 1, Article 315 of the RPC is prision correccional in its maximum period to prision mayor in its minimum period if the amount of the fraud is over P12,000.00 but does not exceed P22,000.00. If the amount involved exceeds the latter sum, the same paragraph provides the imposition of the penalty in its maximum period with an incremental penalty of one year imprisonment for every P10,000.00 but in no case shall the total penalty exceed twenty (20) years imprisonment.

PETITION for review on certiorari of the decision and resolution of the Court of Appeals.

Document: Acharon vs People (G.R. No. 224946) (CASE-AVP511-rw) | Section: Syllabi

The criminal statute must also provide for the overt acts that constitute the crime. For a crime to exist in our legal law, it is not enough that mens rea be shown; there must also be an actus reus.

It is from the actus reus and the mens rea, as they find expression in the criminal statute, that the felony is produced. As a postulate in the craftsmanship of constitutionally sound laws,it is extremely preferable that the language of the law expressly provide when the felony is produced. Without such provision, disputes would inevitably ensue on the elemental question whether or not a crime was committed, thereby presaging the undesirable and legally dubious setup under which the judiciary is assigned the legislative role of defining crimes. Fortunately, our Revised Penal Code does not suffer from such infirmity. From the statutory definition of any felony, a decisive passage or term is embedded which attests when the felony is produced by the acts of execution**. For example, the statutory definition of murder or homicide expressly uses the phrase “shall kill another,” thus making it clear that the felony is produced by the death of the victim, and conversely, it is not produced if the victim survives.

Actus reus is the act (or sometimes an omission or state of affairs) indicated in the definition of the offense charged together with (1) any consequences of that conduct which are indicated by that definition; and (2) any surrounding circumstances so indicated (other than references to the mens rea or element of negligence required on the part of the defendant, or to any defense). [Footnote *: ]

In addition to a physical element consisting of committing a prohibited act, creating a prohibited state of affairs, or omitting to do that which is required by the law, the actus reus requires the conduct in question to be willed; this is

107

usually referred to as voluntariness. The doing of the prohibited act or conduct must involve a mental element. It is this mental element, that is the act of will, which makes the act or conduct willed or voluntary.

Document: Belongilot vs Cua (G.R. No. 160933) (CASE-ARJ693-rw) | Section: Syllabi

Criminal Law; Violation of Section 3(e) of Republic Act No. 3019 may be by dolo or culpa.—In Uriarte v. People, 571 SCRA 471 (2006), this Court explained that “Section 3(e) of R.A. 3019 may be committed either by dolo, as when the accused acted with evident bad faith or manifest partiality, or by culpa, as when the accused committed gross inexcusable negligence. There is manifest partiality when there is a clear, notorious, or plain inclination or predilection to favor one side or person rather than another. ‘Evident bad faith’connotes not only bad judgment but also palpably and patently fraudulent and dishonest purpose to do moral obliquity or conscious wrongdoing for some perverse motive or ill will. It contemplates a state of mind affirmatively operating with furtive design or with some motive or self-interest or ill will or for ulterior purposes. ‘Gross inexcusable negligence’ refers to negligence characterized by the want of even the slightest care, acting or omitting to act in a situation where there is a duty to act, not inadvertently but willfully and intentionally, with conscious indifference to consequences insofar as other persons may be affected.” In issuing the TRO and preliminary injunction, and accepting Constantino’s appeal, the respondents demonstrated manifest partiality, evident bad faith, and gross inexcusable negligence, which, oddly enough, the Ombudsman failed to take into consideration in determining the existence of probable cause.

Document: Beradio vs. Court of Appeals (G. R. No. 20319) (CASE-103 SCRA 567) | Section: Syllabi

Syllabi

• Criminal Law; The essence of an offense is the criminal intent (dolo) without which it cannot exist.—Of great weight in Our criminal justice system is the principle that the essence of an offense is the wrongful intent (dolo), without which it cannot exist. Actus non facit reum, nisi mens set rea, the act itself does not make a man guilty unless his intentions were so. Article 3 of the Revised Penal Code clearly indicates that malice or criminal intent (dolo) in some form is an essential requisite of all crimes and offenses defined in the Code, except in those cases where the element required is negligence (culpa).

Document: Office of the Ombudsman vs Santidad (G.R. No. 207154) (CASE-AUU819-rw) | Section: Syllabi

Felonies are committed not only by means of deceit (dolo), but likewise by means of fault (culpa). There is deceit when the wrongful act is performed with deliberate intent; and there is fault when the wrongful act results from imprudence, negligence, lack of foresight or lack of skill. [Footnote *: ] “In intentional crimes, the act itself is punished; in negligence or imprudence [quasi offenses], what is principally penalized is the mental attitude or condition behind the act, the dangerous recklessness, lack of care or foresight, the imprudencia punible.” [Footnote *: ]

In Jabalde v. People, [Footnote *: ] the Court explained:

[T]he term “dolo” or “malice” is a complex idea involving the elements of freedom, intelligence, and intent. The element of intent is described as the state of mind accompanying an act, especially a forbidden act. It refers to the purpose of the mind and the resolve with which a person proceeds. On the other hand, the term “felonious” means, inter alia, malicious, villainous, and/or proceeding from an evil heart or purpose. With these elements taken together, the requirement of intent in intentional felony must refer to malicious intent, which is a vicious and malevolent state of mind accompanying a forbidden act. [Footnote *: ] (Citation omitted)

Intentional felony requires the existence of dolus malus — that the act or omission be done willfully, maliciously, with

148

deliberate evil intent, and with malice aforethought. [Footnote *: ] In culpable felonies or criminal negligence, the injury inflicted on another is unintentional, the wrong done being simply the result of an act performed without malice or criminal design. [Footnote *: ]

A careful perusal of the provision of Article 171 of the Revised Penal Code, which defines and penalizes falsification of public documents, would readily reveal that the perpetrator must perform the prohibited act with deliberate intent in order to incur criminal liability thereunder, thus:

Article 171. Falsification by Public Officer, Employee or Notary or Ecclesiastical Minister.—The penalty of prisión mayor and a fine not to exceed 5,000 pesos shall be imposed upon any public officer, employee, or notary who, taking advantage of his official position, shall falsify a document by committing any of the following acts:

1. Counterfeiting or imitating any handwriting, signature, or rubric;

Document: Office Of The Ombudsman vs. Santidad, G.R. Nos. 207154 & 222046 (DSR-G.R. Nos. 207154 & 222046) | Section: Office Of The Ombudsman vs. Santidad, G.R. Nos. 207154 & 222046

Felonies are committed not only by means of deceit (dolo), but likewise by means of fault (culpa). There is deceit when the wrongful act is performed with deliberate intent; and there is fault when the wrongful act results from imprudence, Negligence, lack of foresight or lack of skill. 35 "In intentional crimes, the act itself is punished; in Negligence or imprudence [quasi-offenses], what is principally penalized is the mental attitude or condition behind the act, the dangerous recklessness, lack of care or foresight, the imprudencia punible." 36

In Jabalde v. People, 37 the Court explained:

[T]he term "dolo" or "malice" is a complex idea involving the elements of freedom, intelligence, and intent. The element of intent is described as the state of mind accompanying an act, especially a forbidden act. It refers to the purpose of the mind and the resolve with which a person proceeds. On the other hand, the term "felonious" means, inter alia, malicious, villainous, and/or proceeding from an evil heart or purpose. With these elements taken together, the requirement of intent in intentional felony must refer to malicious intent, which is a vicious and malevolent state of mind accompanying a forbidden act. 38 (Citation omitted)

Intentional felony requires the existence of dolus malus — that the act or omission be done willfully, maliciously, with deliberate evil intent, and with malice aforethought. 39 In culpable felonies or criminal Negligence, the injury inflicted on another is unintentional, the wrong done being simply the result of an act performed without malice or criminal design. 40

A careful perusal of the provision of Article 171 of the Revised Penal Code, which defines and penalizes falsification of public documents, would readily reveal that the perpetrator must perform the prohibited act with deliberate intent in order to incur criminal liability thereunder, thus:

Article 171. Falsification by Public Officer, Employee or Notary or Ecclesiastical Minister. — The penalty of Prision mayor and a fine not to exceed 5,000 pesos shall be imposed upon any Public Officer, employee, or notary who, taking advantage of his official position, shall falsify a document by committing any of the following acts:

1. Counterfeiting or imitating any handwriting, signature, or rubric;

Document: Manuel vs. People (G.R) (CASE-476 SCRA 461) | Section: Syllabi

• Same; Same; Same; Same; For one to be criminally liable for a felony by dolo, there must be a confluence of both an evil act and an evil intent—actus non facit reum, nisi mens sit rea.—As gleaned from the Information in the RTC, the petitioner is charged with bigamy, a felony by dolo (deceit). Article 3, paragraph 2 of the Revised Penal Code provides that there is deceit when the act is performed with deliberate intent. Indeed, a felony cannot exist without intent. Since a felony by dolo is classified as an intentional felony, it is deemed voluntary. Although the words “with malice” do not appear in Article 3 of the Revised Penal Code, such phrase is included in the word “voluntary.” Malice is a mental state or condition prompting the doing of an overt act without legal excuse or justification from which another suffers injury. When the act or omission defined by law as a felony is proved to have been done or committed by the accused, the law presumes it to have been intentional. Indeed, it is a legal presumption of law that every man intends the natural or probable consequence of his voluntary act in the absence of proof to the contrary, and such presumption must prevail unless a reasonable doubt exists from a consideration of the whole evidence. For one to be criminally liable for a felony by dolo, there must be a confluence of both an evil act and an evil intent. Actus non facit reum, nisi mens sit rea.

• Same; Same; Same; Same; As a general rule, mistake of fact or good faith of the accused is a valid defense in a prosecution for a felony by dolo—such defense negates malice or criminal intent.—The petitioner is presumed to have acted with malice or evil intent when he married the private complainant. As a general rule, mistake of fact or good faith of the accused is a valid defense in a prosecution for a felony by dolo; such defense negates malice or criminal intent. However, ignorance of the law is not an excuse because everyone is presumed to know the law. Ignorantia legis neminem excusat.

Document: Oliveros, Jr. vs. People, G.R. No. 242552 (DSR-G.R. No. 242552) | Section: Article 6 of the Revised Penal Code (RPC), as amended defines the stages of a felony in the following manner

Article 6 of the Revised Penal Code (RPC), as amended defines the stages of a felony in the following manner:

Document: People vs. Pilen, G.R. No. 254875 (DSR-G.R. No. 254875) | Section: Art. 6 of the RPC defines the stages of a felony as follows

Art. 6 of the RPC defines the stages of a felony as follows:

Document: Two District And Separate Murders (G.R. No. L-30251,) (CASE-96 SCRA 86) | Section: (a) *Generally

(a) Generally

In a number of jurisdictions, the word felony is defined by statute. In this jurisdiction, a felony is defined as the acts and omissions punishable by law, performed with deliberate intent (like MURDER) or through fault.

The Spanish Penal Code defines felony as voluntary acts and omissions punishable by law. The Revised Penal Code suppressed the word “voluntary” in defining felonies. Thus, it defines felonies as “acts or omissions punishable by law.”

The suppression of the word “voluntary” in said definition does not mean that the acts and omission punishable by law need not be voluntary in order to constitute felonies. Such word was suppressed because it is already implied in the concept of felonies, for article 3 of the Code provides that felonies are committed not only by means of “deceit” (dolus) by also by means of fault, and there is deceit according to the same article, when the act is performed with “deliberate intent.” If in order to commit a felony it is necessary to act with deliberate intent, it must follow that the act must necessarily be voluntary.

It is not enough to do what the law prohibits or omit to do what it commands. In order that a felony may exist, an act or omission alone is not sufficient. It is necessary that the act or the omission be committed by means of deceit (dolus) or by means of fault (culpa).

There is deceit (dolus) when the act is performed with deliberate intent. The word “dolus” approximately means the same as “wilfully”, “maliciously” with malice aforethought” as used in English and American statutes to designate a form of criminal intent. (U.S. vs. Ah Chong, 15 Phil. 488)

There is dolus when the act is a free, intelligent and intentional act. Pacheco says: “Without intention to do wrong or criminal intention, there can be no crime.” So also Silvela: “Where there is no intention, there is no crime.” So also Bishop: “Crime proceeds only from a criminal mind”.

Document: Two District And Separate Murders (G.R. No. L-30251,) (CASE-96 SCRA 86 (2)) | Section: (a) *Generally

(a) Generally

In a number of jurisdictions, the word felony is defined by statute. In this jurisdiction, a felony is defined as the acts and omissions punishable by law, performed with deliberate intent (like MURDER) or through fault.

The Spanish Penal Code defines felony as voluntary acts and omissions punishable by law. The Revised Penal Code suppressed the word “voluntary” in defining felonies. Thus, it defines felonies as “acts or omissions punishable by law.”

The suppression of the word “voluntary” in said definition does not mean that the acts and omission punishable by law need not be voluntary in order to constitute felonies. Such word was suppressed because it is already implied in the concept of felonies, for article 3 of the Code provides that felonies are committed not only by means of “deceit” (dolus) by also by means of fault, and there is deceit according to the same article, when the act is performed with “deliberate intent.” If in order to commit a felony it is necessary to act with deliberate intent, it must follow that the act must necessarily be voluntary.

It is not enough to do what the law prohibits or omit to do what it commands. In order that a felony may exist, an act or omission alone is not sufficient. It is necessary that the act or the omission be committed by means of deceit (dolus) or by means of fault (culpa).

There is deceit (dolus) when the act is performed with deliberate intent. The word “dolus” approximately means the same as “wilfully”, “maliciously” with malice aforethought” as used in English and American statutes to designate a form of criminal intent. (U.S. vs. Ah Chong, 15 Phil. 488)

There is dolus when the act is a free, intelligent and intentional act. Pacheco says: “Without intention to do wrong or criminal intention, there can be no crime.” So also Silvela: “Where there is no intention, there is no crime.” So also Bishop: “Crime proceeds only from a criminal mind”.

Document: Valenzuela vs. People (G.R. No. L-45975,) (CASE-525 SCRA 306) | Section: Syllabi

It is from the actus reus and the mens rea, as they find expression in the criminal statute, that the felony is produced. As a postulate in the craftsmanship of constitutionally sound laws, it is extremely preferable that the language of the law expressly provide when the felony is produced. Without such provision, disputes would inevitably ensue on the elemental question whether or not a crime was committed, thereby presaging the undesirable and legally dubious set-up under which the judiciary is assigned the legislative role of defining crimes. Fortunately, our Revised Penal Code does not suffer from such infirmity. From the statutory definition of any felony, a decisive passage or term is embedded which attests when the felony is produced by the acts of execution. For example, the statutory definition of murder or homicide expressly uses the phrase “shall kill another,” thus making it clear that the felony is produced by the death of the victim, and conversely, it is not produced if the victim survives.

We next turn to the statutory definition of theft. Under Article 308 of the Revised Penal Code, its elements are spelled out as follows:

“Art. 308. Who are liable for theft.—Theft is committed by any person who, with intent to gain but without violence against or intimidation of persons nor force upon things, shall take personal property of another without the latter’s consent.

Theft is likewise committed by:

1. 1. Any person who, having found lost property, shall fail to deliver the same to the local authorities or to its owner;
2. 1. Any person who, after having maliciously damaged the property of another, shall remove or make use of the fruits or object of the damage caused by him; and
3. 1. Any person who shall enter an inclosed estate or a field where trespass is forbidden or which belongs to another and without the consent of its owner, shall hunt or fish upon the same or shall gather cereals, or other forest or farm products.

Document: Interpretation and Construction of Penal Statutes (G.R. Nos. 74226-27, L-289,) (CASE-175 SCRA 610) | Section: § V. Problems discussed

Under article 47 of the Revised Penal Code, enacted when the Supreme Court was of eight members, the imposition of the death penalty should be by unanimous decision of the members. Under the Judiciary Act of 1948 it is provided that whenever the judgment of the lower court imposes the death penalty, the case shall be determined by eight Justices of the Court, and that when eight Justices fail to reach a decision as therein provided, the penalty next lower in degree than the death penalty shall be imposed. A question arose whether this provision of the Judiciary Act should be given retroactive effect. A majority of the Members of the Supreme Court were of the opinion that the new law may be given retroactive effect so as to cover a case involving an offense committed prior to its enactment, on the ground that the matter referring to the number of Justices necessary for the imposition of the death penalty is merely one of procedure. Then Chief Justice Paras, however, believed that the requisite of unanimity among the Justices as to the propriety of the imposition of the death penalty is a substantive matter so that the new law may not be applied to cases involving crimes committed prior to its enactment as it is unfavorable to the accused. In an early case, it was held that although Act 1773, doing away with the jurisdictional requirement that private offenses must be commenced by complaint of the offended party, was procedural, it could not be applied retroactively to a case committed before the effectivity of the law (although the case was filed after its effectivity) because it was prejudicial to the accused.

It would seem that the better rule should be that whether a law is substantive or procedural, it should be given retroactive effect if it favors the accused; otherwise it should only have prospective operation.

The accused was charged for a violation of Art. 159 of the Revised Penal Code. The acts complained of occurred in or about and during the period from October 1, 1929 to December 1, 1929. The Revised Penal Code took effect on January 1, 1932 and prior to that date, there was no law punishing the offense of violation of conditional pardon. Although the accused pleaded guilty to the charge, the Supreme Court, through Justice Abad Santos, ruled:

Document: Gumabon vs. Director of the Bureau of Prisons (CASE-37 SCRA 420 (2)) | Section: Syllabi

1. Petitioners likewise, as was made mention at the outset, would rely on Article 22 of the Revised Penal Code which requires that penal judgment be given a retroactive effect. In support of their contention, petitioners cite U.S. v. Macasaet, U.S. vs. Parrone, U.S. v. Almencion, People v. Moran, and People v. Parel. While reference in the above provision is made not to judicial decisions but to legislative acts, petitioners entertain the view that it would be merely an exaltation of the literal to deny its application to a case like the present. Such a belief has a firmer foundation. As was previously noted, the Civil Code provides that judicial decisions applying or interpreting the Constitution, as well as legislation, form part of our legal system. Petitioners would even find support in the well-known dictum of Bishop Hoadley: “Whoever hath an absolute authority to interpret any written or spoken laws, it is he who is truly the law-giver to all intents and purposes, and not the person who first thought or spoke them.” It is to be admitted that constitutional law scholars, notably Frankfurter, Powell, and Thayer, in discussing judicial review as well as the jurist John Chipman Gray, were much impressed with the truth and the soundness of the above observations. We do not have to go that far though. Enough for present purposes that both the Civil Code and the Revised Penal Code allow, if they do not call for, a retroactive application.

Document: Act No. 3815 - An Act Revising the Penal Code and Other Penal Laws. (ACT-3815) | Section: ART. 4. Criminal liability*.—Criminal liability shall be incurred

ART. 4. Criminal liability.—Criminal liability shall be incurred:

By any person committing a felony (delito) although the wrongful act done be different from that which he intended.

By any person performing an act which would be an offense against persons or property, were it not for the inherent impossibility of its accomplishment or on account of the employment of inadequate or ineffectual means.

ART. 5. Duty of the court in connection with acts which should be repressed but which are not covered by the law, and in cases of excessive penalties.—Whenever a court has knowledge of any act which it may deem proper to repress and which is not punishable by law, it shall render the proper decision, and shall report to the Chief Executive, through the Department of Justice, the reasons which induce the court to believe that said act should be made the subject of penal legislation.

In the same way the court shall submit to the Chief Executive, through the Department of Justice, such statement as may be deemed proper, without suspending the execution of the sentence, when a strict enforcement of the provisions of this Code would result in the imposition of a clearly excessive penalty, taking into consideration the degree of malice and the injury caused by the offense.

Document: Gumabon vs. Director of the Bureau of Prisons (CASE-37 SCRA 420) | Section: Syllabi

1. Petitioners likewise, as was made mention at the outset, would rely on Article 22 of the Revised Penal Code which requires that penal judgment be given a retroactive effect. In support of their contention, petitioners cite U.S. v. Macasaet, U.S. vs. Parrone, U.S. v. Almencion, People v. Moran, and People v. Parel. While reference in the above provision is made not to judicial decisions but to legislative acts, petitioners entertain the view that it would be merely an exaltation of the literal to deny its application to a case like the present. Such a belief has a firmer foundation. As was previously noted, the Civil Code provides that judicial decisions applying or interpreting the Constitution, as well as legislation, form part of our legal system. Petitioners would even find support in the well-known dictum of Bishop Hoadley: “Whoever hath an absolute authority to interpret any written or spoken laws, it is he who is truly the law-giver to all intents and purposes, and not the person who first thought or spoke them.” It is to be admitted that constitutional law scholars, notably Frankfurter, Powell, and Thayer, in discussing judicial review as well as the jurist John Chipman Gray, were much impressed with the truth and the soundness of the above observations. We do not have to go that far though. Enough for present purposes that both the Civil Code and the Revised Penal Code allow, if they do not call for, a retroactive application.

Document: Interpretation and Construction of Penal Statutes (G.R. Nos. 74226-27, L-289,) (CASE-175 SCRA 610) | Section: § IV. Substantive provisions—problems encountered

Excessive penalty.—“In case of doubt in the interpretation or application of laws, it is presumed that the lawmaking body intended right and justice to prevail,” but in a somewhat countervailing vein, the Revised Penal Code mandates that “when a strict enforcement of the provisions of this Code would result in the imposition of a clearly excessive penalty, taking into consideration the degree of malice and the injury caused by the offense,” “the court shall submit to the Chief Executive, through the Department of Justice, such statement as may be deemed proper, without suspending the execution of the sentence.” On the other hand, the Constitution provides that

1. “excessive fines shall not be imposed, nor cruel, degrading or inhuman punishment inflicted,” not to mention the fact that the present Constitution now provides for protection against human rights violations.

Document: Acharon vs People (G.R. No. 224946) (CASE-AVP511-rw) | Section: Syllabi

The criminal statute must also provide for the overt acts that constitute the crime. For a crime to exist in our legal law, it is not enough that mens rea be shown; there must also be an actus reus.

It is from the actus reus and the mens rea, as they find expression in the criminal statute, that the felony is produced. As a postulate in the craftsmanship of constitutionally sound laws,it is extremely preferable that the language of the law expressly provide when the felony is produced. Without such provision, disputes would inevitably ensue on the elemental question whether or not a crime was committed, thereby presaging the undesirable and legally dubious setup under which the judiciary is assigned the legislative role of defining crimes. Fortunately, our Revised Penal Code does not suffer from such infirmity. From the statutory definition of any felony, a decisive passage or term is embedded which attests when the felony is produced by the acts of execution**. For example, the statutory definition of murder or homicide expressly uses the phrase “shall kill another,” thus making it clear that the felony is produced by the death of the victim, and conversely, it is not produced if the victim survives.

Actus reus is the act (or sometimes an omission or state of affairs) indicated in the definition of the offense charged together with (1) any consequences of that conduct which are indicated by that definition; and (2) any surrounding circumstances so indicated (other than references to the mens rea or element of negligence required on the part of the defendant, or to any defense). [Footnote *: ]

In addition to a physical element consisting of committing a prohibited act, creating a prohibited state of affairs, or omitting to do that which is required by the law, the actus reus requires the conduct in question to be willed; this is

107

usually referred to as voluntariness. The doing of the prohibited act or conduct must involve a mental element. It is this mental element, that is the act of will, which makes the act or conduct willed or voluntary.

Document: Acharon vs People (G.R. No. 224946) (CASE-AVP511-rw) | Section: Syllabi

Remedial Law; Criminal Procedure; Burden of Proof; View that the prosecution always bears the burden of proving the actus reus, the mental element of voluntariness of the actus reus, and the mens rea mental element.—Actus reus is the act (or sometimes an omission or state of affairs) indicated in the definition of the offense charged together with (1) any consequences of that conduct which are indicated by that definition; and (2) any surrounding circumstances so indicated (other than references to the mens rea or element of negligence required on the part of the defendant, or to any

23

Document: Acharon vs People (G.R. No. 224946) (CASE-AVP511-rw) | Section: Syllabi

On the other hand, mens rea is the subjective or mental element of an accused’s intention to commit a crime, or knowledge that an accused’s action or lack of action would cause a crime to be committed, or willful blindness or recklessness that an accused’s actus reus would cause a crime to be perpetrated.

But mens rea, properly understood, does not encompass all of the mental elements of a crime. As stated, the actus reus has its own mental element; the act must be the voluntary act of an accused for the actus reus to exist.

Mens rea, on the other hand, refers to the guilty mind, the wrongful intention, of an accused. Its function in criminal law is to prevent the conviction of the morally innocent — those who do not understand or intend the consequences of their acts.

Mens rea is a contemporaneous mental element comprising an intention to carry out the prohibited physical act or omission to act; that is to say a particular state of mind such as the intent to cause, or some foresight of, the results of the act or the state of affairs.

Thus, typically, mens rea is concerned with the mental element accompanying the consequences of the prohibited actus reus.

The prosecution always bears the burden of proving the actus reus, the mental element of voluntariness of the actus reus, and the mens rea mental element. Therefore, in certain situations, a person who committed a prohibited physical act still could not be found guilty. A number of examples come to mind.

For instance, if a person in a state of automatism as a result of a blow on the head committed a prohibited act that

108

this person was not consciously aware of committing, the latter could not be found guilty. The mental element involved in committing a willed voluntary act and the mental element of intending to commit the act were absent. Thus neither the requisite actus reus or mens rea for the offense was present.

Document: Act No. 3815 - An Act Revising the Penal Code and Other Penal Laws. (ACT-3815) | Section: ART. 4. Criminal liability*.—Criminal liability shall be incurred

ART. 4. Criminal liability.—Criminal liability shall be incurred:

By any person committing a felony (delito) although the wrongful act done be different from that which he intended.

By any person performing an act which would be an offense against persons or property, were it not for the inherent impossibility of its accomplishment or on account of the employment of inadequate or ineffectual means.

ART. 5. Duty of the court in connection with acts which should be repressed but which are not covered by the law, and in cases of excessive penalties.—Whenever a court has knowledge of any act which it may deem proper to repress and which is not punishable by law, it shall render the proper decision, and shall report to the Chief Executive, through the Department of Justice, the reasons which induce the court to believe that said act should be made the subject of penal legislation.

In the same way the court shall submit to the Chief Executive, through the Department of Justice, such statement as may be deemed proper, without suspending the execution of the sentence, when a strict enforcement of the provisions of this Code would result in the imposition of a clearly excessive penalty, taking into consideration the degree of malice and the injury caused by the offense.

Document: Acharon vs People (G.R. No. 224946) (CASE-AVP511-rw) | Section: Syllabi

As early as the twelfth century, however, in large part through the influence of the canon law, it was established that there must also be a mental element combined with the prohibited act to constitute a crime. That is to say that an accused must have meant or intended to commit the prohibited act. The physical act and the mental element which together constitute a crime came to be known as the actus reus denoting the act, and the mens rea for the mental element.

Violations of Section 5(e) and Section 5(i) have the requisite actus reus and mens rea elements. In deciding the merits of a criminal case, the analysis should always start from and refer to these elements and not from anywhere or to anything else.

The following excerpt from Valenzuela v. People, G.R. No. 160188, June 21, 2007, supplies the rationale for this starting point of every criminal case analysis:

The long-standing Latin maxim “actus non facit reum, nisi mens sit rea” supplies an important characteristic of a crime, that “ordinarily, evil intent must unite with an unlawful act for there to be a crime,” and accordingly, there can be no crime when the criminal mind is wanting. Accepted in this jurisdiction as material in crimes mala in se, mens rea has been defined before as “a guilty mind, a guilty or wrongful purpose or criminal intent,” and “essential for criminal liability.” It follows that the statutory definition of our mala in se crimes must be able to supply what the mens rea of the crime is, and indeed the U.S. Supreme Court has comfortably held that “a criminal law that contains no mens rea requirement infringes on constitutionally protected rights.”

106

Document: Aberratio Ictus (G.R. No. 208719,) (CASE-AUL396-rw) | Section: Document Body

the perpetrator has committed an intentional crime. [Footnote *: ] (Underlining supplied)

The second wrong victim situation, sometimes called aberratio ictus, or more poetically, a mistake of the bullet that has led to the controversy surrounding the doctrine of transferred intent. In the second situation, the perpetrator aims at X but by chance or lack of skill hits Y. The appropriateness of assessing criminal liability as though the bullet had found its intended mark depends heavily upon one’s evaluation of the importance of the identity of the victim as an element of the offense in question.” [Footnote *: ]  (Underlining supplied)

(2) CONCRETE/PRINCIPLED APPROACH – It is called the principled approach because it follows the principles of criminal liability. It can only be accepted that the accused intended to kill the unintended victim if it can be demonstrated or proved that the accused knew his blow could (possibly) strike the unintended victim (foreseeability — dolus eventualis, or if he did not, he ought to have foreseen. One merely applies the ordinary principles violating the intention, especially dolus eventualis. If the accused lacked intention with respect to the unintended victim’s death, he cannot be convicted of murder and this intention to kill the intended victim cannot be used as a substitute for the actual victim. If the accused did not foresee but ought to have foreseen then he is guilty of culpable homicide. It is not an abstract intention but concrete and tangible. This approach derives support from Holmes JAinS v. Mtshiza. [Footnote *: ]  (Underlining supplied)

623

a. Cases of Concrete Principle Approach (Two [2]) Local Decisions in a Foreign Court**

1. CASE: S v. Mtshiza, 1970, AD

Document: Aberratio Ictus (G.R. No. 208719,) (CASE-AUL396-rw) | Section: Document Body

A N N O T A T I O N

ABERRATIO ICTUS

An Annotation on the case of People of the Philippines v. Ronger Ringor Umawid, G.R. No. 208719, June 9, 2014, 725 SCRA 597

by

ALICIA GONZALEZ-DECANO, DCL, OP. [Footnote *: ]

620

harmed him bitterly. In short, this is how aberratio ictus comes in.

§ II. Definition of Terms

Insecurity – exists when there is a complete deprivation of intelligence while committing the act i.e., where the accused is deprived of reason, he acts without the least discernment because there is a complete absence of power to discern, or there is total deprivation of freedom of the will.

Treachery – there is treachery when the offender commits any of the crime against the person, employing means, methods or forms in the execution thereof which tend directly and specially to insure its execution, without risk to himself arising from the defense which the offended party might make.

Delito compuesto– a compound crime where a single act produces two or more grave or less grave felonies. It is a complex crime in single terms. [Footnote *: ]

Aberratio Ictus– “going astray of the blow.” There is no mistake in such instances, but the consequences merely turn out to be different than the accused expected. [Footnote *: ]

Dolus eventualis – means foreseeability of the accused did not but he ought to have foreseen.

§ III. Discussion

The first part of this discussion refers to a foreign setting while the second part refers to the case in Philippine setting which is captioned in the title of this article.

621

The aberratio ictus rule derives from two 1949 cases (RV Kuzwayo and RV Koza) which cited an example of a situation or an example of a case in this manner: A had intention to kill C but killed B. A is guilty of murder without the prosecution having to prove specific intention with regard to B. [Footnote *: ] (Underlining supplied)

In the example given above, there are two approaches to this defense namely: Transferred Intent/Policy Approach and Concrete/Principled Approach.

The first approach is explained in this manner:

Document: Jurisprudential Abreaction to the Ex Post Facto Law and Prospectivity of Laws (G.R. Nos. 115835-36,) (CASE-ATP170-rw) | Section: Document Body

As a general rule, penal laws should not have a retroactive application, lest they acquire the character of an ex post facto law. An exception to this rule, however, is when the law is advantageous to the accused. According to Mr. Chief Justice Araullo, this is “not as a right” of the offender, “but founded on the very principles on which the right of the State to punish and the commination of the penalty are based, and regards it not as an exception based on political considerations, but as a rule founded on principles of strict justice.” (Valeroso v. People, 546 SCRA 450 [2008])

Thus, when in a sentence of conviction it appears that the defendant voluntarily confessed his guilt in court before the prosecution presented its evidence, such voluntary confession shall be taken into account in a petition for habeas cor-

706

pus to give effect to Article 22 of the Revised Penal Code. (Rodriguez v. Director of Prisons, 57 Phil. 133 [1932])

Document: Interpretation and Construction of Penal Statutes (G.R. Nos. 74226-27, L-289,) (CASE-175 SCRA 610) | Section: § V. Problems discussed

“x x x The application of the rule on constructive notice in the construction of Art. 91 of the Revised Penal Code would most certainly be favorable to the accused since the prescriptive period of the crime shall have to be reckoned with earlier, i.e, from the time the notarized deed of sale was recorded in the Registry of Deeds. In the instant case, the notarized deed of sale was registered on May 26, 1961. The criminal informations for falsification of a public document having been filed only on October 18, 1984, or more than ten (10) years from May 26, 1961, the crime for which the accused was charged has prescribed. The Court of Appeals, therefore, committed no reversible error in affirming the trial court’s order quashing the two informations on the ground of prescription.”

The message of this decision is that even in the matter of prescription of offenses, that interpretation concerning the computation and reckoning of the prescriptive period most favorable to the accused must be adopted.

Document: Aberratio Ictus (G.R. No. 208719,) (CASE-AUL396-rw) | Section: Document Body

(1) TRANSFERRED INTENT/POLICY APPROACH  – Is exemplified in the following manner: (a) transferring the accused’s intent to kill/harm one person to apply in respect of the person actually killed; (b) there is never a prospect for the accused to be acquitted and it encourages versari in re illicita; (c) the accused will be liable for an unintended victim’s murder according to the generalized approach to mens rea. Murder consists of the unlawful, intentional killing a human being but the fact that the actual victim deflected from the unintended victim ought not to afford a defense. In the eyes of the accused he intended to kill the actual victim. [Footnote *: ]  (Underlining supplied)

The literature on transferred intent distinguishes two kinds of situations in which the wrong victim suffers harm at the hands of the accused. The first, sometimes called error in objectio which involves a mistake by the perpetrator as to the identity of the victim. A gunman aims at and shoots a pedestrian on the street; the assailant thought the pedestrian was X, but in fact he is Y. There is little controversy that these sort of mistake as to the identity of the victim in no way affects the fact that

622

Document: Intod vs Court of Appeals (G.R) (CASE-215 SCRA 52) | Section: Syllabi

Syllabi

• Criminal Law; Impossible crime; To be impossible, the act intended by the offender must be by its nature one impossible of accomplishment.—That the offense cannot be produced because the commission of the offense is inherently impossible of accomplishment is the focus of this petition. To be impossible under this clause, the act intended by the offender must be by its nature one impossible of accomplishment. There must be either (1) legal impossibility, or (2) physical impossibility of accomplishing the intended act in order to qualify the act as an impossible crime.

• Same; Same; Same; Legal impossibility occurs where the intended acts even if completed, would not amount to a crime.—Legal impossibility occurs where the intended acts, even if completed, would not amount to a crime. Thus: Legal impossibility would apply to those circumstances where (1) the motive, desire and expectation is to perform an act in violation of the law; (2) there is intention to perform the physical act; (3) there is a performance of the intended physical act; and (4) the consequence resulting from the intended act does not amount to a crime.

• Same; Same; Same; Factual impossibility occurs when extraneous circumstances unknown to the actor or beyond his control prevent the consummation of the intended crime.—On the other hand, factual impossibility occurs when extraneous circumstances unknown to the actor or beyond his control prevent the consummation of the intended crime. One example is the man who puts his hand in the coat pocket of another with the intention to steal the latter’s wallet and finds the pocket empty.

• Same; Same; There is a difference between the Philippine and the American laws regarding the concept and appreciation of impossible crimes.—The aforecited cases are the same cases which have been relied upon by Respondent to make this Court sustain the judgment of attempted murder against Petitioner. However, we cannot rely upon these decisions to resolve the issue at hand. There is a difference between the Philippine and the American laws regarding the concept and appreciation of impossible crimes.

Document: Intod vs Court of Appeals (G.R) (CASE-215 SCRA 52) | Section: Syllabi

• Same; Same; Same; In the Philippines, the Revised Penal Code, in Article 4(2) expressly provided for impossible crimes and made them punishable.—In the Philippines, the Revised Penal Code, in Article 4(2), expressly provided for impossible crimes and made them punishable. Whereas, in the United States, the Code of Crimes and Criminal Procedure is silent regarding this matter. What it provided for were attempts of the crimes enumerated in the said Code. Furthermore, in said jurisdiction, the impossibility of committing the offense is merely a defense to an attempt charge. In this regard, commentators and the cases generally divide the impossibility defense into two categories: legal versus factual impossibility.

• Same; Same; Same; In American law, there is no such thing as an impossible crime.—To restate, in the United States, where the offense sought to be committed is factually impossible of accomplishment, the offender cannot escape criminal liability. He can be convicted of an attempt to commit the substantive crime where the elements of attempt are satisfied. It appears, therefore, that the act is penalized, not as an impossible crime, but as an attempt to commit a crime. On the other hand, where the offense is legally impossible of accomplishment, the actor cannot be held liable for any crime–—neither for an attempt nor for an impossible crime. The only reason for this is that in American law, there is no such thing as an impossible crime. Instead, it only recognizes impossibility as a defense to a crime charge–—that is, attempt.

• Same; Same; Same; In our jurisdiction, impossible crimes are recognized.—This is not true in the Philippines. In our jurisdiction, impossible crimes are recognized. The impossibility of accomplishing the criminal intent is not merely a defense, but an act penalized by itself. Furthermore, the phrase “inherent impossibility” that is found in Article 4(2) of the Revised Penal Code makes no distinction between factual or physical impossibility and legal impossibility. Ubi lex non distinguit nec nos distinguiere debemos.

• Same; Same; Same; Factual impossibility of the commission of the crime is not a defense.—x x x Factual impossibility of the commission of the crime is not a defense. If the crime could have been committed had the circumstances been as the defendant believed them to be, it is no defense that in reality the crime was impossible of commission.

• Same; Same; Same; Legal impossibility is a defense which can be invoked to avoid criminal liability for an attempt.—Legal impossibility, on the other hand, is a defense which can be invoked to avoid criminal liability for an attempt.

Document: Intod vs Court of Appeals (G.R) (CASE-215 SCRA 52) | Section: Article 4 , paragraph 2 is an innovation of the Revised Penal Code. This seeks to remedy the void in the Old Penal Code where

Legal impossibility, on the other hand, is a defense which can be invoked to avoid criminal liability for an attempt. In U.S. vs. Berrigan, the accused was indicted for attempting to smuggle letters into and out of prison. The law governing the matter made the act criminal if done without the knowledge and consent of the warden. In this case, the offender intended to send a letter without the latter’s knowledge and consent and the act was performed. However, unknown to him, the transmittal was achieved with the warden’s knowledge and consent. The lower court held the accused liable for attempt but the appellate court reversed. It held unacceptable the contention of the state that “elimination of impossibility as a defense to a charge of criminal attempt, as suggested by the Model Penal Code and the proposed federal legislation, is consistent with the overwhelming modern view.”. In disposing of this contention, the Court held that the federal statutes did not contain such provision, and thus, following the principle of legality, no person could be criminally liable for an act which was not made criminal by law. Further, it said:

Congress has not yet enacted a law that provides that intent plus act plus conduct constitutes the offense of attempt irrespective of legal impossibility until such time as such legislative changes in the law take place, this court will not fashion a new non-statutory law of criminal attempt.

To restate, in the United States, where the offense sought to be committed is factually impossible of accomplishment, the offender cannot escape criminal liability. He can be convicted of an attempt to commit the substantive crime where the elements of attempt are satisfied. It appears, therefore, that the act is penalized, not as an impossible crime, but as an attempt to commit a crime. On the other hand, where the offense is legally impossible of accomplishment, the actor cannot be held liable for any crime–—neither for an attempt nor for an impossible crime. The only reason for this is that in American law, there is no such thing as an impossible crime. Instead, it only recognizes impossibility as a defense to a crime charge–—that is, attempt.

This is not true in the Philippines. In our jurisdiction, impossible crimes are recognized. The impossibility of accomplishing the criminal intent is not merely a defense, but an act penalized by itself. Furthermore, the phrase “inherent impossibility” that is found in Article 4(2) of the Revised Penal Code makes no distinction between factual or physical impossibility and legal impossibility.Ubi lex non distinguit nec nos distinguiere debemos.

Document: People vs. Callao, G.R. No. 228945 (DSR-G.R. No. 228945) | Section: PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, PLAINTIFF-APPELLEE, VS. HESSON CALLAO Y MARCELINO AND JUNELLO AMAD, ACCUSED, HESSON CALLAO Y MARCELINO, ACCUSED-APPELLANT. DECISION

Thus, the requisites of an impossible crime are: (1) that the act performed would be an offense against persons or property; (2) that the act was done with evil intent; and (3) that its accomplishment was inherently impossible, or the means employed was either inadequate or ineffectual.[67]

The third element, inherent impossibility of accomplishing the crime, was explained more clearly by the Court in the case of Intod v. Court of Appeals[68] in this wise:

Under this article, the act performed by the offender cannot produce an offense against persons or property because: (1) the commission of the offense is inherently impossible of accomplishment; or (2) the means employed is either (a) inadequate or (b) ineffectual.

That the offense cannot be produced because the commission of the offense is inherently impossible of accomplishment is the focus of this petition. To be impossible under this clause, the act intended by the offender must be by its nature one impossible of accomplishment. There must be either (1) legal impossibility, or (2) physical impossibility of accomplishing the intended act in order to qualify the act as an impossible crime.

Legal impossibility occurs where the intended acts, even if completed, would not amount to a crime. xxx

x x x x

The impossibility of killing a person already dead falls in this category.

On the other hand, factual impossibility occurs when extraneous circumstances unknown to the actor or beyond his control prevent the consummation of the intended crime. xxx[69] (Emphasis supplied)

Document: Evidence To Be Believed Must Be Credible In Itself (G.R. No. 50631) (CASE-105 SCRA 241) | Section: (a) *Scope

(a) Scope

The charge of robbery with homicide, and, murder are covered by the Revised Penal Code. Hence, a part of criminal law.

Penal or criminal law is that branch or division of law which defines crimes, treats of their nature and provides for their punishment. (Abbot L.D.)

Scope of criminal law

The definition quoted above refers to the substantive criminal law. Substantive criminal law relates to the definition and classification of crimes generally, the criminal act, the criminal intent, the capacity to commit crime and exemptions from criminal liability, the parties to crime, and finally, a consideration of the elements or characteristics of particular offenses.

The law of criminal procedure consists of the rules according to which the substantive criminal law itself is administered.

In its broader phases, criminal law is concerned not only with the substantive criminal law and the criminal procedure but with all of the legal relations which are involved in the commonly used expression “the administration of criminal justice,” which includes the organization of courts of criminal jurisdiction, probation, parole, prison administration, juvenile courts and laws designed to change social and industrial conditions in order to prevent crime.

Function of criminal law

Document: Hopeless Mess of our Criminal Law System (G.R. No. 115988) (CASE-254 SCRA 745) | Section: § 4. Comingling of special and penal code crimes and penalties renders enforcement and administration of our penal laws more difficult and unwieldy

Judicial creativeness and innovations should be concentrated more on procedural matters the formulations of which had strictly been judicialized under the 1987 Constitution. When it comes to the definition of crimes and ordination of their punishment, such is a distinct function that must be left to the legislature and no court decision should tamper with what the lawmakers have written. If there are defects of deficiencies let Congress correct itself instead of the courts indulging in judicial craftsmanship.

Document: Hopeless Mess of our Criminal Law System (G.R. No. 115988) (CASE-254 SCRA 745) | Section: § 4. Comingling of special and penal code crimes and penalties renders enforcement and administration of our penal laws more difficult and unwieldy

Inspite of the clear differentiation of the rules for the determination of the indeterminate sentences provided by this positive law, decisions also confuse its application. Classic example of this is the recent decision of the Supreme Court in the case of People v. Simon. The majority decision in said case considered drug-related offenses as punished under the penal code, clearly a strained if not a twisted interpretation. As Mr. Justice Davide, Jr. in his dissent said, the fact that the amendments to the Dangerous Drugs Act by Rep. Act No. 7659 adopted penal code nomenclature of penalties does not make those offenses punished by the Revised Penal Code.

Another disturbing decision concerning penalties is that announced in People v. Lucas, holding that the penalty of reclusion perpetua, which was given a duration of 20 years and one day to forty years by Rep. Act No. 7659, is still an indivisible penalty. Justification for this ruling are quotations from the discussions of the legislators.

Mr. Justice Albert, that noted criminologist, has said that penalties which have fixed durations are divisible because they can be divided into periods. The Lucas decision is another example of an interpretation contrary to the clear wordings of the statute, because the legislature is always assumed to have intended what it wrote. It must be remembered that the primary guide in getting the meaning and intent of the law are the words of the statute itself. It is only when the words used are so ambiguous that interpretation and construction come into play. But even so, in interpreting and construing a statute, it is the intention of the legislature that is the objective. The remarks of the legislators may only express their individual intents but they do not necessarily mean the intent of the lawmaking body. It is the collective intent of the legislators assembled as a body that counts, not the individual views of each or any group of them. The reason is that the legislative assembly transacts business and exercises its functions as a body.

In the case under annotation, the Supreme Court expressed its aversion to the mixture or comingling of penalties. Yet, this is what the Court is doing in many of its decisions.

Perhaps it is now time to re-examine objectives, to the end that the wordings of penal legislations may be more simplified to insure their effective enforcement and application, and that court decisions be more direct and simply worded instead of exhibitions of literary prowess. We should evolve our own style of legal writing along uncomplicated patterns instead of copycatting from others.

Document: Hopeless Mess of our Criminal Law System (G.R. No. 115988) (CASE-254 SCRA 745) | Section: § 4. Comingling of special and penal code crimes and penalties renders enforcement and administration of our penal laws more difficult and unwieldy

§ 4. Comingling of special and penal code crimes and penalties renders enforcement and administration of our penal laws more difficult and unwieldy

The comingling of special and penal code offenses and penalties in our system of criminal law had, no doubt, spawned more controversies and made the enforcement and administration of our penal laws more difficult and complicated.

The application of the Indeterminate Sentence Law alone is a classic example. The said law provides for different rules in its application to penal code felonies, on one hand, and to special crimes, on the other. Thus, it provides that—

“*** in imposing a prison sentence for an offense punished by the Revised Penal Code, or its amendments, the court shall sentence the accused to an indeterminate sentence the maximum term of which shall be that which, in view of the attending circumstances, could be properly imposed under the rules of said Code, and the minimum of which shall be within the range of the penalty next lower to that prescribed by the Code for the offense;”

whereas,

“*** if the offense is punished by any other law, the court shall sentence the accused to an indeterminate penalty, the maximum of which shall not exceed the maximum fixed by said law and the minimum term of which shall not be less than the minimum term prescribed by the same.”

It is clear from the foregoing provision of the law that in applying it to offenses penalized by the Revised Penal Code, the attendant modifying circumstances have to be taken into account in ascertaining the penalty imposable, and in fixing the minimum of the indeterminate sentence to be imposed on the accused, the court shall go down to the penalty next lower in degree. In the cases punished by special laws, however, the modifying circumstances are totally ignored and that the penalty next lower in degree is never considered, and the rationale behind this different rule is that in special laws, there are usually no modifying circumstances and that they do not provide graduation of penalties or divisions thereof into degrees.

Document: The Malum Prohibitum Doctrine in Philippine Criminal Law (G.R. No. 07578) (CASE-223 SCRA 606) | Section: § 1. What is an offense malum prohibitum?

§ 1. What is an offense malum prohibitum?

According to prior decisions an offense malum prohibitum is an act not inherently immoral but becomes so because its commission is expressly forbidden by law; an offense not such of itself but because prohibited by statute; an illegal act because of the prohibition of the law; evil because it is prohibited; and, it is consummated by the very fact of its performance.

In a case, Justice Moreland said that in many crimes made such by statutory enactment, the intention of the person who commits the crime is entirely immaterial. In these crimes the evil to society and to the Government does not depend upon the state of mind of the one who performs the prohibited act, but upon the effect which the act has upon the public mind.

In short, an offense malum prohibitum is a punishable act not because it is inherently evil according to social moral standards, but simply because the law prohibits its performance. Intent or motive on the part of the doer is generally irrelevant, in contrast with dolo or mens rea felonies.

Document: The Malum Prohibitum Doctrine in Philippine Criminal Law (G.R. No. 07578) (CASE-223 SCRA 606) | Section: § 7. Observations on the case under annotation

It would have been an impossibility for the accused Wilkins and Leonor in applying for a permit or license to possess their firearms prior to their having the specifications of said weapons, and while they were in a foreign country and in their flight to the Philippines. P.D. 1866 could not have intended to punish an impossible act. And the penalty provided for in 1866 is heavier than the penalty provided for in the Tariff and Customs Code, and it is a postulate of criminal law that when the same act is punished by two different laws, that provided for in the law imposing a lighter penalty must be imposed.

The quashal of the information against Wilkins and the acquittal of Leonor by Judge Dizon were not therefore entirely erroneous. It was the reason used that was off-tangent. And the Prosecution Service could have filed the proper charge instead of filing administrative charges against Judge Dizon, because such quashal and acquittal did not bar the filing of the proper charge as the offense defined and punished in the Tariff and Customs Code is different and distinct from that defined and punished under P.D. 1866.

Lawyers, especially the members of the Prosecution Service, should not only update themselves with the decisions of the Supreme Court; they must also familiarize themselves with the various legislations punishing certain acts as offenses. And by way of concluding statement, it is pertinent to quote what Mr. Justice (later Chief Justice) Makalintal said in one case:

If in the mind of a judge a particular course of action is the appropriate thing to do in a case, he cannot be held to account for the action he has taken, for that is the very essence of judicial inquiry; otherwise, the burdens of judicial office would be intolerable.23

Misapplication of certain doctrines has happened even in some decisions of the Highest Court of the land, and this too happens, with more reason in trial courts’ adjudication. Precisely, appeals is the remedy to correct possible errors that may be committed by trial courts, for without appeals, there would be no need for appellate courts. With the monumental clogged dockets of the trial courts, whose function is not only to gather the pertinent facts (trial) but also to research, draft and render their decisions, absolute perfection from them cannot possibly be expected.

With these observations as guide it is perhaps just and proper for the High Court to be more tolerant and cautious in the exercise of its power of disciplining and removing judges of lower courts.